UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA    SAN  DIEGO 

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3  1822  00295  5649 


IVERSITY   OF   CALIFORNIA,   SAN   DItUU 
LA  JOLLA,  CALIFORNIA 


NIVEBSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA    SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  00295  5649 


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I 


OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  CHRIST 

An  Historical  Approach 

BY 

LUCIUS   HOPKINS   MILLER 

Professor  of  Biblical  Instruction,  Princeton 
University.    $1.00  net. 

Discusses  the  sources  of  our  information  re- 
garding Christ,  His  life,  teaching  and  Divinity. 

"The  reverence  of  faith  is  blended  with  the 
freedom  of  the  scholar.  Admirable." — Dean 
Hodges  in  The  Atlantic  Monthly. 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

PUBLI8HBR8  NEW  TORK 


BERGSON   AND/, 
RELIGION     '^^-^ 


/ 


BY 


LUCIUS  HOPKINS  MILLER 

Assistant  Professor  of  Biblical  Instruction  in 
Princeton  University 


NETT  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

1916 


COFTBiaBT,  1916 
BY 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


Publithed  May,  1916 


THE    OUINN    «    BODEN    CO.   PREil 
RAHWAr,    N.   J. 


PREFACE 

As  the  reader  will  quickly  see,  this  is  not 
primarily  a  book  on  philosophy,  but  a  book  on 
religion.  Otherwise  the  writing  of  it  should 
have  been  left  to  a  philosopher,  and  that  I  do 
not  pretend  to  be.  Still,  the  ground  covered 
lies  between  the  two  subjects  (or,  rather,  over- 
laps both)  and  might  therefore  be  considered 
open  to  occupancy  by  students  of  either  sub- 
ject. Theoretically,  there  is  no  reason  why  a 
philosopher's  religious  deductions  should  be 
any  more  reliable  than  the  philosophical  de- 
scriptions of  a  student  of  religion,  for  just  as 
philosophy  has  its  intricacies  so  religion  also 
has  its  subtleties,  and  the  subtleties  of  religion 
can  be  caught  only  through  that  insight  which 
is  bestowed  by  an  intimate  historical  under- 
standing. In  this  task  the  application  of  philo- 
sophical criteria  may  harm  as  well  as  help. 

It  is  commonly  thought,  however,  that  the 
philosopher  has  more  right  in  the  field  of  re- 
ligion than  the  student  of  religion  has  in  the 
field  of  philosophy,  and  I  must  admit  that. 


IV 


PREFACE 


judging  by  past  performance,  there  is  ground 
for  this  opinion.  It  is  generally  true  that  the 
philosopher  is  more  at  home  in  religion  than 
the  student  of  religion  is  in  philosophy.  I  do 
not  think  that  he  should  be,  but  he  undoubtedly 
has  been.  However,  I  have  noticed  among 
philosophers  the  marked  habit  of  carrying  the 
metaphysical  "  big  stick  "  wherewith  to  beat 
into  subjection  recalcitrant  facts  of  religious 
history  and  psychology.  This  will  not  do,  even 
though  it  is  a  natural  tendency  and  very  hard 
to  avoid.  Because  it  is  so  hard  for  the  philoso- 
pher to  resist  this  temptation,  and  because  the 
student  of  the  history  of  religion  is  likely  to 
be  more  scientifically  respectful  in  dealing 
with  religious  facts,  there  is  much  to  be  said 
for  "  a  fair  field  and  no  favor  "  when  a  pro- 
posed discussion  necessarily  involves  both  sub- 
jects. I  trust  that  in  the  philosophical  parts 
of  this  study  philosophers  may  not  find  the 
presentation  inadequate  or  mistaken.  I  have 
at  least  tried,  as  best  one  may,  to  rid  myself 
of  prejudice  and  to  present  the  facts  exactly 
as  they  lie. 

To  obviate  possible  misunderstanding  let 
me  state  definitely  what  my  plan  is.    It  is  not 


PREFACE  V 

my  aim  to  give  a  complete  picture  of  Bergson's 
thought,  nor  is  it  my  purpose  to  criticise  his 
work.  These  things  belong  to  philosophical 
specialists  and  they  have  been  taken  care  of 
in  adequate  fashion.  The  religious  effects  of 
this  important  phase  of  recent  thought  have 
not  been  adequately  dealt  v^^ith  hitherto,  and 
tliis  fact  constitutes  the  raison  d'etre  of  the 
book.  To  discuss  these  effects  satisfactorily 
I  have  been  obliged  to  present,  as  briefly  as 
clearness  would  permit,  the  outstanding  em- 
phases of  Bergson's  position.  This,  and  this 
alone,  is  what  I  have  tried  to  do  in  the  philo- 
sophical portions  of  what  follows. 

The  problem  may  be  put  thus:  If  Berg- 
son's doctrine  be  completely  accepted,  what 
results  for  religion?  The  reader  will  soon  dis- 
cover that  I  sympathize  with  the  teaching  of 
Bergson  at  many  points,  both  on  philosophical 
and  on  religious  grounds,  but  there  are  also 
elements  in  his  system  which  I  find  difficult  to 
accept.  In  other  words,  I  am  not  a  Berg- 
sonian.  But,  among  other  things,  I  agree  with 
Bergson  in  this,  that  the  discovery  of  the  whole 
truth  of  the  universe  is  not  the  task  of  any 
one  man.    It  requires  the  work  of  many  men 


vi  PREFACE 

and  many  minds  to  win  those  approximations 
to  truth  which  are  open  to  mortal  beings. 
Nevertheless,  Bergson  has  struck  a  vein,  glis- 
tening and  valuable,  from  which  much  pure 
and  precious  metal  may  be  mined.  This  is 
particularly  true  for  the  student  of  religion 
and,  through  him,  for  religious  leaders  and 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  laity.  At  least  this  is 
my  firm  conviction,  a  conviction  that  has  arisen 
and  matured  through  a  study  of  Bergson  which 
was  begun  without  any  presuppositions,  purely 
out  of  a  general  desire  for  information,  and 
without  any  idea  of  writing  a  book.  The  think- 
ing world  is  weary  of  negations.  It  is  even 
more  weary  of  dogmatic  assertions.  It  must 
know,  but  it  wishes  also  to  believe.  Bergson 
teaches  us  that  we  may  believe  without  blink- 
ing the  facts,  and  this,  I  take  it,  is  the  bottom- 
most yearning  of  the  educated  world  today. 
I  may  add  that  Bergson  is  the  outstanding 
literary  exponent  of  those  new,  virile,  construc- 
tive forces  which  are  manifesting  themselves  so 
conspicuously  in  the  bearing  of  France  at  the 
present  moment.  No  one  can  fully  under- 
stand the  spiritual  background  of  the  present 
situation  without  knowing  what  Bergson  and 


PREFACE  vii 

others  like  him  have  been  contributing  towards 
a  revival  of  faith  among  Frenchmen. 

I  do  not  maintain  that  the  religious  infer- 
ences I  have  drawn  from  Bergson's  thought 
are  all  that  might  conceivably  be  drawn,  nor 
do  I  deny  that  other  and  different  conclusions 
might  consistently  be  reached.  I  do  hold  that 
the  religious  consequences  indicated  in  this 
book  are  not  only  compatible  with  Bergsonian 
doctrine  but  are  also  those  towards  which  his 
thinking  most  clearly  points.  We  know  very 
little  about  Bergson's  own  religious  views,  but 
he  has  conditionally  promised  to  enlighten  us 
later.  Interesting  and  important  as  this  in- 
formation will  be,  it  is  not  an  essential  matter. 
The  effect  of  a  man's  thought  goes  out  beyond 
him  and  beyond  his  power  of  control,  and  it  is 
conceivable  that  it  may  traverse  legitimate 
paths  that  are  quite  different  from  those  which 
he  himself  may  wish  to  mark  out  for  it.  I 
shall  be  surprised,  however,  if  the  ultimate 
publication  of  Bergson's  conception  of  religion 
does  not  reveal  a  viewpoint  which  will  justify 
the  conclusions  of  this  book.  ' 

In  any  case,  I  can  say  with  earnestness  that 
Bergson  has  thrown  light  for  me  upon  several 


vHi  PREFACE 

puzzling  religious  questions,  and  the  result  has 
been  a  quickened  appreciation  of  certain  fun- 
damental religious  truths  and  a  greater  desire 
to  experience  their  benefits.  Some  of  these 
truths,  interpreted  in  the  light  of  Bergson, 
reveal  anew  the  fact  that  orthodox  religionists 
have  often  obstructed  their  own  path.  Others 
show,  with  a  new  clarity,  who  the  age-old 
enemies  of  religion  really  are.  The  result  re- 
minds one  of  the  parable  of  the  householder 
who  brings  out  of  his  store  things  old  and 
things  new.  And  that  is  what  we  are  all  seek- 
ing, a  result  that  includes  a  belief  in  the  good- 
ness of  the  old  wine  without  thereby  denying 
the  possibility  of  new  vintages  of  new  and 
satisfying  flavor.  These  too  may  yield  pure, 
unadulterated  wine.  In  other  words,  if  "  God 
is  in  His  heaven,"  all  has  not  yet  been  given 
to  the  world,  and  we  of  the  latter  days  may 
share  with  our  forefathers  the  zest  of  quest, 
discovery,  and  creative  evolution,  even  in  re- 
ligion. 

I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  append  a 
bibliography  of  the  well-nigh  two  hundred 
books,  articles,  and  reviews— French,  German, 
and  English — which  have  been  consulted  in  the 


PREFACE  ix 

preparation  of  this  book.  A  goodly  number 
of  these  are  referred  to  in  the  notes.  An  ex- 
cellent bibliography  is  to  be  found  in  the  Eng- 
lish edition  of  Time  and  Free  Will  ( 1910) ,  and 
another  has  been  published  separately  by  the 
Columbia  University  Library  (1913).  INIore 
recent  literature  can  be  found  by  consulting 
the  various  philosophical  reviews. 

Chapters  I  and  V  have  already  appeared  as 
articles  in  the  Biblical  World  and  in  the  Jour- 
nal of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific 
Methods,  respectively.  I  am  indebted  to  the 
editors  of  these  publications  for  their  kind  per- 
mission to  reprint  these  articles  here. 

I  wish  to  thank  my  colleagues,  Professor 
Roger  Bruce  Cash  Johnson,  Professor  Charles 
G.  Osgood,  and  Professor  Edward  Gleason 
Spaulding,  for  their  kindness  in  reading  parts 
of  the  manuscript,  and  for  valuable  criticism 
and  suggestions. 

Lucius  Hopkins  Miller. 

Princeton,  New  Jersey, 
February,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAOB 

I.    Preliminary  Observations  .       .  3 

II.   Bergson  The  Protestant    .       .  27 

III.   How  Do  We  Know  Reality?     .  59 

IV.    Creative  Evolution     ...  90 

V.    Intuition  and  the  Primacy  of 

Spirit 148 

VI.    Individual  Freedom     .       .       .185 

VII.    Immortality 237 

Index 277 


BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 


CHAPTER  I 
PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS 

The  motto  i:)refixed  by  Pogson  to  his  English 
translation  of  Bergson's  Essai  siir  les  donnces 
immediatcs  de  la  conscience  ^  is  the  following 
characteristic  quotation  from  Plotinus : 

If  a  man  were  to  inquire  of  Nature  the  reason  of 
her  creative  activity,  and  if  she  were  willing  to  give 
ear  and  answer,  she  would  say :  "  Ask  me  not,  but 
understand  in  silence,  even  as  I  am  silent  and  am 
not  wont  to  speak." 

This  is,  of  course,  a  half-truth,  but  that  half- 
truth  may  help  to  carry  us  into  the  very  depths 
of  the  Bergsonian  position.  The  words  of 
Plotinus  have  in  them  a  touch  of  fundamental 
religious  feeling,  and  if,  in  any  real  sense, 
Bergson's  thought  pursues  the  path  of  "  under- 
standing silence,"  we  may  expect  to  find  in 
that  thought  definite  religious  implications. 
If   that    is    so,    Bergson    should    be    of    in- 

*  English  title,  Time  and  Free  Will. 
3 


4  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

terest  to  all  who  believe  in  the  significance  of 
religion. 

To  be  sure,  Bergson's  thought  may,  and  in- 
deed it  does,  suggest  religious  implicates  which 
are  at  variance  with  widely  accepted  interpre- 
tations of  the  religious  life.  But  for  one  who 
believes  in  the  reality  of  a  progressive  revela- 
tion of  God  in  human  history — and  is  this  not 
biblical  and  Christian? — departure  from  exist- 
ing forms  of  faith  will  not  necessarily  disturb 
fundamental  faith  itself.  JNIere  change  of  air 
is  often  invigorating.  There  is  such  a  thing  as 
a  healthy  mental  disturbance,  for  mental  peace 
and  placidity  are  often  only  the  precursors  of 
spiritual  slumber.  To  those  who  wish  to  main- 
tain a  religion  of  mere  peace  and  placidity,  if 
such  a  thing  be  possible,  I  would  suggest  that 
they  shun  the  influence  of  Bergson's  philoso- 
phy. Set  and  final  forms,  rigid  and  unchang- 
ing formulations,  do  not  flourish  in  its  at- 
mosphere. 

On  the  other  hand,  Bergson  strikes  certain 
notes  which  harmonize  with  age-old  religious 
themes.  Many  thinkers  ob j  ect  to  him  because, 
as  they  say,  he  is  too  old-fashioned ;  because  he 
merely  voices  in  new  form  ideas  which  are  too 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  5 

old  to  be  any  longer  regarded — Heracleitan 
ideas,  neo-Platonic  ideas ;  because  he  resurrects 
conceptions  which  have  been  conclusively  dis- 
proved, as,  for  example,  the  independent  exist- 
ence of  the  soul  and  the  possibiHty  for  man  of 
at  least  a  modicum  of  absolute  knowledge. 
These  conflicting  opinions  whet  curiosity,  and 
one  wonders  whether  this  philosophy  may  not 
contain  new  values  for  religious  thought,  espe- 
cially in  a  day  when  men  are  longing  as  much 
as  ever  for  the  great  religious  verities  but  are 
often  unable  to  find  them  satisfactorily  in  or- 
thodox forms  of  interpretation. 

Thus  far,  comparatively  little  attention  has 
been  paid  to  the  religious  aspects  of  Bergson's 
thought.  A  few  books  and  articles  discuss 
this  question,  but  they  are  without  exception 
either  haphazard  in  method  or  otherwise  un- 
satisfactory.-    Naturally  enough,  most  of  the 

'  Among  others,  compare  the  following:  E.  Hermann, 
Eucke.n  and  Bergson:  Their  Significance  for  Christian  Thought 
(Boston);  A.  S.  Mories,  "Bergson  and  Mysticism,"  Tre*^- 
minster  Revieio  (June,  1912) ;  Underbill,  "  Bergson  and  the 
Mystics,"  Living  Age  (March  IG,  1912);  Macintosh,  "Bergson 
and  Religion,"  Biblical  World  (January,  1913);  Gcrrard, 
"Bergson,  Newman  and  Aquinas,"  Catholic  World  (March, 
1913);  Douglas,  "Christ  and  Bergson,"  North  American  Re- 
view (April,  1913) ;  E.  LeRoy,  A  New  Philosophy;  Henri  Berg- 


6  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

literature  dealing  with  Bergson  has  consisted 
of  reviews,  criticisms,  and  expositions  of  his 
philosophy  as  such.  This  emphasis  still  con- 
tinues in  spite  of  the  feeling  of  surfeit  which 
is  beginning  to  manifest  itself.  This  monot- 
onous repetition  of  description  has  had  its  value, 
however,  in  extending  to  wider  and  wider  cir- 
cles an  acquaintance,  however  superficial,  with 
this  philosophy.  But  even  lay  readers  are  now 
beginning  to  ask  what  bearing,  if  any,  this  new 
method  of  viewing  the  universe  may  have  upon 
religious  thought. 

Another  reason  for  the  comparative  lack  of 
religious  emphasis  in  the  literature  of  the  sub- 
ject is  the  fact  that  Bergson  does  not  anticij^ate 
himself.  He  has  promised  us  for  the  days  to 
come  a  discussion  of  both  religion  and  ethics, 
provided  he  feels  when  the  time  comes  that 
his  results  in  these  directions  contribute  some- 
thing new  to  human  thought.    He  is  careful 

son  (1913);  K.  Bornhausen;  "Die  Philosophic  Henri  Bergsons 
und  ihre  Bedeutung  fiir  den  ReligionsbegriiF,"  Zeitschrift  fur 
Theologie  und  Kirche  (1910);  Charles  Corbiere,  "  Le  dieu  de 
M.  Bergson,"  Revue  de  theologie  et  des  questions  religieuses 
(March,  1910);  A.  Joussain,  Romantisme  et  religion  (Alcan, 
Paris,  1910)  ;  C.  Coignet,  De  Kant  a  Bergson.  Reconciliation 
de  la  religion  et  de  la  science  dans  un  spiritualisme  nouveau 
(Alcan,  Paris,  1911).. 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  7 

and  conservative  in  what  he  publishes  and  has 
himself  said  that  much  of  his  work  has  never 
reached  the  lioht  of  publication  because  the 
results  were  inconclusive.  His  own  words 
are: 

Throughout  my  philosophical  career  I  have  never 
felt  that  I  was  under  the  obligation  of  writing  a 
book.  Many  of  the  lines  of  investigation  which  I 
pursued  led  me  nowhere,  and  I  did  not  think  it 
necessary  to  give  the  world  "  news  from  nowhere." 
It  was  only  when  I  readied  a  ]:)ositive  answer  to  a 
question  tliat  I  embodied  it  in  a  book. 

I  still  feel  the  same  way.  If  my  studies  of  ethics 
and  religion  do  not  throw  new  light  upon  these 
vexed  problems,  I  will  not  encumber  the  world  with 
an  additional  book.  But  if  my  method  enables  me 
to  grasp  certain  aspects  of  the  problem  which  have 
eluded  others,  I  shall  endeavor  to  make  others  see 
the  things  which  I  saw.^ 

Ber^son  may  come  to  a  negative  conclusion 
regarding  the  publication  of  his  religious  and 
ethical  researches,  but  I  do  not  think  this  is 
likely  to  be  the  case.  On  occasion  he  has  made 
specific  references  to  these  questions  and  in  a 

*  Dr.  I.ouis  I.evine's  interview  with  Bergson.  Cf.  the  Xew 
York  Times,  February  22,  1914. 


8  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

sympathetic  tone.  For  instance,  Levine's  in- 
terview, just  quoted,  contains  these  statements 
also: 

.  .  .  the  craving  for  rehgious  experience  will  re- 
main and  probably  grow  stronger  as  time  goes  on. 
The  religious  feeling  [in  Professor  Bergson's  philo- 
sophical interpretation]  is  the  sense  of  not  being 
alone  in  this  world,  the  sense  of  a  relationship  be- 
tween the  individual  and  the  spiritual  source  of  life. 

And  again: 

....  This  source  of  life  is  undoubtedly  spirit- 
ual. Is  it  personal?  Probably.  ...  of  course,  per- 
sonal in  a  different  way,  without  all  those  accidental 
traits  which  in  our  minds  form  part  of  personality 
and  which  are  bound  up  with  the  existence  of  the 
body.  But  personal  in  a  larger  sense  of  the  term — a 
spiritual  unity  expressing  itself  in  the  creative 
process  of  evolution. 

Useful  as  these  statements  are,  they  are  at 
best  merely  straws  indicating  which  way  the 
wind  is  blowing.  At  the  present  time,  if  one 
is  to  characterize  the  religious  effects  of  Berg- 
son's thought,  he  must  do  it  chiefly  by  means 
of  inferences  drawn  from  the  main  emphases 
of  the  philosophy.  These  emphases  can  be  de- 
termined with  sufficient  certainty,  and  it  is  as 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  9 

legitimate  as  it  is  interesting  and  valuable  to 
discuss  tentatively  the  relation  of  these  em- 
phases to  religious  thought  and  life. 

The  imagination  of  the  educated  world  has 
been  fired  by  this  man ;  especially  in  France,  of 
course,  but  only  less  so  in  England  and  in 
America.  He  has  many  admirers  in  Italy  and 
in  other  countries,  and  even  Germany,  wedded 
as  she  is  to  her  own  processes  of  thought,  has 
recognized  his  significance.  The  modernists  in 
Europe,  particularly  in  France,  are  turning  to 
Bergson  for  inspiration  and  support.  On 
the  social  side,  the  syndicalists  are  appealing 
to  him  and,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly, 
are  finding  in  his  philosophy  a  j^oint  d'ap- 
pui  for  their  own  views  regarding  the  social 
order. 

More  generally,  thinking  people  throughout 
the  civilized  world  have  come  to  realize  that 
here  is  a  new  force  to  be  reckoned  with,  a  new 
view  to  be  seriously  considered.  Leaders  of 
thought  have  long  since  recognized  that  there 
has  not  yet  been  time  in  which  mentally  to 
digest  the  mass  of  new  facts  brought  to  light 
by  scientific  investigation.  Those  who  know 
the  history  of  human  thought  and  the  circum- 


10  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

stances  which  give  rise  to  new  philosophies 
have  reahzed  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  an 
attempt  to  reassess  the  meaning  of  hfe  in  the 
light  of  the  new  knowledge.  Even  the  rank 
and  file  of  men,  who  necessarily  lag  behind  and 
gather  up  the  crumbs  which  fall  from  the 
tables  of  the  masters,  have  come  to  feel  that 
a  new  interpretation  of  life  was  due.  Many 
have  been  looking  in  eager  expectancy  for  such 
an  interpretation  in  the  hope  that  old  values 
might  be  conserved  while  forms  and  interpreta- 
tions more  suited  to  the  temper  and  informa- 
tion of  the  age  were  being  wrought  out.  Thus, 
whether  attracted  or  repelled,  all  informed 
men  are  at  least  curious  regarding  this  new 
jjhilosophy.  It  is  therefore  a  pertinent  and  a 
timely  matter  to  attempt  to  decide  what  its  re- 
ligious values  may  be. 


The  kind  and  degree  of  interest  one  has  in 
a  task  of  this  sort  depend  upon  the  theory  one 
holds  regarding  the  relation  of  philosophy  and 
religion  to  one  another.  One  may  start  with 
the  presupposition  that  philosophy  is  the  be-all 
and  end-all  of  any  attempt  to  unify  the  ap- 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         11 

parently  conflicting  facts  of  human  existence; 
that  one  must  first  have  a  complete  philosophy 
of  the  universe  hefore  he  can  hegin  to  discuss 
the  question  of  religion.  For  such  a  man  phi- 
losophy determines  religion  and  the  latter  must 
ever  be  subservient  to  the  former. 

This  is  what  the  Hegelians  have  generally 
done  and,  it  must  be  admitted,  with  great  suc- 
cess, if  the  size  and  quality  of  a  following  are 
tests  of  success.  One  has  but  to  read  Edward 
Caird's  Evolution  of  Religion  to  see  this  point 
of  view  at  its  best.  Here  evolutionary  idealism 
is  the  key  used  with  a  sure  and  clever  hand  to 
unlock  the  door  to  the  mysteries  of  religious 
truth  and  history.  I  may  remark  in  passing 
that  when  the  door  is  opened,  in  the  case  of 
Caird  at  least,  we  are  led  directly  to  Chris- 
tianity as  the  goal  of  all  our  seeking.  Of 
course,  for  those  who  think  in  this  way,  who 
believe  that  philosophy  should  dominate  re- 
ligion, there  is  little  use  in  discussing  the  re- 
ligious value  of  a  philosophy  until  they  have 
settled  the  one  all-important  and  prior  ques- 
tion: "  What  philosophy  should  be  espoused?  " 
The  primary  interest  of  such  men  is  in  the  com- 
parison of  philosophies,  in  order  to  determine 


12  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

that  philosophy  to  which  one  should  yield  ad- 
herence. When  that  adherence  is  achieved,  it 
is  merely  a  question  of  determining  the  kind  of 
religion  which  such  a  philosophy  may  allow 
or  suggest.  A  discussion  of  the  religious  val- 
ues of  other  philosophies  becomes,  in  this  in- 
stance, a  more  or  less  idle  and  academic  dis- 
cussion. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  those  who  hold 
that  it  is  religion  which  necessarily  deter- 
mines one's  philosophy.  We  need  not  here 
take  into  account  the  "  man  on  the  street." 
Such  a  man  may  have  his  philosophy,  but  it  is 
necessarily  crude  and  undeveloped.  If  he  is 
a  religious  "  man  on  the  street,"  he  will  more 
than  likely  be  suspicious  of  all  philosophy  on 
the  general  and  not  wholly  despicable  supposi- 
tion that  all  intellectual  speculation  regarding 
supermundane  matters  is  profitless,  or  worse. 
There  are,  however,  large  sections  of  the  reli- 
gious world  in  which,  because  of  certain  his- 
torical processes,  religion  has  come  to  exercise 
a  dominant  authority  over  philosophy.  The 
Roman  Catholic  position  is  the  best  illustra- 
tion of  this,  although  this  point  of  view  is  not 
at  all  limited  to  Roman  Catholics.    Protestant 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         13 

theologians  also  have  held  that  only  one  form 
of  philosophical  thought  was  consistent  with 
Christian  revelation — a  philosophy  necessarily 
determined,  so  they  thought,  by  the  character 
of  that  revelation. 

This  tendency,  at  least  so  far  as  Roman 
Catholics  are  concerned,  is  due  to  a  historical 
development,  through  which,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  philosophy  first  impressed  the  iron  heel 
of  its  authority  upon  religion.  The  vogue  of 
Aristotle  in  the  mediaeval  world,  especially 
from  the  time  of  Thomas  Aquinas,  estab- 
lished a  connection  between  the  Aristote- 
lian philosophy  and  the  Christian  religion 
which  still  persists  in  the  Roman  Catho- 
lic Church  and  seems  well-nigh  unbreakable. 
The  modernist  movement  continues  its  nib- 
bling process,  but  there  does  not  seem  to  be 
any  likelihood  of  its  producing  an  immediate 
effect  upon  the  great  mass  of  Roman  Catholic 
thinkers.  Of  course,  these  thinkers  now  be- 
lieve that  their  philosophy  is  as  divine  and  as 
unassailable  as  Christian  revelation  itself  and, 
from  a  very  early  time  after  the  Aristotelian 
conquest  of  the  Church,  the  exponents  of  ortho- 
dox theology  have  believed  that  this  philosophy 


14.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

inescapably  follows  from  the  religion.  This 
means  that  to  be  a  Christian  in  religion  is 
necessarily  to  be  an  Aristotelian  in  philosophy. 
The  traditional  dogmas  of  the  Church,  largely 
Augustinian,  were  fitted  into  the  Aristotelian 
framework  by  Aquinas  in  such  a  way  that  the 
two  elements  became  fused  and  the  aegis  of 
revelation  and  of  Church  authority  was  thrown 
over  both  alike.  Thus  Roman  Catholic  theolo- 
gians have  come  to  think  that  philosophy  is 
necessarily  subservient  to  religion;  that  there 
is  only  one  philosophy  capable  of  this  supreme 
submission,  the  revealed  Aristotelianism ;  that 
all  other  philosophies  are  anathema.  These 
theologians  represent  a  power  too  strong  and 
too  extensive  to  be  ignored. 

For  such  men  also  a  discussion  of  the  re- 
ligious significance  of  a  philosophy  is  an  idle 
discussion,  unless  it  be  a  discussion  of  the  reli- 
gious implicates  of  the  philosophy — the  phi- 
losophy which,  as  they  fondly  think,  religion 
necessarily  dictates  to  the  believer.  Indeed, 
such  thinkers  would  go  further  and  brand  such 
an  attempt  with  the  marks  of  skepticism  and 
infidelity,  because  there  can  be  only  one  phi- 
losophy   and    that   philosophy    is    the    divine 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         15 

philosophy — the  only  one  which  is  consistent 
with  divinely  revealed  religion/ 

The  charming  or,  as  some  would  prefer  to 
have  it,  the  distressing  variety  of  man's  mental 
operations  finds  one  of  its  best  illustrations  in 
the  subject  now  before  us.  After  leaving  our 
Catholic  friend,  who  insists  upon  the  essential 
connection  between  religion  and  philosophy — 
and  a  particular  philosophy  at  that — we  soon 
traverse  the  path  of  other  friends  quite  differ- 
ent. In  the  homes  of  these  people  also  Reli- 
gion is  a  welcome  guest,  but  welcome  because 
of  her  own  innate  charm.  She  does  not  need 
the  more  sophisticated  Dame  Philosophy  to  an- 
nounce her  entrance  into  the  drawing-room. 
She  does  not  ask  or  wish  the  worldly-wise 
Queen  of  the  Sciences  to  stand  at  her  elbow 
and  suggest  the  next  proper  step.  She  moves 
through  the  homes  of  men  with  the  sure  grace 
of  unconscious  simplicity.  In  fact,  according 
to  these  friends,  Dame  Philosophy  should  be 
barred  the  door.  She  has  been  such  a  dis- 
turbing  factor   at   previous   gatherings    that 

*  The  Aristotclianism  of  Roman  Catholic  thinkers  contains 
within  itself  the  principle  l)y  which  tiic  Church  justifies  the 
contention  that  there  is  no  other  ]ihi!nsophy.  Hence  the  un- 
breakable circle  of  thought  in  which  Catholic  theologians  move. 


16  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

her  presence  is  no  longer  desirable  or  per- 
missible. 

Christianity  is  an  inductive  religion  and 
Christian  theology  must  take  on  an  inductive 
character.  Fact  and  not  theory  is  the  import- 
ant thing  and  speculation  should  be  disowned. 
We  are  living  in  an  inductive  age  which  yields 
easily  to  agnosticism,  and  if  we  are  to  present 
religion  to  such  an  age  in  any  effective  manner 
we  must  adapt  our  religious  interpretation 
to  the  inductive  method  and  the  agnostic 
temper. 

According  to  Ritschl,  whom  we  may  take 
as  the  best  example  of  this  tendency  in  cur- 
rent thought,  reason  and  faith  must  be  sepa- 
rated— philosophy  and  religion  kept  apart. 
As  Edghill  says,  Ritschl  held  that  "...  the 
conclusions  of  practical  religion  are  supposed 
to  be  independent  of  and  irreconcilable  with 
the  results  of  the  theoretic  reason  .  .  .  reality 
is  unknowable  by  way  of  metaphysics  .  .  . 
[there  is]  a  line  of  absolute  demarcation  be- 
tween religious  and  theoretic  knowledge."  ^ 
And  Hermann  has  said,  "  It  makes  no  differ- 
ence to  a  Christian  whether  philosophically  he 

*  E.  A.  Edghill,  Faith  and  Fact :  A  Study  of  Bitschlianism. 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  17 

is  a  materialist  or  an  idealist."  ^  It  should  be 
added  that  this  position  is  of  a  kind  to  appeal 
to  "  the  man  on  the  street."  What  he  wants  is 
practice,  not  theory,  of  course.  What  he  is 
after  is  results,  no  matter  how  they  come  or 
how  their  coming  may  be  metaphysically  ex- 
plained. Thus,  among  average  people  as  well 
as  among  the  intellectual  "  quality,"  this  anti- 
metaphysical  metaphysics  has  an  imposing 
following. 

One  is  tempted  to  tarry  and  discuss  the 
validity  of  this  position  in  itself ;  to  ask  whether 
our  knowledge  can  thus  be  placed  in  two  or 
more  water-tight  compartments;  to  discuss 
whether  judgments  of  value  may  legitimately 
eliminate  judgments  of  fact,  judgments  of 
existence.  But  we  must  not  stop.  The  dis- 
cussion would  not  be  pertinent  for  present 
purposes.  What  we  need  to  realize  at  this 
point  is  merely  this :  for  such  as  the  Ritschlians, 
at  least  so  far  as  they  personally  are  con- 
cerned, our  question  is  once  more  an  idle  one. 

'  Quoted  by  Kdghill,  op.  cit.  One  must  remember,  however, 
that  there  are  Ritschlians  and  Ritschlians.  Ritschl  himself 
was  not  consistent  in  this  matter  of  the  relation  of  religion  to 
metaphysics,  and  there  are  striking  differences  between  the 
position  of  Hermann,  for  instance,  and  that  of  such  men  as 
Kaftan  and  Harnack, 


18  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

I  mean  the  question  of  the  rehgious  value  of  a 
given  philosophy.  A  given  philosophy  has  no 
religious  value  because  philosophy  as  such  has 
no  religious  value.  ^len  who  wish  to  keep 
young  that  way  may,  if  they  like,  gambol  in 
metaphysical  meadows  and  emit  philosophical 
pipings.  The  Ritschlian  is  rather  inclined  to 
think  such  an  attempt  at  a  renewal  of  youth 
will  prove  disappointing.  The  way  of  life  is 
not  there.  Reality  is  not  in  it.  It  is  all  dark- 
ness, fog,  uncertainty.  If  you  want  youth  and 
life,  come  over  into  the  fair  fields  of  religion. 
Drop  your  metaphysics  and  renew  your  faith, 
hope,  and  love  at  religion's  fount.  Give  over 
your  attempt  to  secure  religious  values  from 
philosophy,  or  even  to  assess  philosophy's  re- 
ligious value.     It  has  none. 

Needless  to  say,  this  book  will  not  interest 
such  men  except  that  men  of  all  schools  of 
thought  are  alike  in  this,  at  least,  that  their  ears 
itch  to  hear  what  others  say  about  them.  As 
for  the  subject  itself,  there  is  nothing  in  it. 
It  is  a  no-thing. 

•  •••••• 

In  considering  the  foregoing  positions  I 
have  already  given  by  implication  that  view  of 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         19 

the  relation  between  religion  and  philosophy 
which  commends  itself  to  me  as  most  reason- 
able and  true.  To  say  that  philosophy  deter- 
mies  religion  is,  in  the  long  run,  to  eliminate 
religion  in  favor  of  philosophy;  it  is  to  turn 
religion  into  philosophy.  Still,  we  may  re- 
assure ourselves  with  Lincoln's  reminder,  in 
his  famous  sheep  anecdote,  that  "  calling  a  tail 
a  leg  doesn't  make  it  one."  On  the  other  hand, 
to  think  that  religion  can  determine,  or  ever 
has  determined,  philosophy  is  merely  to  mis- 
read and  misinterpret  the  history  of  human 
thought. 

Those,  no  doubt,  are  nearer  the  truth  who 
say  that  the  two — philosophy  and  religion — 
move  in  different  spheres  and  do  not  touch. 
They  would  be  still  nearer  the  truth,  I  think, 
did  they  grant  some  measure  of  contact  or 
influence,  even  while  insisting  upon  a  real  in- 
dependence. That  many  men  today,  over- 
borne by  the  inductive  method  of  modern 
science  and  the  temptation  to  agnosticism,  are 
unable  to  react  spontaneously  to  the  appeal  of 
metaphysics,  may  argue  a  defect  in  them  quite 
as  easily  as  it  may  indicate  unreality  and  im- 
practicality  in  metaphysical  effort. 


20  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

That  religious  faith  is  generated  apart  from 
metaphysics,  at  least  of  a  formal  or  conscious 
sort ;  that  religion  is  in  a  very  real  sense  a  scion 
of  the  House  of  Humanity,  quite  as  old  and 
quite  as  independently  worthy  of  consideration 
as  philosophy — these  are  statements  whose 
truth  we  gladly  recognize  and  accept.  Its 
acceptance  need  not  prevent  our  recognizing 
other  complementary  truths  of  a  different 
order.  One  of  these  truths  is:  that  men  have 
perennially  felt  the  necessity  of  using  philos- 
ophy in  formulating  religious  experience. 
Feeling  is  fundamental,  perhaps,  but  if  it  is 
confined  to  one's  self  the  thought  comes,  "  Per- 
haps I  am  an  exception,  a  bit  queer."  If  the 
feeling  is  shared  with  others,  a  comparison  re- 
sults, which  leads  back  to  the  rationale  of  the 
feeling — that  is,  to  its  philosophy.  Or  again, 
action  is  insisted  upon,  perchance.  But  ac- 
tion, without  some  fundamental  purpose  to 
which  to  link  it,  soon  falters.  Be  it  ethical  or 
ritual,  the  act  soon  suggests  a  question  and  the 
question  leads  one  to  philosophy. 

For  the  individual,  therefore,  generally 
speaking,  philosophy  is  bound  to  assert  itself 
in  the  inevitable  attempt  to  make  more  clear 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         21 

and  reasonable  to  one's  self  a  faith  already 
held,  and  in  bringing  forward  supplementary 
considerations  which  may  set  the  religious  na- 
ture free  for  further  gains  of  faith.  In  other 
words,  philosoj)liy  often  accompanies  the  re- 
ligious life  of  the  individual,  now  consciously, 
now  unconsciously;  sometimes  preceding  the 
advance  of  religious  faith,  sometimes  follow- 
ing behind  to  consolidate  the  gains  made  by 
direct  frontal  attack. 

When  we  turn  from  the  individual  aspects 
of  religion  to  its  social  side,  we  find  philosophy 
still  dogging  our  steps.  There  has  been  mis- 
conception, no  doubt,  in  regard  to  the  way  in 
which  religion  actually  spreads  from  man  to 
man.  That  intellectual  argument  is  a  gun  of 
smaller  caliber  than  it  is  usually  thought  to 
be,  is  certainly  true.  Life,  and  naught  else, 
begets  life.  Religious  life,  and  naught  else, 
begets  religious  life.  Argue  with  your  neigh- 
bor until  the  flow  of  words  chokes  you  and 
he  will  still  persist  in  his  iniquity.  Live 
against  his  error  and  say  nothing;  soon  the 
cause  for  argument  will  have  disappeared. 
Nevertheless,  as  with  the  individual,  so  in  the 
spread  of  Beligion  from  man  to  man  philoso- 


22  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

phy  helps.  In  certain  cases  it  may  precede  the 
main  charge,  cutting  the  entanglements  and 
clearing  the  way.  In  following  up  these  ad- 
vances it  certainly  has  helped  to  preserve  the 
gains  so  as  to  make  continuity  of  combined 
action  possible.  That  the  forms  thus  produced 
have  often  been  given  an  exaggerated  im- 
portance, and  have  thus  been  made  harmful, 
is  no  necessary  argument  against  the  value  and 
inevitableness  of  their  rise. 

May  we  not  conclude,  then,  thai;  philosophy 
and  religion  do  indeed  represent  autonomous 
phases  of  human  life;  that  they  differ,  if  not 
in  their  material  and  in  their  goal,  at  least  in 
their  method;  but  that,  nevertheless,  they  are 
not  independent,  in  that  either  can  ignore  the 
other  entirely?  Certainly  philosophy  cannot 
ignore  religion,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
religion  is  a  great  fact  of  human  history;  and 
religion  cannot  ignore  philosophy,  not  merely 
because  the  philosophy  of  past  ages  has  pushed 
itself,  perhaps  to  an  unjustifiable  extent,  into 
the  territory  of  religion,  but  also  because  the 
studies  that  deal  with  the  human  personality, 
be  they  of  one  sort  or  of  another,  cannot  thus 
be  cut  asunder.    The  direct  experience  of  the 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS         23 

religious  believer  is  undeniable,  but  it  must  be 
tested,  or  checked  up,  by  the  reason.  The  grist 
of  religion  must  be  put  through  the  mill  of  phi- 
losophy that  man  may  secure  a  product  of  the 
very  highest  value,  with  the  chaff  of  ignorance 
and  of  illusion  winnowed  away.  It  is,  there- 
fore, no  idle  question,  but  one  of  supreme  mo- 
ment oftentimes,  to  ask  what  the  religious 
value  of  a  philosophy  may  be. 

It  is  conceivable  that  such  an  inquiry  as  this 
might  be  conducted  in  a  variety  of  ways  with 
an  equal  amount  of  profit,  though  of  differing 
kind.  One  might  study  the  relation  of  the 
philosophy  of  Bergson  to  religion  in  general. 
He  might  proceed  by  first  defining  religion 
in  general,  setting  forth  its  essential  features 
as  manifested  in  the  various  religions  of  man 
in  all  ages  and  climes ;  then,  taking  up  in  turn 
these  essential  features  of  religion,  he  might 
discuss  the  relation  to  them  and  the  effect  upon 
them  of  the  Bergsonian  ideas.  In  this  way  it 
might  be  found  that  certain  of  the  philosoph- 
ical ideas  under  examination  would  have  a 
positive  and  favorable  relation  to  religion, 
others  a  negative  relation,  and  still  others  a 


24  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

neutral  influence.  From  these  specific  con- 
clusions a  general  conclusion  might  be  drawn 
regarding  the  relation  to  religion  of  the  phi- 
losophy as  a  whole,  whether  favorable  or  un- 
favorable. 

Another  profitable  method  would  be  to  select 
a  particular  religion,  such  as  Christianity,  and 
apply  to  it  the  process  just  described.  First, 
define  the  essence  of  Christianity  and  then  pass 
judgment  upon  the  philosophy  in  accordance 
with  the  positive  or  negative  relation  of  its 
ideas  to  the  essential  elements  of  Christianity 
as  thus  defined. 

A  more  modest  plan  commends  itself  to  me 
and  yields  values  which  do  not  have  to  wait 
for  the  completion  of  such  extended  investiga- 
tions as  are  presupposed  in  the  previous  sug- 
gestions. These  values,  too,  are  not  at  all  to 
be  despised.  Let  us  yield  the  subjects,  "  Re- 
ligion in  General "  and  "  Essence  of  Chris- 
tianity." Have  we  not  already  had  a  suffi- 
ciency of  such  discussions?  Let  us  also  forego 
any  attempt  to  give  a  complete  description  of 
Bergson's  philosophy.  There  are  now  literally 
hundreds  of  books  and  articles,  in  English, 
French,  and  German,  not  to  speak  of  other 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS  25 

languages,  in  which  satisfactory  characteriza- 
tions of  Bergson's  philosophy  may  be  found. 
It  would  be  of  small  use,  but  rather  a  great 
weariness,  to  repeat  in  such  a  study  as  this 
what  has  been  so  often  and  so  excellently  done 
elsewhere.  The  modern  literary  world  would 
gain  much  by  recalling  the  caution  of  the  wise, 
even  though  overwise,  author  of  Ecclesiastes, 
"  Of  making  many  books  there  is  no  end;  and 
much  study  is  a  weariness  of  the  flesh." 

It  is  possible,  therefore,  to  assume  a  knowl- 
edge of  these  details  or,  at  least,  to  refer  to 
others  the  reader  who  desires  them.  For  the 
same  reason,  and  for  other  reasons  as  well,  no 
attempt  at  a  criticism  of  the  philosophy  need 
be  made.  That  is  being  attended  to  by  the 
philosophers,  ably,  loquaciously,  and  vocifer- 
ously. Our  task  would  be  large  enough  in 
itself  to  excuse  us  from  embroiling  ourselves 
in  these  other  matters.  To  turn  to  these  things 
would  prove  too  tempting;  they  are  so  com- 
plicated and  so  interesting.  Besides,  others 
are  attending  to  them  in  a  thoroughly  com- 
petent way. 

We  would  be  children  of  wisdom  should  we 
limit  ourselves  to  the  single  task  of  passing 


26  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

in  review  the  outstanding  Bergsonian  em- 
phases for  the  sake  of  drawing  any  possible 
inferences  in  a  religious  direction,  but  with 
special  reference,  perhaps,  to  Christianity. 
We  might  thus  determine  what  would  be  the 
religious  result  of  a  complete  acceptance  of 
the  Bergsonian  philosophy  and  thus  determine 
whether,  and  how  far,  this  philosophy  is  com- 
patible with  religion,  and  especially  with  the 
Christian  religion.    As  LeRoy  says: 

The  present  question  of  the  relation  of  Bergson 
to  morality  and  religion  is,  not  to  find  bases  for  the 
latter  in  his  philosophy,  but  to  know  whether  they 
are  compatible.  It  is  not  a  question  of  deducing 
morality  and  religion  from  what  is  already  given, 
but  whether  there  is  room  for  new  intuitions  along 
these  lines — intuitions  of  different  orders  of  life/ 

^Edouard  LeRoy,  A  New  Philosophy:  Henri  Bergson 
(1913). 


CHAPTER  II 

BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT 

Some  of  the  greatest  changes  in  human  his- 
tory have  begun  with  protests.  The  human 
mind,  connected  with  Reahty  by  a  slight 
thread  as  it  often  seems,  swings  backward  and 
forward  pendulum-like,  never  able  to  main- 
tain itself  at  the  plumb-line  for  more  than  a 
fraction  of  a  second  at  a  time — seconds  of  in- 
sight, immediately  past,  whose  interpretation 
has  to  be  figured  out  at  the  inevitable  angle 
of  the  succeeding  swing.  We  may  not  quar- 
rel with  the  law  of  our  being  but  only  recog- 
nize and  master  it.  To  pursue  the  figure, 
perhaps  the  clock  would  stop  without  the  pen- 
dulum-swing. Maintenance  upon  the  plumb- 
line  of  thought  might  prove  the  end  of  all 
progress.  Surely  it  would  be  deadly  dull.  Be 
these  things  as  they  may,  we  have  to  reckon 
with  the  fact  of  action  and  reaction,  extreme 
and  revulsion  from  the  extreme.  And  if  this 
shuttle-like  movement  of  thought  is  a  necessary 
law  of  human  development,  then  protests  and 

27 


28  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

protesters  are  fundamentally  grounded  in  the 
very  philosophy  of  history  itself.  ^ 

I  do  not  forget  that  we  are  at  present  bored, 
and  rightly  so,  by  the  omnipresent  "  muck- 
raker."  The  "  muck-raker,"  as  distinguished 
from  the  genuine  reformer,  is  a  sham  Prot- 
estant; a  child  of  littleness  who  is  either  an 
insincere  imitator,  for  reasons  best  known  to 
himself  and  best  not  known  by  others,  or  one 
whose  humanitarianism  is  so  expansive  and  so 
unballasted  that  it  cannot  be  confined  within 
reasonable  limits;  one  whose  sense  of  dispro- 
portion varies  directly  as  the  square  of  his 
charitable  feeling  or,  in  other  cases,  of  his 
overweening  self-interest.  The  "  muck-raker  " 
is  the  modern  public  form  of  a  private  nuis- 
ance which  God  gave  man  from  the  beginning, 
for  his  chastening — the  acquaintance  who  al- 
ways and  inevitably  objects,  criticises,  and  pro- 
tests. 

Still,  I  shall  reaffirm  the  remark  that  the 

*  The  pendulum  figure  is  suggestive  and  the  best  that  occurs 
to  me  for  the  immediate  purpose.  W^ere  progress  and  not 
protest  my  present  theme,  I  should  prefer  to  use  the  illustra- 
tion of  the  ascending  spiral  as  truest,  though  not  perfectly 
true,  to  the  facts  of  life.  That  is,  round  and  round  we  go; 
and  that  means  backward  and  forward,  but  never  directly 
backward  nor  directly  forward;  ever  onward  and,  at  least 
eventually,  upward. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  29 

beginnings  of  great  things  in  human  history 
have  usually  been  attended  by  protests.  The 
earlier  Greek  thinkers  protested  against  the 
crudely  anthropomorphic  Olympians  and  thus 
laid  the  basis  for  the  later  developments  of 
Greek  philosophy.  The  Hebrew  Prophets 
criticised  the  customary  religion  of  their  day 
and  by  their  criticism  "  made  straight,"  or  at 
least  more  straight,  "  a  highway  for  our  God." 
Paul  disengaged  the  innate  freedom  and  life 
of  the  Christian  religion  by  lodging  an  effective 
protest  against  the  Judaizing  of  Christianity 
through  rabbinical  legalism.  Luther,  a  de- 
voted disciple  of  Paul,  repeated  the  work  of  his 
master,  under  different  conditions  but  with  a 
similar  result.  And  the  Great  INlaster  of  Paul 
and  of  Luther,  Himself  brought  into  being  the 
most  powerful  spiritual  explosive  the  world  has 
known  and  thus  became  the  Leader  and  Pro- 
genitor of  true  Protestants.  All  progress  is 
necessarily  accompanied  by  protest,  even 
though  all  protest  is  not  on  the  way  of 
progress. 

One  of  the  things  that  first  fix  the  atten- 
tion of  a  reader  of  Bergson,  it  matters  not 


so  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

which  of  his  books  he  may  be  reading,^  is  the 
frequent  note  of  polemic.  He,  too,  is  a  Pro- 
tester. Should  we  call  him  a  true  Protestant? 
Perhaps  time  alone  will  tell.  But,  surely,  the 
range  of  his  knowledge  and  the  beauty  of  his 
style  predispose  us  in  his  favor.  Whatever  he 
may  or  may  not  be,  he  is  not  a  small  man. 
Neither  his  intellect  nor  his  soul,  to  employ  a 
Bergsonian  distinction,  is  of  small  caliber. 
There  must  be  some  greatness  in  a  man  whom 
some  seriously  consider  to  be  another  Kant. 
Thus  it  is  impossible  to  dismiss  him  with  cheap 
and  flippant  characterization  and  equally  im- 
possible to  silence  him  with  scorn  and  epithet. 
He  is  genuine;  and  those  who  do  not  relish 
his  protests  must  be  as  genuine,  as  big,  and  as 
clever  as  he  or  their  chance  of  successful  refu- 
tation is  gone.  Even  were  he  refuted,  at  least 
a  part  of  his  protest  would  carry  through  for 

*  One  should  begin,  I  think,  with  his  Introduction  to  Meta- 
physics, where  he  himself  draws  up  his  program  in  definite 
fashion.  Over  against  Creative  Evolution,  this  book  presents 
the  bareness,  but  also  the  sharp  definition,  of  a  landscape 
gardener's  plan  as  compared  with  the  garden  itself,  whose 
paths  are  beautified  and  set  off,  but  also  somewhat  obscured, 
by  the  luxuriance  of  plant,  shrub,  and  tree.  The  remaining 
works  of  importance  are,  Time  and  Free  Will  and  Matter 
and  Memory.  To  these  may  be  added  his  short  and  charming 
essay  on  Laughter. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  31 

Bergson  is  the  harbinger,  or  better,  an  early 
manifestation  of  a  new  spiritual  season  whose 
warmth  none  of  us  shall  be  able  or  willing  to 
resist.  One  may  prefer  this  manifestation, 
another  that,  but  all  must  live  the  season 
through. 

Bergson  has  crossed  swords  primarily  with 
absolutistic  rationalism,  whose  vice  is  a  narrow, 
unvitalized  logic;  with  scientific  determinism, 
which  has  often  deserted  its  proper  scientific 
attitude  for  one  of  intellectual  dogmatism 
often  bordering  on  that  of  absolutism;  and 
finally,  with  materialism,  which  too  often  lurks 
near  both  of  the  preceding  points  of  view. 

Coming  into  prominence  contemporaneously 
with  pragmatism  and  receiving,  also,  highest 
praise  from  William  James  himself,  it  is  but 
natural  that  this  philosoj^hy,  being  what  it  is, 
should  often  be  confused  with  pragmatism. 
Bergson  protests,  as  the  pragmatists  protest, 
against  a  rigidly  rationalistic  absolutism  and 
against  an  equally  rigid  scientific  determin- 
ism. It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that 
these  likenesses  are  more  than  offset  by  differ- 
ences. Bergson  is  essentially  anything  but 
pragmatic.    To  be  sure,  his  world,  like  that  of 


32  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

James,  is  a  wide-open  world,  not  fixed  and 
static,  but  his  interest  is  in  "  what  is  "  rather 
than  in  "  what  works."  I  should  say  that  the 
chief  difference  between  Bergson  and  other 
thinkers  of  an  idealistic  type  is  not  one  of 
pragmatism  versus  idealism,  but  of  biological 
versus  a  purely  logical  idealism.  In  classing 
Bergson  with  the  pragmatists,  men  have  used 
the  mistaken  formula  that  two  men  who  fight 
the  same  thing  are  necessarily  in  agreement 
with  each  other.  Protestantism  has  ever  been 
pursued  by  the  genius,  good  or  evil,  of  sec- 
tarianism. James,  the  Protestant,  and  Berg- 
son, the  Protestant,  are  not  to  be  identi- 
fied. 

Confusion  also  exists  regarding  Bergson's 
estimate  of  the  intellect.  In  spite  of  his  de- 
motion of  the  intellect,  as  some  would  call  it, 
Bergson  is  not  so  anti-intellectual  as  he  has 
often  been  made  out.  His  polemic  against  the 
immortal  intellectualists  has,  indeed,  fairly 
laid  him  open  to  such  a  charge,  but  a  care- 
ful analysis  of  his  position  reveals  a  recog- 
nition of  the  intellect,  not  merely  as  a  neces- 
sary instrument  of  action — though  it  is  chiefly 
that,   according   to   Bergson — but   also   as   a 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  33 

means  of  acquiring  at  least  a  partial  knowl- 
edge of  the  Absolute.  Evidently  Bergson's 
polemical  emphasis  has  misled  some  of  the 
critics.  He  does  not  impeach  the  intellect. 
He  impeaches  those  who,  he  thinks,  have  mis- 
used the  intellect.  Even  did  he  entirely  debar 
the  intellect  from  practising  its  art  in  the  realm 
of  ultimate  reality,  he  might  present  a  show 
of  reason  by  exhibiting  the  discordant  results 
hitherto  obtained  by  this  means,  and  the  in- 
creasing wreckage  of  agnosticism.  But  he 
does  not  so  completely  debar  the  intellect. 
He  merely  wishes,  as  we  shall  see,  to  legitima- 
tize another  power  along  with  that  of  the  in- 
tellect, the  power  of  intuition  which,  he  thinks, 
has  been  unfairly  and  harmfully  repressed. 
From  the  cooperation  of  the  two  will  come 
mutual  enrichment.^ 

Again,  Bergson  has  been  branded  as  anti- 
scientific.  I  think  this  characterization  is  very 
misleading.    Those  who  proclaim  it  are  misled 

*  Doubtless  the  logic  Bergson  attacks  is,  to  the  modern  logi- 
cian himself,  a  "  man  of  straw."  But  it  is  not  so  in  general. 
The  less  rigid,  more  inclusive  logic  of  recent  years  is  still 
merely  "  food  for  the  gods."  The  modern  logician  can  be 
of  help  to  Bergson,  but  not  by  misinterpreting  his  attack  upon 
the  Aristotelian  logic.  That  logic  may  be  outworn  for  them, 
but  its  general  sway  is  still  undoubted. 


34  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

by  the  pronounced  polemic  of  the  man  against 
certain  tendencies  among  scientists;  a  polemic 
which  is  far  from  being  anti-scientific,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  that  term.  Bergson  holds,  as 
Rene  Gillouin  says,  that  "  determinism  is  an 
excellent  method  within  certain  limits,  but  that 
it  has  been  pushed  beyond  those  limits  and 
made  ruinous  by  being  set  up  as  a  fundamental 
doctrine."  This  is  not  an  anti-scientific  posi- 
tion. It  is  merely  a  sane  recognition  of  the 
limits  of  science  and  of  the  scientific  method. 
It  is  aimed  only  against  those  who  wish  to 
exalt  their  scientific  method  to  a  metaphysical 
throne  and  burden  us  with  the  tyranny  of  a 
New  Dogmatism. 

We  now  begin  to  see  what  the  main  lines 
of  the  Bergsonian  protest  are  and  whither  they 
lead.  Let  us  first  discuss  his  protest  against 
what  he  considers  to  be  an  abuse  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  scientific  determinism.  The  scientist 
has  been  crowding  us  rather  hard.  He  knows 
that  we  honor  him  and  that  we  cannot  get 
along  without  him.  He  has  not  only  enriched 
our  imagination  by  revealing  to  us  the  im- 
mensely great,  as  well  as  the  infinitely  small, 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  35 

wonders  of  nature,  but  he  has  also  given  us 
increased  length  of  days  through  the  elimina- 
tion of  disease  and,  to  some  of  us  (others  of 
us,  I  should  say),  through  the  capture  of  na- 
ture's intimate  secrets,  increased  riches  with 
which  to  enjoy  these  multiplied  days.  That 
men  who  have  done  such  things  should  not  be 
conscious  of  their  power,  would  indicate  an 
anomalous  lack  of  mental  acumen. 

I  think  that  this  self-consciousness  has 
tended  to  spoil  the  scientist.  At  any  rate,  we 
have  been  told  often  enough  that  it  was  a 
question  of  all  or  none.  Either  give  up  your 
scientific  method  altogether,  or  pursue  it 
everywhere.  To  be  sure,  its  natural  home  is  in 
the  physical  sciences  but  now  it  has  come  up 
into  psychology,  by  way  of  biology  and  physi- 
ology, and  even  religion  and  ethics  are  about 
to  be  subdued.  Not  that  the  scientific  method 
should  not  be  applied  in  every  direction.  It 
certainly  should  be.  But  its  own  fundamental 
principle  should  lead  it  to  recognize  that  dif- 
ferences in  the  nature  of  the  material  must 
differentiate  the  scientific  handling  of  living 
organisms  from  the  scientific  handling  of 
purely  material  masses. 


36  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

I  suppose  it  has  been  the  fear  that  deter- 
ministic materiahsm  would  dominate,  if  not 
eliminate,  ethics  and  rehgion  that  has  caused  the 
continued  distrust  of  conservatives,  or  their  ac- 
tive opposition,  towards  anything  which  looked 
like  evolution.  We  too  easily  dismiss  the  crav- 
ing of  religious  people  for  miracle,  for  "  signs 
and  wonders,"  when  we  condemn  it  as  merely 
the  product  of  ignorance  and  credulity.  Par- 
ticular judgments  and  beliefs  may  often  be  ex- 
plained in  this  way,  but  back  of  the  craving 
itself  there  often  lies  a  deeper  reason,  usually 
not  clearly  realized,  but  a  reason  that  concerns 
the  very  springs  of  religion.  For  the  truly  re- 
ligious man  there  is  always  a  dualism,  more 
or  less  clearly  defined,  between  the  personal 
and  the  impersonal  in  life.  One  constant  ele- 
ment of  religious  experience  is  a  sense  of  the 
triumph  of  the  personal  over  the  impersonal. 
Here  lie  eternal  issues;  and  any  tendency  to- 
wards the  reduction  of  the  world-life  to  the 
level  of  impersonality  will  always  be  resisted, 
and  rightly  even  though  unintelligently  re- 
sisted, by  all  sincere  religious  men. 

But  indeed  it  is  not  merely  ultra-conserva- 
tives who  scent  present  danger.     Even  Mc- 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  37 

Dougall  has  pointed  out  *  that,  due  to  the  all- 
embracing  extension  of  scientific  determinism, 
our  psychology  lias  become  very  largely  a 
"  psychology  without  a  soul."  For  religion 
this  spells  danger,  if  not  disaster,  because,  he 
continues,  religion  is  inevitably  bound  up  with 
some  form  of  "  animism  "  (as  he  calls  it) ,  that 
is,  with  a  belief  in  the  distinct  existence  of  the 
soul  of  the  individual. 

Now  Bergson  does  not  start  out  from  any 
religious  presupposition;  but  solely  on  the 
basis  of  facts,  chiefly  biological  facts,  he  comes 
to  the  conclusion  that  science  is  pushing  its 
necessarily  deterministic  method  too  far.  It 
is  stepping  out  of  the  circle,  thus  disqualifying 
the  throw.  The  interesting  thing,  however, 
about  Bergson's  attack  upon  science  is,  that 
it  is  itself  united  with  an  extensive  use  of  the 
scientific  method  and  of  scientific  material.  It 
might  better  be  called  a  challenge,  or  a  sharp 
reminder,  than  an  attack.  Let  us  see  what 
Bergson  himself  says : 

Men  of  science  have  fixed  their  attention  mainly 

on   the   concepts  with   whicli   the}'  have  marked   out 

the  pathway  of  intuition.     The  more  they  laid  stress 

*  William  McDougall,  Mind  and  Body.    Cf.  Preface,  p.  xiii. 


88  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

on  these  residual  products,  which  have  turned  into 
symbols,  the  more  they  attributed  a  symbolic  char- 
acter to  every  kind  of  science.  And  the  more  they 
believed  in  the  symbolic  character  of  science,  the 
more  did  they  indeed  make  science  symbolical.  Grad- 
ually they  have  blotted  out  all  difference,  in  positive 
science,  between  the  natural  and  the  artificial,  be- 
tween the  data  of  immediate  intuition,  and  the  enor- 
mous work  of  analysis  which  the  understanding  pur- 
sues round  intuition.  Thus  they  have  prepared  the 
way  for  a  doctrine  which  affirms  the  relativity  of  all 
our  knowledge.^ 

And  again," 

Now  I  recognize  that  positive  science  can  and 
should  proceed  as  if  organization  was  like  making  a 
machine.  Only  so  will  it  have  any  hold  on  organized 
bodies.  For  its  object  is  not  to  show  us  the  essence 
of  things,  but  to  furnish  us  with  the  best  means  of 
acting  on  them.  Physics  and  chemistry  are  well  ad- 
vanced sciences,  and  living  matter  lends  itself  to  our 
action  only  so  far  as  we  can  treat  it  by  the  processes 
of  our  physics  and  chemistry.  Organization  can 
therefore  only  be  studied  scientifically  if  the  organ- 
ized body  has  first  been  likened  to  a  machine.  The 
cells  will  be  the  pieces  of  the  machine,  the  organism 

*  Henri  Bergson,  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  English 
translation  by  T.  E.  Holme,  pp.  77-78. 

*  Henri  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution.  English  transla- 
tion by  Mitchell.  The  following  quotations  are  to  be  found 
on  pp.  93,  195,  207  and  254,  respectively. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  39 

their  assemblage,  and  the  elementary  labors  which 
have  organized  the  parts  will  be  regarded  as  the 
real  elements  of  the  labor  which  has  organized  the 
whole.  This  is  the  standpoint  of  science.  Quite 
different,  in  our  opinion,  is  that  of  philosophy.  .    .    . 

Positive  science  is,  in  fact,  a  work  of  pure  intel- 
lect. Now,  whether  our  conception  of  the  intellect 
be  accepted  or  rejected,  there  is  one  point  on  which 
everybody  will  agree  with  us,  and  that  is  that  the 
intellect  is  at  home  in  the  presence  of  unorganized 
matter.  This  matter  it  makes  use  of  more  and  more 
by  mechanical  inventions,  and  mechanical  inventions 
become  the  easier  to  it  the  more  it  thinks  matter  as 
mechanism.  .   .   . 

In  principle,  positive  science  bears  on  reality  it- 
self, provided  it  does  not  overstep  the  limits  of  its 
own  domain,  which  is  inert  matter.  ... 

Now,  it  might  easily  be  shown  that  the  conclusions 
of  this  mctaphysic,  springing  from  science,  have  re- 
bounded upon  science  itself,  as  it  were,  by  ricochet. 
They  penetrate  the  whole  of  our  so-called  empiri- 
cism. Physics  and  chemistry  study  only  inert 
matter ;  biology,  when  it  treats  the  living  being  phy- 
sically and  chemically,  considers  only  the  inert  side 
of  the  living:  hence  tlic  mechanistic  explanations, 
in  spite  of  their  development,  include  only  a  small 
part  of  the  real.  To  suppose  o  priori  that  the  whole 
of  the  real  is  resolvable  into  elements  of  this  kind, 
or  at  least  that  mechanism  can  give  a  complete  trans- 
lation of  what  happens  in  the  world,  is  to  pronounce 


40  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

for  a  certain  metaphysic — the  very  metaphysic  of 
which  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz  have  laid  down  the  prin- 
ciples and  drawn  the  consequences. 


Now  the  upshot  of  such  a  protest  is,  in  itself, 
heartening  to  religionists.  Before  all,  we  are 
put  in  the  way  of  seeing  that,  in  a  certain 
sense,  religion  is  out  of  the  range  of  science. 
This  figure  is  rather  more  apt  than  figures 
usually  are  in  that,  though  religion  is  out  of 
the  range  of  the  scientific  batteries,  needing  no 
longer  to  fear  destruction  by  them,  she  must, 
nevertheless,  dispose  her  forces  in  accordance 
with  the  territory  covered  by  science.  The 
main  thing,  however,  is  to  realize  that  scien- 
tific dogmatism  is  in  discredit ;  that  science  did 
not  destroy  philosophical  and  theological  dog- 
matism in  order  to  set  up  a  new  dogmatism  of 
her  own;  that  the  facts,  inductively  studied, 
lead  to  an  "  open-door  policy  "  by  which  reli- 
gion enters  into  its  rightful  own  without  the 
unfair  and  illegitimate  intrusion  upon  her  of 
other  claims  and  interests.  This  does  not  bring 
us  up  into  the  free  air  of  finality.  Not  at  all. 
But  it  certainly  does  bring  to  religion  a  great 
opportunity — the  opportunity  to  demonstrate 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  41 

unimpeded  her  power  and  validity.  The  case 
shall  not  he  prejudged  against  her.  It  would 
be  going  beyond  the  facts  to  say  that  Bergson 
alone  is  responsible  for  this  changing  attitude. 
He  is  but  one  among  those,  though  a  leader 
among  them,  who  have  been  restraining  scien- 
tific smartness  and  preparing  the  way  for  more 
vivid,  non-scientific  but  not  anti-scientific,  ap- 
preciations. 

But  Bergson,  at  least,  has  done  more  than 
this — more  than  reading  science  a  needed  lesson. 
The  inductive  method  of  science  has  superin- 
duced the  inductive  temper.  The  result  has  been 
a  great  increase  of  fundamental  agnosticism. 
Now,  one  finds  it  hard  to  be  severe  with  even 
an  out-and-out  agnostic.  His  extreme  mod- 
esty disarms  one's  attack  and  makes  almost 
any  statement  about  spiritual  realities  appear 
too  self-assertive,  if  not  actually  dogmatic. 
And  yet  one  has  the  suspicion  that,  even  with 
the  agnostic,  a  bit  of  dogmatism  has  crept  in 
unawares;  that  the  Absolute  which  went  out 
of  the  door,  clothed  in  the  garments  of  knowl- 
edge, has  come  in  again  at  the  window,  garbed 
in  the  weeds  of  ignorance. 

One  thing,  however,  the  agnostic  himself  will 


42  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

tell  you.  The  agnostic  diet  is  not  as  filling  as 
porridge.  Indeed  it  is  distinctly  unsatisfying 
and  leaves  a  longing  in  the  heart,  if  not  a 
gnawing  there.  Agnosticism  may  be  the  final 
thing.  I  doubt  it.  But  if  it  is,  I  pity  hu- 
manity as  it  grows  in  unsatisfied  and  unsatisfi- 
able  spiritual  hunger.  Let  priests  unfrock 
themselves  and  the  pious  raise  no  more  pin- 
nacled spires  to  the  glory  of  God;  it  is  all 
"  vanity  of  vanities,"  as  the  Preacher  said.  If 
agnosticism  is  the  last  word,  then  a  good  case 
could  be  made  out  for  the  Illusion  Theory. 
Better  be  deceived  by  a  pretty  and  satisfying 
fancy  than  to  face  with  dull  eye  a  certain  un- 
certainty. At  least,  if  one  were  thorough- 
going, one  could  never  be  sure  that  it  was  an 
illusion  anyway,  and  it  might  therefore  be 
true,  according  to  the  most  consistent  agnostic. 
But  he  wouldn't — couldn't — say  so. 

Let  us  come  out  of  the  cave  into  the  sun- 
light. The  air  is  rather  heavy  in  there  and 
breathing  is  difficult.  Who  calls  us  out? 
There  are  several  voices,  but  one  is  Bergson's. 
We  may  appreciate  the  sunlight  all  the  more 
for  having  been  in  the  cave,  but  we  are  grate- 
ful, nevertheless,  for  the  release.    To  leave  the 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  43 

figure:  the  modern  educated  world  has  been 
"  sickhed  o'er  with  a  pale  cast  of  thought " — 
with  agnosticism.  All  our  knowledge  is  rela- 
tive; there  is  no  hope  of  our  ever  being  able 
to  "  jump  out  of  our  skins  "  and  attain  to  any- 
final  knowledge ;  absolute  knowledge,  the  truly 
real,  is  forever  shut  off  from  us. 

These  things  Bergson  disputes  with  vigor, 
reasserting  the  old  belief  of  man  that  he  can 
know  truth,  the  truth,  the  final  truth.  And 
with  the  reassertion  of  this  belief  comes  back 
the  collateral  conviction,  "  the  truth  shall  make 
you  free."  May  not  the  twentieth  century  see 
the  advent  of  a  "  Day  View  "  of  existence — 
a  view  of  faith,  appreciation  and  enjoyment — 
after  the  "  Night  View  "  of  an  all-embracing 
determinism,  a  self-distrustful  agnosticism  and 
a  despairing  skepticism  ?  This  need  not  be  the 
pantheistic  "  Day  View  "  of  Fechner,  though 
even  that  has  its  qualities  compared  with  the 
"  Night  View." 

There  is  pregnancy  in  Jacks'  thought "  that 
the  world  should  be  taken  as  a  work  of  art 
rather  than  as  a  problem  to  be  solved.  That 
is,  we  must  open  the  eyes  of  our  appreciative 

^L.  P,  Jacks,  The  Alchemy  of  Thought.    Cf.  Chapter  2. 


44  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

self  as  well  as  those  of  our  logical  self.  This 
may  seem  a  very  ironical  suggestion  to  those 
who  are  caught  in  the  web  of  practical  life 
and  are  struggling  for  their  very  existence. 
But  the  Christian  message,  likewise,  often  im- 
presses such  hearers  ironically.  That  may  be 
so  much  the  worse  for  the  Christian  message, 
but  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  it  is  just  so 
much  the  better  for  Jacks.  At  any  rate,  Berg- 
son  is  here  on  the  side  of  Christianity  and  on 
the  side  of  Jacks,  Fechner  or  anyone  else  who 
thinks,  for  any  reason  whatsoever,  that  life  is 
still  worth  living.  "  True  religion  and  unde- 
filed  "  is  fundamentally  optimistic.  It  frowns 
upon  pessimism  and  pessimism  frowns  upon 
it.  Pessimism  is  the  Deadly  Nightshade  in 
the  garden  of  man.  Whoso  destroys  it  serves 
man  and  religion.  This  Bergson  does  by  cut- 
ting off  one  of  its  roots,  namely,  radical  agnos- 
ticism. He  holds  it  to  be  untrue  that  we  can 
"  believe  only  what  we  can  claw,"  or  rather, 
he  holds  that  we  can  claw  further  into  Reality 
than  many  think — in  fact,  into  the  Absolute 
itself.  That  makes  life  worth  while  and  gives 
religion  a  new  chance. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  45 

But  while  with  one  hand  Bergson  slays  the 
Agnostic  Leviathan,  with  the  other  he  reaches 
out  over  the  territory  of  the  orthodox — whether 
philosophical  or  theological— and  lays  about 
the  head  of  the  Absolutistic  Giant  of  dogmatic 
orthodoxy.  To  understand  fully  the  nature 
and  amount  of  Bergson's  emphasis  upon  evo- 
lution, creative  evolution,  and  upon  his  new 
idea  of  time  and  teleology,  one  must  appre- 
ciate that,  in  every  case,  Bergson  is  largely 
engaged  in  a  vigorous  polemic  against  pre- 
vailing modes  of  thought.  It  is  not  to  our  pur- 
pose to  discuss  these  matters  here,  except  by 
way  of  brief  illustration  of  the  present  point — 
Bergson's  protest  against  mere  logical  abso-. 
lutism. 

The  novelty  of  his  approach  to  the  question 
is  seen  in  that  he  also  opposes  the  Spencerian 
scheme  of  evolution  which  ends  in  the  doc- 
trine of  the  "  Unknowable."  This  system,  he 
says,  is  equally  rigid,  formal,  and  barren  with 
the  systems  of  the  absolutists.  It  only  gets  out 
of  its  evolution  what  was  already  put  in  at  the 
beginning  and  therefore,  like  orthodox  abso- 
lutism, does  not  fit  into,  or  explain,  the  facts 
of  a  life  that  is  ever  growing.     On  the  con- 


46  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

trary,  evolution  rightfully  viewed  is  a  real 
process  actually  giving  rise  to  new  things  all 
the  time,  things  unpredictable  and  unforesee- 
able and  therefore  not  pre-ordained,  at  least  in 
detail.  Bergson  sees  in  such  a  world  a  place 
for  a  certain  kind  of  teleology,  final  purpose — 
Providence,  if  you  will — but  it  cannot  be  the 
fixed  and  rigid  finality  of  the  absolutistic  dog- 
matist, be  he  rationalistic  or  orthodox,  or  both. 
Bergson  says :  * 

If  philosophy  leave  biological  and  psychological 
facts  to  positive  science  alone,  as  it  has  left,  and 
rightly  left,  physical  facts  .  .  .  [then]  ...  it 
will  accept  a  priori  a  mechanistic  conception  of  all 
nature,  a  conception  unreflected  and  even  uncon- 
scious, the  outcome  of  a  material  need  .    .    . 

The  moment  it  does  so,  its  fate  is  sealed.  The 
philosopher  has  no  longer  any  choice  save  between 
a  metaphysical  dogmatism  and  a  metaphysical  skep- 
ticism, both  of  which  rest,  at  bottom,  on  the  same 
postulate,  and  neither  of  which  adds  anything  to 
positive  science.  He  may  hypostasize  the  unity  of 
nature,  or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing,  the  unity 
of  science,  in  a  being  who  is  nothing  since  he  does 
nothing,  an  ineffectual  God  who  simply  sums  up  in 

*  Henri  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution.  English  transla- 
tion by  Mitciiell.  The  following  quotations  are  to  be  found 
on  pp.  196,  197,  40,  94-95,  248-249. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  47 

himself  all  the  given ;  or  in  an  eternal  ^Matter  from 
whose  womb  have  been  poured  out  the  properties  of 
things  and  the  laws  of  nature;  or,  again,  in  a  pure 
Form  which  endeavors  to  seize  the  unscizable  multi- 
plicity, and  which  is,  as  we  will,  the  form  of  nature 
or  the  form  of  thought.  ...  In  many  cases,  how- 
ever, we  feel  the  frame  cracking.  .  .  .  To  a  meta- 
physical dogmatism,  which  has  erected  into  an  abso- 
lute the  factitious  unity  of  science,  there  succeeds 
a  skepticism  or  a  relativism  that  universalizes  and 
extends  to  all  the  results  of  science  the  artificial 
character  of  some  of  them.    .    .    . 

Yet  finalism  is  not,  like  mechanism,  a  doctrine 
■with  fixed  rigid  outlines.  It  admits  of  as  many  in- 
flections as  Ave  like.  The  mechanistic  philosophy  is 
to  be  taken  or  left :  it  must  be  left  if  the  least  grain 
of  dust,  by  straying  from  the  path  foreseen  by 
mechanics,  should  show  the  slightest  trace  of  spon- 
taneity. The  doctrine  of  final  causes,  on  the  con- 
trary, will  never  be  definitely  refuted.  If  one  form 
of  it  be  put  aside,  it  will  take  another.  Its  princi- 
ple, which  is  essentially  psychological,  is  very  flexi- 
ble. It  is  so  extensible,  and  thereby  so  comprehen- 
sive, that  one  accepts  something  of  it  as  soon  as  one 
rejects  pure  mechanism.  The  theory  we  shall  put 
forward  in  this  book  will  therefore  necessarily  par- 
take of  finalism  to  a  certain  extent.    .    .    . 

With  greater  precision,  we  may  compare  the 
process  by  which  nature  constructs  an  eye  to  the 
simple   act  by  which  we   raise  the  hand.     But  we 


48  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

supposed  at  first  that  the  hand  met  with  no  resist- 
ance.    Let  us  now  imagine  that,  instead  of  moving 
in   air,  the   hand   has   to  pass   through   iron  filings 
which  are  compressed  and  offer  resistance  to  it  in 
proportion   as   it  goes  forward.     At   a  certain  mo- 
ment the  hand  will  have  exhausted  its  effort,  and,  at 
this    very    moment,    the   filings    will   be   massed    and 
coordinated  in  a  certain  definite  form,  to  wit,  that 
of  the  hand  that  is  stopped  and  of  a  part  of  the 
arm.     Now,  suppose  that  the  hand  and  arm  are  in- 
visible.    Lookers-on  will  seek  the  reason  of  the  ar- 
rangement  in   the   filings   themselves   and   in   forces 
within  the  mass.     Some  will  account  for  the  position 
of  each  filing  by  the  action  exerted  upon  it  by  the 
neighboring  filings :  these  are  the  mechanists.    Others 
will  prefer  to   think  that  a  plan  of  the  whole  has 
presided  over  the  detail  of  these  elementary  actions: 
they  are  the  finalists.     But  the  truth  is  that  there 
has  been  merely  one  indivisible  act,  that  of  the  hand 
passing  through  the  filings:  the  inexhaustible  detail 
of  the  movement  of  the  grains,  as  well  as  the  order 
of  their  final  arrangement,  expresses  negatively,  in 
a  way,  this  undivided  movement,  being  the  unitary 
form  of  resistance,  and  not  a  synthesis  of  positive 
elementary  actions.     For  this  reason,  if  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  grains  is  termed  an  "  effect  "  and  the 
movement  of  the  hand  a  "  cause,"  it  may  indeed  be 
said  that  the  whole  of  the  effect  is  explained  by  the 
whole  of  the  cause,  but  to  parts  of  the  cause  parts 
of  the  effect  will  in  no  wise  correspond.     In  other 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  49 

words,  neither  mechanism  nor  finahsm  will  here  be 
in  place,  and  we  must  resort  to  an  explanation  of  a 
different  kind.    .    .    . 

God  thus  defined,  has  nothing  of  the  already  made ; 
He  is  unceasing  life,  action,  freedom.  Creation,  so 
conceived,  is  not  a  mystery ;  we  experience  it  our- 
selves when  we  act  freely  .  .  .  that  action  increases 
as  it  goes  on,  that  it  creates  in  the  measure  of  its 
advance,  is  what  each  of  us  finds  when  he  watches 
himself  act. 


One  sees  at  once  that  this  phase  of  Berg- 
son's  position  has  a  very  direct  bearing  upon 
religious  ideas  and  formulations.  God  is  Him- 
self growing,  and  while  a  Bergsonian  may  be 
able  to  connect  with  Him  a  certain  consistency 
of  character  and  a  general  direction  of  pur- 
pose, he  cannot  any  longer  abide  by  a  purely 
logical  interpretation  of  God's  infinity,  oiimi- 
science,  omnipotence,  and  the  like,  since  such 
an  interpretation  is  inconsistent  with,  and 
meant  to  be  inconsistent  with,  real  growth, 
evolution,  or  progress.  Through  this  new 
view  Bergson  claims  to  have  resolved  the  old 
antinomies  of  human  thought,  such  as  free  will 
and  predestination,  by  showing  that  the  prob- 
lems are  pseudo-problems.    "  The  problem  of 


50  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

freedom  has  thus  sprung  from  a  misunder- 
standing: it  has  been  to  the  moderns  what  the 
paradoxes  of  the  Eleatics  were  to  the  ancients, 
and,  hke  these  paradoxes,  it  has  its  origin  in  the 
illusion  through  which  we  confuse  succession 
and  simultaneity,  duration  and  extensity,  qual- 
ity and  quantity."  °  Whether  Bergson  is  right 
in  this  or  not,  it  is  refreshing  to  turn  away  from 
the  lifeless  discussions  of  so  much  of  our  ortho- 
dox philosophy  and  theology  towards  a  phi- 
losophy that  seems,  at  least,  to  live  and  move 
and  have  some  being,  even  if  its  "  being  "  be 
"  becoming." 

Perhaps  we  do  not  need  any  more  of  this 
sort  of  protest  in  religion  just  now.  We  have 
indeed  had  much  of  it  and  very  likely  we 
should  turn  to  other  ways  of  thinking.  If  this 
protest  of  Bergson  were  merely  a  protest 
without  a  positive  basis  and  a  correspondingly 
constructive  proposal,  I  should  be  disposed  to 
say  that  we  had  had  enough.  But  his  is  not  a 
blind,  unreasoned,  and  purely  negative  pro- 
test. It  is  an  unusually  acute  one,  and  it  is 
accompanied  by  what  purports  to  be  a  sub- 

*  Henri    Bergson,    Time    and   Free    Will.      English    transla- 
tion by  Pogson,  p.  240. 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  51 

stitute  view.  This  substitute  view  is  only  par- 
tially worked  out,  but  more  is  to  come,  if  Berg- 
son  lives ;  and  he  has  already  given  us  some  of 
its  main  features.  What  has  been  given 
promises  well  for  a  complete  view  which  will 
have  a  positive  and  hel23ful  influence  upon  re- 
ligion, by  way  of  greater  vitality,  inwardness, 
and  progressiveness. 

Religion  has  had  to  struggle  perennially 
against  that  form  of  infidelity  which  refuses 
to  believe  that  God  can  take  care  of  Himself; 
which  insists  on  the  maintenance  of  a  "  Board 
of  Guardians,"  usually  selected,  of  course, 
from  the  inside  circle;  which  insists  that  the 
truth  of  God  and  of  His  universe  must  be  pro- 
tected by  certain  sacred  custodians,  either  in 
the  form  of  a  direct  personal  supervision  or  in 
the  form  of  codes,  firmans,  decrees,  and  creeds, 
made  sacrosanct  and  infalli])le  forever.  Those 
who  feel,  as  I  do,  that  the  greatest  witness  to 
the  truth  and  power  of  religion  has  been  its 
ability  to  survive  the  efforts  of  friends  like 
these,  will  speedily  and  gratefully  recognize 
the  possibility,  at  least,  of  great  religious  value 
in  a  philosophy  like  that  of  Bergson,  which 
eliminates  this  kind  of  thing  from  life  as  a 


52  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

whole.  As  has  ah-eady  been  seen,  Bergson's 
conception  of  the  Vital  Impetus  necessarily 
affects  a  Bergsonian  conception  of  God.  The 
Divine  Being,  so  conceived,  would  not  be  blind, 
purposeless,  and  ineffective,  as  some  say. 
There  is  room  for  purpose,  end,  and  consist- 
ency of  character,  but  there  would  also  be  a 
delicious  unexpectedness  which  would  delight 
the  vitally  minded  and  dismay,  as  it  ought  to 
dismay,  the  smugly  formal.  Such  a  God 
would  be  hard  for  an  absolutist  or  a  dogmatist 
to  believe  in.  He  would  require  too  much  faith 
from  them  and  too  little  assistance.  For  that 
very  reason  He  might  prove  the  joy  of  more 
truly  religious  souls. 

•  •••••• 

The  originality  and  utter  impartiality  of  M. 
Bergson,  the  Protestant,  is  well  illustrated  by 
the  fact  that  he  turns  fiercely  also  upon  some 
of  those  who  gleefully  agree  with  him  in  the 
protest  we  have  just  been  discussing.  Ma- 
terialism is  a  word  which  is  used  in  very  dif- 
ferent senses  and  it  may,  consequently,  be  re- 
ferred to  very  different  causes.  But  practical 
materialism  and  theoretic  materialism  are  not 
so  far  apart  as  they  sometimes  seem.     They 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  53 

interact  upon  each  other  as  cause  and  effect, 
and  both  of  them  are,  in  the  long  run,  fatal  to 
religion.  Bergson's  whole  position  is  anti- 
materialistic  throughout,  hut,  at  one  point  in 
particular,  we  find  him  crossing  swords  with 
the  materialist  and  fighting  to  the  finish.  It 
is  where  he  discusses  the  relation  of  mind  and 
matter.  His  whole  system  depends  upon  a 
successful  refutation  of  parallelism  and  epi- 
phenomcnalism,  and  we  find  him  devoting 
much  attention  to  those  who  deny  the  existence 
of  spiritual  activity  underived  from,  or  inde- 
dendent  of,  physical  changes." 

But  our  distinction  between  "  pure  perception  " 
and  "  pure  memory  "  has  yet  another  aim.  Just  as 
pure  perception,  by  giving  us  hints  as  to  the  nature 
of  matter,  allows  us  to  take  an  intermediate  position 
between  realism  and  idealism,  so  pure  memory,  on 
the  other  hand,  by  opening  to  us  a  view  of  what  is 
called  spirit,  should  enable  us  to  decide  between 
those  other  two  doctrines,  materialism  and  spiritual- 
ism.^^  .   .   . 

.  .  .  For  it  is  possible  to  sum  up  our  conclusions 
as   to   pure   perception   by   saying   tliat    there   is   in 

"  Henri  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will,  Chapter  3. 

"  The  translator  here  appends  this  note,  "  The  word  '  spirit- 
ualism '  is  used  throughout  this  work  to  signify  any  philosophy 
that  claims  for  spirit  an  existence  of  its  own." 


54  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

matter  something  more  than,  hut  not  something  dif- 
ferent from,  that  which  is  actually  given.  Un- 
doubtedly conscious  perception  does  not  compass 
the  whole  of  matter,  since  it  consists,  in  as  far  as 
it  is  conscious,  in  the  separation,  or  the  "  discern- 
ment," of  that  which,  in  matter,  interests  our  vari- 
ous needs.  But  between  this  perception  of  matter 
and  matter  itself  there  is  but  a  difference  of  degree 
and  not  of  kind,  pure  perception  standing  towards 
matter  in  the  relation  of  the  part  to  the  whole. 
This  amounts  to  saying  that  matter  cannot  exercise 
powers  of  any  kind  other  than  those  which  we  per- 
ceive. It  has  no  mysterious  virtue,  it  can  conceal 
none.  To  take  a  definite  example,  one  moreover 
which  interests  us  most  nearly,  we  may  say  that 
the  nervous  system,  a  material  mass  presenting  cer- 
tain qualities  of  color,  ,resistance,  cohesion,  etc., 
may  well  possess  unperceived  physical  properties, 
but  physical  properties  only.  And  hence  it  can  have 
no  other  office  than  to  receive,  inhibit,  or  transmit 
movement. 

Now  the  essence  of  every  form  of  materialism  is 
to  maintain  the  contrary,  since  it  holds  that  con- 
sciousness, with  all  its  functions,  is  born  of  the  mere 
interplay  of  material  elements.  Hence  it  is  led  to 
consider  even  the  perceived  qualities  of  matter, — 
sensible,  and  consequently  felt,  qualities, — as  so 
many  phosphorescences  which  follow  the  track  of 
the  cerebral  phenomena  in  the  act  of  perception. 
Matter,  thus  supposed  capable  of  creating  elemen- 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  55 

tary  facts  of  consciousness,  might  therefore  just  as 
well  engender  intellectual  facts  of  the  highest  order. 
It  is,  then,  of  the  essence  of  materialism  to  assert 
the  perfect  relativity  of  sensible  qualities,  and  it  is 
not  without  good  reason  that  this  thesis,  which 
Democritus  has  formulated  in  precise  terms,  is  as 
old  as  materialism. 

But  spiritualism  has  always  followed  materialism 
along  this  path.  As  if  everything  lost  to  matter 
must  be  gained  by  spirit,  spiritualism  has  never 
hesitated  to  despoil  matter  of  the  qualities  with 
which  it  is  invested  in  our  perception,  and  which,  on 
this  view,  are  subjective  appearances.  Matter  has 
thus  too  often  been  reduced  to  a  mysterious  entity 
which,  just  because  all  we  know  of  it  is  an  empty 
show,  might  as  well  engender  thought  as  any  other 
phenomenon. 

The  truth  is  that  there  is  one,  and  only  one, 
method  of  refuting  materialism:  it  is  to  show  that 
matter  is  precisely  that  which  it  appears  to  be. 
Thereby  we  eliminate  all  virtuality,  all  hidden  power, 
from  matter,  and  establish  the  phenomena  of  spirit 
as  an  independent  reality.  But  to  do  this  we  must 
leave  to  matter  those  qualities  which  materialists  and 
spiritualists  alike  strip  from  it:  the  latter  that  they 
may  make  of  them  representations  of  the  spirit,  the 
former  that  they  may  regard  them  only  as  the  acci- 
dental garb  of  space. ^" 

"  Henri  Bergson,  Matter  and  Memory.  English  transla- 
tion Jby  Paul  and  Palmer,  pp.  77-80. 


56  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Regardless  of  the  validity  of  Bergson's  con- 
structive position,  it  is  encouraging  to  witness 
his  doughty  attack  upon  those  psychologists, 
now  very  numerous,  who  have  practically  out- 
lawed the  soul  from  polite  psychological  so- 
ciety. His  summons  at  least  serves  as  a  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  by  which  the  soul  will  be 
given  a  fair  chance  to  prove  itself  innocent  of 
the  charge  of  wrongful  impersonation.  The 
soul  is  the  citadel  of  religion.  If  we  lose  this 
fortress,  the  campaign  is  over  and  uncondi- 
tional surrender  alone  remains.  Bergson  pro- 
tests against  the  necessity  of  capitulation.  By 
counter-attacks  he  opens  the  way  for  rein- 
forcements and  re-victualling.  No  wonder 
the  reduced  but  faithful  garrison  is  heart- 
ened. 

He  indicates  his  general  position  and  even 
hints  at  his  method  when  he  says  that  the  only 
way  to  refute  materialism  "is  to  show  that 
matter  is  exactly  that  which  it  appears  to  be." 
At  another  time  and  in  another  connection  it 
would  be  necessary  to  follow  this  lead  further. 
It  is  enough  for  us  here  that  we  remind  our- 
selves of  Bergson's  fundamental  insistence 
upon  the  reality  of  the  soul,  upon  the  fact  of 


BERGSON  THE  PROTESTANT  57 

at  least  a  partial  freedom,  and  upon  the  essen- 
tially psychic,  or  spiritual,  nature  of  the  whole 
process  of  evolution.  At  several  points  in  the 
elaboration  of  his  system,  notably  in  his  dis- 
cussion of  the  reality  of  the  soul  and  of  the  fact 
of  freedom,  he  comes  into  direct  conflict  with 
materialistic  theories.  It  is  therefore  quite  fair 
to  include  materialism  with  scientific  deter- 
minism, agnosticism,  and  dogmatic  absolutism, 
in  presenting  a  picture  of  Bergson  the 
Protestant. 


There  is  religious  value,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
all  these  protests,  looked  at  merely  as  pro- 
tests. They  are,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  only  in- 
cidental as  protests.  Their  main  service  is  to 
level  the  ground  for  the  positive  Bergsonian 
structure.  One  is  therefore  led  to  expect  from 
this  philosophy  a  general  compatibility  with 
the  religious  viewpoint.  It  is  certain  that  a 
religious  position,  closely  conformed  to  the 
Bergsonian  philosophy,  would  yield  at  least 
some  of  the  age-old  religious  satisfactions. 
Freshness  and  piquancy  w^ould  not  be  lacking. 
They  are  lacking  in  current  orthodoxy.    Per- 


58  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

haps  Bergson  may  point  us  out  a  way — not 
necessarily  tJie  way  or  the  only  way,  but  a 
way — by  which  our  rehgious  thought  may  be- 
come revitahzed. 


CHAPTER  III 

HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY? 

I  WELL  remember  a  discussion  with  my  sister, 
when  we  were  both  in  early  youth,  regarding 
the  greenness  of  the  grass.  She  propounded 
to  me  the  baffling  question,  "  You  call  the 
grass  green  and  I  call  the  grass  green,  but 
how  do  we  know  that  your  green  is  the  same  as 
my  green." 

I  fancy  that  it  is  unusual  to  have  this  philo- 
sophical question  posed  in  such  a  clear-cut 
form  at  such  an  early  age,  but  the  thoughtful 
do  not  need  many  years  of  experience  in  order 
to  become  aware  of  the  problem  of  reality  and 
truth,  not  only  as  between  man  and  man  but 
also  as  between  man  and  all  else.  The  child, 
living  in  the  protected  atmosphere  of  the 
family,  sees  life  through  one  set  of  windows 
largely.  Later  in  life  other  windows  open  be- 
fore him  and,  as  he  gazes  through,  he  sees  vis- 
tas hard  to  piece  together  into  a  homogeneous 
landscape.    So,  in  the  history  of  the  great  hu- 

59 


60  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

man  family,  questions  regarding  the  nature 
and  the  possibility  of  knowledge  have  been 
"  raised  by  the  divergent  views  to  which  medi- 
tation on  physical  and  metaphysical  questions 
leads.  This  division  raises  the  question:  Is  it 
at  all  possible  for  the  human  understanding  to 
solve  these  problems?  "  ^ 

From  the  age  of  the  Greek  sophists  the 
question  has  continually  recurred,  "  How  do 
we  know  the  True  and  the  Real?  "  As  Locke 
says  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Reader/  "  It  came 
into  my  thoughts  that  we  took  a  wrong  course, 
and  that,  before  we  set  ourselves  upon  in- 
quiries of  that  nature  (metaphysical  inquiries) , 
it  was  necessary  to  examine  our  own  abilities, 
and  see  what  objects  our  understandings  were 
or  were  not  fitted  to  deal  with."  Since  Locke's 
time  men  have  become  increasingly  sensitive 
regarding  the  final  validity  of  their  mental 
activity.  The  two  extreme  notes  of  the  octave 
are  still  struck  no  doubt,  but  there  is  equally 
little  doubt  that  today  the  fingers  insensibly 

*  Paulsen,  E'mleitung  in  die  Philosojjhie,  2nd  edition,  p.  349. 
Quoted  by  Pringle-Patterson  in  his  article,  "  Epistemology," 
in  the  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  edited  by  J. 
Mark  Baldwin. 

^  Quoted  by  Pringle-Patterson  in  the  foregoing  article, 
"  Epistemology." 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         61 

glide  towards  and  tend  to  rest  upon  the  middle 
lower  tones  of  agnostieisni,  bringing  forth  a 
series  of  pronouncedly  minor  chords. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  the  problem  of  the  validity 
of  our  knowledge  has  more  and  more  absorbed 
attention,  and  rightly  so.  It  is  a  fundamental 
problem.  We  nmst  know  whether  we  are  liv- 
ing in  a  world  of  reality  or  in  one  of  make- 
believe.  Take  away  the  hope  and  confidence 
which  the  touch  of  Finality  imparts  and  what 
is  left  for  man  but  materialism,  utilitarianism, 
stoicism,  or  at  best  a  "  practical "  humanita- 
rianism  whose  very  practicality  is  nullified  by 
its  blindness? 

It  would  seem  as  if  final  realities  were  more 
and  more  being  consigned  to  the  limbo  of  dis- 
carded human  illusions.  We  are  bid  to  the 
cult  of  "the  Practical."  "Practical,"  if  it 
means  anything,  means,  "  capable  of  achiev- 
ing a  useful  end."  But  of  what  value,  pray,  is 
the  adjective  "  useful "  in  defining  the  word 
"  practical,"  if  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
"end"?  Thus  this  supposedly  theoretical 
question  becomes  a  very  practical  one.  In 
fact,  one  cannot  be  fundamentally  practical 
without  answering  it.     We  are  especially  in- 


62  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

terested  in  the  effect  of  this  answer  upon  re- 
ligion, for  its  effect  is  immediate  and  dii'ect. 
But  its  effect  is  also  as  directly  felt  in  the 
sphere  of  ethics  and  of  everyday  morality. 
Thus  the  answer  to  our  "  unpractical "  ques- 
tion has  to  do  with  those  secret  springs  of  life 
whence  flow  happiness  and  destiny. 

The  untrained  man  is  unaware  of  such  diffi- 
culties as  these  and  unhesitatingly  trusts  his 
senses.  He  may  cry  out  at  times,  "  I  can  hardly 
beheve  my  eyes,"  but  he  does  believe  them, 
year  in  and  year  out.  You  remark  that  he 
assumes  their  trustworthiness.  Perhaps  the 
philosopher  will  have  to  do  the  same.  Indeed 
one  of  them  says  just  this.  "  It  is  obvious 
that  we  cannot  sit  in  judgment  upon  the  cog- 
nitive faculties  without  employing  those  very 
faculties,  and  thereby  implying  their  trust- 
worthiness. The  validity  of  knowledge  as 
such  is  an  ultimate  and  inevitable  assump- 
tion. .  .  r' 

"  Well,"  retorts  the  plain  man,  "  if  this  be 
so,  what  is  the  use  of  all  this  philosophical 
pother  over  a  question  which  is  not  a  question 
but  an  assumption?  "    "  Much  use  every  way," 

^  Pringle-Patterson,  of.  cit. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         63 

replies  the  philosopher.  Besides  possessing 
other  values,  "  its  use  is,  in  the  first  instance, 
polemical,  in  answer  to  the  challenge  of  skep- 
ticism, suhjectivism,  agnosticism,  relativism. 
In  this  regard,  it  is  the  province  of  episte- 
mology  to  investigate  the  nature  of  the  cogni- 
tive relation  as  such,  in  order  to  discover  its 
essential  conditions,  and  so  to  determine 
whether  the  circumstances  of  human  knowl- 
edge are  such  as  to  invalidate  its  claim  to  be  a 
true  account  of  rcalit3\  An  agnostic  relativism 
condenms  knowledge  because  it  does  not  sat- 
isfy certain  conditions.  By  exposing  the  in- 
herently contradictory  nature  of  the  demands 
made,  epistemological  analysis  deprives  such 
criticism  of  its  basis,  and  restores  us  to  the 
original  confidence  of  reason  in  itself.  Till 
skepticism  and  agnosticism  cease  from  the 
land,  this  polemic  will  necessarily  continue  to 
be  prominent  in  epistemological  literature, 
whichever  side  may  win  the  greater  body  of 
adherents."  * 

We  see,  therefore,  that  it  makes  a  great  deal 
of  difference  to  the  average  man,  in  the  every- 
daynesses  of  life,  what  his  theory  of  knowledge 

*  Pringle-Patterson,  op.  cit. 


64  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

is ;  what  sort  of  knowledge-theory  is  prevalent 
about  him;  what  theory  is  nearest  the  actual 
fact.  Likewise,  in  discussing  the  religious  as- 
pect of  a  philosophy,  it  is  essential  to  know 
that  philosophy's  answer  to  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  knowledge ;  the  theory  of  knowledge 
which  it  presents. 

In  discussing  this  interesting  and  basal  ele- 
ment of  Bergson's  thought,  we  must  impose 
strict  limits  upon  the  presentation  and  exami- 
nation of  details.""  Bergson's  theory  contains 
difficulties  whose  resolution  would  require  an 
extended  consideration.  I  refer  to  such  prob- 
lems as  the  nature  and  function  of  "  pure  per- 
ception," and  the  exact  status  of  the  intellect 
in  relation  to  final  truth.  But  the  main  trend 
of  the  theory  is  clear  enough  and  our  task  is 
merely  to  indicate  that  trend  and  then  draw 
inferences  in  the  direction  of  religion. 

*  There  are  numerous  books  and  articles  in  which  these  mat- 
ters are  fully  presented.  Compare,  for  example:  H.  Berg- 
son,  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics;  H.  W.  Carr,  "  Bergson's 
Theory  of  Knowledge,"  Proceedings  of  Aristotelian  Society 
(London,  1909.  New  Series,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  41-60) ;  A.  D. 
Lindsay,  The  Philosophy  of  Bergson  (London,  1911);  Muir- 
head,  in  the  Hibbert  Journal  (July,  1911,  IX:  895-907); 
Edouard  LeRoy,  A  New  Philosophy:  Henri  Bergson  (New 
York,  1913). 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         65 

The  three  main  theories  of  knowledge  which 
had  been  advanced  prior  to  that  of  Bergson 
were:  that  the  mind  is  a  tabula  rasa  on  which 
things  impress  themselves  through  sensation; 
that  the  mind  transfers  its  own  forms  to  the 
outer  world;  that  mind  and  matter  go  their 
own  separate  ways,  but  conform  to  each  other 
according  to  a  pre-established  harmony.  The 
tendency  of  the  first  theory  is  towards  ma- 
terialism. The  second  theory,  in  spite  of  the 
valuable  service  it  has  rendered,  has  been  one 
of  the  main  sources  of  modern  agnosticism. 
The  third  theory  begs  the  whole  question  and 
answers  nothing. 

Now  Bergson  holds  that  our  theory  of 
knowledge  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  our 
theory  of  life;  thus  the  origin  of  our  intel- 
lectual concepts  may  be  traced  and  their  true 
value  determined. 

This  amounts  to  saying  that  theorij  of  knowledge 
and  theorjj  of  life  sccni  to  us  inseparable.  A  theory  of 
life  that  is  not  accompanied  by  a  criticism  of  knowl- 
edge is  obliged  to  accept,  as  they  stand,  the  concepts 
which  the  understanding  puts  at  its  disposal:  it  can 
but  enclose  the  facts,  willing  or  not,  in  pre-existing 
frames  which  it  regards  as  ultimate.     It  thus  obtains 


66  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

a  symbolism  which  is  convenient,  perhaps  even  neces- 
sary to  positive  science,  but  not  a  direct  vision  of  its 
object.  On  the  other  hand,  a  theory  of  knowledge 
which  does  not  replace  the  intellect  in  the  general 
evolution  of  life  will  teach  us  neither  how  the  frames 
of  knowledge  have  been  constructed  nor  how  we  can 
enlarge  or  go  beyond  them.  It  is  necessary  that 
these  two  inquiries,  theory  of  knowledge  and  theory 
of  life,  should  join  each  other,  and,  by  a  circular 
process,  push  each  other  on  unceasingly.® 

What  has  just  been  said  makes  it  clear  that 
we  must  include  Bergson's  theory  of  life  in 
our  present  discussion.  Let  us,  therefore,  sur- 
vey this  theory  briefly:  All  things  may  be 
traced  back  to  an  original,  self-sufficient 
"  Vital  Impetus,"  '  whose  inner  nature  is  move- 
ment, growth,  change,  "  duration  ";  whose  one 
goal  is  ever  to  create  more  life.  Thus  the  "  will 
to  live "  is  dominant  in  the  organic  world 
which  this  Vital  Impetus  has  evolved.  Spread- 
ing like  a  sheaf,  the  "  elan  "  achieved  different 
results  in  different  directions.  Matter  repre- 
sents the  failure  of  the  Vital  Impetus  to  fulfill 
its  destiny  and  may  be  described  as  a  kind  of 

'  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution.  English  translation  by  Mitch- 
ell.    Introduction,  p.  xiii. 

'  This  is  the  translation  of  "  4lan  vital "  which  Bergson  him- 
iself  prefers. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         67 

condensed  "  elan,"  its  lifeless  residuum.  On 
the  other  hand,  highest  suecess  has  been  at- 
tained in  the  development  of  the  instinet,  best 
seen  in  the  hymenoptera,  and  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  intellect,  best  seen  in  man. 

So  we  come  back  ...  to  the  idea  we  started  from, 
that  of  an  original  impetus  of  life,  passing  from  one 
generation  of  germs  to  the  following  generation  of 
germs  through  the  developed  organisms  which  bridge 
the  interval  between  the  generations.  This  impetus, 
sustained  right  along  the  lines  of  evolution  among 
which  it  gets  divided,  is  the  fundamental  cause  of 
variations,  at  least  of  those  that  are  regularly 
passed  on,  that  accumulate  and  create  new  species. 
In  general,  when  species  have  begun  to  diverge  from 
a  common  stock,  they  accentuate  their  divergence 
as  they  progress  in  their  evolution.  Yet,  in  certain 
definite  points,  they  may  evolve  identically ;  in  fact, 
they  must  do  so  if  the  hypothesis  of  a  conmion  im- 
petus be  accepted.  This  is  just  what  we  shall  have 
to  show  now  in  a  more  precise  way.   .  .  .^ 

The  evolution  movement  would  be  a  simple  one, 
and  we  should  soon  have  been  able  to  determine  its 
direction,  if  life  had  described  a  single  course,  like 
that  of  a  solid  ball  shot  from  a  cannon.  But  it  pro- 
ceeds rather  like  a  shell,  which  suddenly  bursts  into 

*  This  quotation  and  those  immediately  following  it  are  taken 
from  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  87-88,  98,  135. 


68  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

fragments,  which  fragments,  being  themselves  shells, 
burst  in  their  turn  into  fragments  destined  to  burst 
again,  and  so  on  for  a  time  incommensurably  long. 
We  perceive  only  what  is  nearest  to  us,  namely,  the 
scattered  movements  of  the  pulverized  explosions. 
From  them  we  have  to  go  back,  stage  by  stage,  to 
the  original  movement. 

When  a  shell  bursts,  the  particular  way  it  breaks 
is  explained  both  by  the  explosive  force  of  the  pow- 
der it  contains  and  by  the  resistance  of  the  metal. 
So  of  the  way  life  breaks  into  individuals  and  species. 
It  depends,  we  think,  on  the  two  series  of  causes : 
the  resistance  life  meets  from  inert  matter,  and  the 
explosive  force — due  to  an  unstable  balance  of 
tendencies — which  life  bears  within  itself, 

.  .  .  But  the  real  and  profound  causes  of  division 
(in  the  case  of  unorganized  matter)  were  those  which 
life  bore  within  its  bosom.  For  life  is  tendency,  and 
the  essence  of  a  tendency  is  to  develop  in  the  form 
of  a  sheaf,  creating,  by  its  very  growth,  divergent 
directions  among  which  its  impetus  is  divided.  This 
we  observe  in  ourselves,  in  the  evolution  of  that  spe- 
cial tendency  which  we  call  our  character.  Each  of 
us,  glancing  back  over  his  history,  will  find  that  his 
child-personality,  though  indivisible,  united  in  itself 
divers  persons,  which  could  remain  blended  just  be- 
cause they  were  in  a  nascent  state:  their  indecision, 
so  charged  with  promise,  is  one  of  the  greatest 
charms  of  childhood.  But  these  interwoven  person- 
alities   become    incompatible   in    course    of    growth, 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         69 

and,  as  each  of  us  can  live  but  one  life,  a  choice  must 
perforce  be  made.  We  choose  in  reality  without 
ceasing;  without  ceasing,  also,  we  abandon  many 
things.  The  route  we  pursue  in  time  is  strewn  with 
the  remains  of  all  that  we  began  to  be,  of  all  that  we 
might  have  become.  But  nature,  which  has  at  com- 
mand an  incalculable  number  of  lives,  is  in  no  wise 
bound  to  make  such  sacrifices.  She  preserves  the 
different  tendencies  that  have  bifurcated  with  their 
growth.  She  creates  with  them  diverging  series  of 
species  that  will  evolve  separately. 

.  .  .  Vegetative  torpor,  instinct,  and  intelligence — 
these,  then,  are  the  elements  that  coincided  in  the 
vital  impulsion  common  to  plants  and  animals,  and 
which,  in  the  course  of  a  development  in  which  they 
were  made  manifest  in  the  most  unforeseen  forms, 
have  been  dissociated  by  the  very  fact  of  their 
growth.  The  cardinal  error  which,  from  Aristotle 
onwards,  has  vitiated  most  of  the  philosophies  of 
nature,  is  to  see  in  vegetative,  instinctive,  and  ra- 
tional life,  three  successive  degrees  of  the  develop- 
ment of  one  and  the  same  tendency,  whereas  they  are 
three  divergent  directions  of  an  activity  which  has 
split  up  as  it  grew.  The  difference  between  them 
is  not  a  difference  of  intensity,  nor,  more  generally, 
of  degree,  but  of  kind. 


So  much  for  Bergson's  theory  of  life.    Re- 
calling his  statement  that  "  it  is  necessary  that 


70  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

these  two  inquiries,  theory  of  knowledge  and 
theory  of  Hfe,  should  join  each  other,  and,  by  a 
circular  process,  push  each  other  on  unceas- 
ingly," let  us  now  turn  to  his  theory  of  knowl- 
edge which,  as  he  maintains,  is  and  must  be  in 
continuous  interaction  with  his  theory  of  life. 
Bergson  maintains  that  instinct  and  intel- 
lect are  both  practical  in  their  function;  they 
are  aimed  at  securing  more  life.  But  they 
differ  in  that  "  intellect  deals  with  relationships 
— instinct  with  things."  ^  Also,  instinct  uses 
organized  means  to  accomplish  its  end  and  in- 
tellect uses  the  unorganized.  That  is,  intellect 
can  fabricate  tools  while  instinct  has  to  depend 
upon  the  "  tools  "  furnished  by  nature.  Thus 
intellect's  conquests  of  nature  have  been 
greater  than  those  of  instinct,  but  instinct  is 
closer  to  reality.  The  latter  alone  has  direct 
contact  with  reality,  but,  being  unintellectual, 
it  will  not  seek  Reality  as  a  Whole.  It  goes 
blindly  at  a  very  small  part.  Intellect,  on  the 
contrary,  has  become  disinterested  enough  to 
seek  Reality  as  a  Whole,  that  is,  to  speculate, 
but  it  is  cut  off  by  its  very  nature  from  that 

•  Cf.  Albert  Steenbergen,  Henri  Bergson's  Intuitive  PhilosO' 
phie.    Jena,  1909. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?        71 

direct  contact  with  reality  which  alone  can  pro- 
vide the  proper  means,  hasis,  and  material  for 
speculation.  "Without  our  intellect  we  would 
not  speculate.  The  intellect  is  the  source  of 
the  need  for  speculation,  but  not  its  instru- 
ment." '" 

Man  retains  in  intuition  the  latent  power  of 
direct  contact  with  reality  which  instinct  pos- 
sesses so  intensely  in  its  limited  field.  But  our 
intuition  has  been  oppressed  by  the  "  homo 
faber  "  in  us,  whose  intellect,  turned  ever  to- 
wards action,  has  become  dominant.  With  the 
rise  of  speculative  needs  we  have  carried  over 
into  the  sphere  of  disinterested  metaphysics  the 
methods  of  an  instrument  meant  primarily  for 
practical  action.  As  LeRoy  states  the  prob- 
lem,'' "  Our  intelligence  has  become  utilitarian 
out  of  long  habit  and  we  must  first  free  it 
from  this  thraldom.  Our  realizable  knowl- 
edge is  at  every  moment  partial  and  limited 
rather  than  exterior  and  relative.  To  progress 
towards  absolute  knowledge  we  nmst  extend 
experience,  diversify  it  by  science,  correct  the 
disturbing  effect  of  action,  and  quicken  all  the 

"  From  Bergsoii,  throiifih  J.  C.  Meredith,  "  Critical  Side  of 
Bergson's   Philosophy,"    Wexdniimter   Revieir,   February,    1912. 
"Edouard  LeRoy,  A   New  Philosophy:  Henri  Bergson. 


•72  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

results  by  an  effort  of  sympathy  by  which  we 
feel  the  inner  wealth  of  the  object." 

But  it  is  not  only  by  inner  intuition  that  we 
touch  reality.  Perception  is,  in  part,  an  intui- 
tion of  the  outer  world.  It  is  reality,  though 
a  limited  part  of  it,  which  the  senses  give  us. 
Hence,  to  a  degree,  intellect  and  science  may 
touch  reality.  But  without  these  intuitive  per- 
ceptions the  intellect  would  be  a  mere  logic- 
chopping  machine,  a  mill  without  grist  from 
the  real  world.  As  it  is,  the  intellect  gives  us 
only  cinematograph  pictures  of  a  reality  which 
is  always  moving  faster  than  it,  and  always 
escaping  it.  Even  modern  mathematics,  with 
its  marvelous  calculations  of  motion,  only  re- 
duces the  intervals  between  the  "  snap-shots." 
The  "  New  Logic  "  also,  which  posits  change 
and  allows  for  new  appearances,  cannot  catch 
the  actual  process  by  which  the  new  appear- 
ances emerge.^"  Thus  it  is  by  intuition  alone 
that  we  touch  reality,  and  by  intuition  is 
meant  instinct  become  self-conscious,  a  fusion 

*^  Professor  Edward  G.  Spaulding,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
school  of  "  New  Realism,"  said  to  me,  "  Bergson  attacks  the 
truth-getting  ability  of  science.  This  is  because  he  identifies 
all  logic  with  Aristotelian  logic,  which  proceeds  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  purely  additive  relationships.  He  ignores  the  '  nev/ 
logic '  which  allows  for  new  appearances." 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         73 

between  the  instinct  of  the  animal  and  the  in- 
tellect of  man. 

But  our  intuitions  can  find  expression  only 
through  language,  and  this  means  concepts. 
Our  concepts,  however,  should  be  less  rigid, 
more  fluid,  than  they  have  been ;  molded  more 
nearly  on  reality.  Concepts  are  really  meta- 
phors, for  metaphor  is  "  the  chosen  instrument 
of  philosophic  thought."  This  must  indeed  be 
the  case  because  reality  overflows  all  the  cate- 
gories of  the  intellect.  In  the  main,  however, 
the  function  of  the  intellect,  working  through 
concepts,  is  a  very  practical  thing.  Its  func- 
tion is  "  to  enumerate  the  principal  possible  at- 
titudes of  the  thing  (that  is,  the  object  of 
knowledge)  towards  us,  as  well  as  our  best 
possible  attitude  towards  it."  ^^ 

Let  me  add  two  or  three  somewhat  extended 
quotations  from  Bergson  himself,  that  his 
theory  of  knowledge  may  be  more  clear  to  us : 

.  .  .  An  intelligent  being  bears  within  himself  the 
means  to  transcend  his  own  nature. 

He  transcends  himself,  however,  less  than  he 
wishes,  less  also  than  he  imagines  himself  to  do.  The 
purely  formal  character  of  intelligence  deprives  it 
*»  Bergson,  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,    p.  54. 


74  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

of  the  ballast  necessary  to  enable  it  to  settle  itself 
on  the  objects  that  are  of  the  most  powerful  interest 
to  speculation.  Instinct,  on  the  contrary,  has  the 
desired  materiality,  but  it  is  incapable  of  going  sa 
far  in  quest  of  its  object;  it  does  not  speculate. 
Here  we  reach  the  point  that  most  concerns  our 
present  inquiry.  The  difference  that  we  shall  now 
proceed  to  denote  between  instinct  and  intelligence  is 
what  the  whole  of  this  analysis  was  meant  to  bring 
out.  Wc  formulate  it  thus:  There  are  things  that 
intelligence  alone  is  able  to  seek,  but  which,  by  itself, 
it  will  never  -find.  These  things  instinct  alone  could 
find;  but  it  will  never  seek  them.^^ 

Instinct  is  sympathy.  If  this  sympathy  could  ex- 
tend its  object  and  also  reflect  upon  itself,  it  would 
give  us  the  key  to  vital  operations — just  as  intelli- 
gence, developed  and  disciplined,  guides  us  into 
matter.  For — we  cannot  too  often  repeat  it — intelli- 
gence and  instinct  are  turned  in  opposite  directions, 
the  former  towards  inert  matter,  the  latter  towards 
life.  Intelligence,  by  means  of  science,  which  is  its 
work,  will  deliver  up  to  us  more  and  more  completely 
the  secret  of  physical  operations ;  of  life  it  brings  us, 
and,  moreover,  only  claims  to  bring  us,  a  translation 
in  terms  of  inertia.  It  goes  all  round  life,  taking 
from  outside  the  greatest  possible  number  of  views 
of  it,  drawing  it  into  itself  instead  of  entering  into 
it.  But  it  is  to  the  very  inwardness  of  life  that  intui- 
tion leads  us — by  intuition  I  mean  instinct  that  has 

**  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution.  Mitchell's  translation,  p.  151. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         75 

become  disinterested,  self-conscious,  capable  of 
reflecting  upon  its  object  and  of  enlarging  it 
indefinitely/^ 

In  conclusion,  we  may  remark  that  there  is  noth- 
ing mysterious  in  this  faculty  (the  faculty  of  intui- 
tion). Every  one  of  us  has  had  occasion  to  exercise 
it  to  a  certain  extent.  Any  one  of  us,  for  instance, 
who  has  attempted  literary  composition  knows  that 
when  the  subject  has  been  studied  at  length,  the  ma- 
terials all  collected,  and  the  notes  all  made,  something 
more  is  needed  in  order  to  set  about  the  work  of  com- 
position itself,  and  that  is  an  often  very  painful 
effort  to  place  ourselves  directly  at  the  heart  of  the 
subject,  and  to  seek  as  deeply  as  possible  an  impulse, 
after  which  we  need  only  let  ourselves  go.  This  im- 
pulse, once  received,  starts  the  mind  on  a  path  where 
it  rediscovers  all  the  information  it  had  collected, 
and  a  thousand  other  details  besides ;  it  develops  and 
analyses  itself  into  terms  which  could  be  enumerated 
indefinitely.  The  farther  we  go,  the  more  terms  we 
discover;  we  shall  never  say  all  that  could  be  said, 
and  yet,  if  we  turn  back  suddenly  upon  the  impulse 
that  we  feel  behind  us,  and  try  to  seize  it,  it  is  gone; 
for  it  was  not  a  thing,  but  the  direction  of  a  move- 
ment, and  though  indefinitely  extensible,  it  is  in- 
finitely simple.  Metaphysical  intuition  seems  to  be 
something  of  the  same  kind.  What  corresponds  here 
to  the  documents  and  notes  of  literary  composition 
is  the  sum  of  observations  and  experience  gathered 

**  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  p.  176. 


76  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

together  by  positive  science.  For  we  do  not  obtain 
an  intuition  from  reality — that  is,  an  intellectual 
sympathy  with  the  most  intimate  part  of  it — unless 
we  have  won  its  confidence  by  a  long  fellowship  with 
its  superficial  manifestations/** 

There  are  several  vital  religious  values  which 
this  phase  of  Bergson's  thought  conserves  and 
fosters.  In  the  first  place,  for  those  who  ac- 
cept this  epistemology,  there  is  an  end  of 
skepticism  and  agnosticism — of  the  radical 
sort,  I  mean.  To  be  sure  Carr  holds  "  that, 
on  the  contrary,  this  view  of  the  intellect  must 
itself  end  in  skepticism.  He  admits  that  Berg- 
son  himself  is  not  a  skeptic  but  says  that  "  he 
(Bergson)  states  admirably  the  argument 
which  leads  to  skepticism — -sl  new  Hume — ." 
By  skepticism  Carr  means  "  the  view  that  our 
ideas  and  beliefs  are  due  to  categories  that  are 
valid  only  within  the  sphere  of  my  activity 
and  unable  to  solve  the  problem  raised  by  that 
activity  itself." 

I  do  not  care  to  argue  the  prior  question. 
Certainly,  if  Bergson's  intuitive  foundation 
breaks  down,  the  superstructure  of  real  knowl- 

*•  Bergson,  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  pp.  89-91. 
*'  H.  Wildon  Carr,  op.  cit. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?        77 

edge  of  the  Real  will  fall  with  it.  But  our 
thesis  is:  "  Granted  the  philosophic  sub-struc- 
ture, then  what  ? ' '  The  answer  must  be,  without 
a  doubt:  The  "Day  View"  of  hfe;  a  feel- 
ing of  confidence  in  our  senses,  that  they  can- 
not all  be  fooled  all  the  time;  a  feeling  of  con- 
fidence in  our  intuitions,  provided  they  spring 
out  of  a  wide  experience  with  fact  and  are 
properly  tested  by  fact  and  reason;  in  other 
words,  a  general  confidence  in  ourselves  and 
in  our  ability  to  get  at  the  heart  and  meaning 
of  life. 

As  we  look  about  us,  we  do  indeed  realize 
that  nature  is  more  than  we  can  see,  and  that 
even  what  we  see  is  colored  by  the  memory  of 
past  experiences,  a  memory  which  fastens  it- 
self instinctively  upon  the  practical  elements 
of  the  new  experience,  ignoring  the  rest.  Still, 
our  apprehension  of  things  may  be  taken  nmch 
as  the  "  common-sense "  view  indicates, 
*'  Things  are  what  they  seem  " — in  the  main, 
and  so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  matter  is  not  "  relative,"  with  the 
Ding-an-Sich  of  Reality  lurking  entirely  con- 
cealed and  forever  concealed  behind  mere  ap- 
pearance— a  Spencerian  "  Unknowable  ";  our 


78  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

knowledge  is  merely  "  limited,"  which  is  quite 
another  thing.  We  cut  out  of  the  whole  small 
sections  suited  to  our  practical  needs,  but 
within  the  portions  thus  cut  out  we  come  to 
grips  with  reality  itself,  limited  and  also  col- 
ored, but  nevertheless  real.  Thus,  in  our  ordi- 
nary external  relationships,  we  are  brought 
back  into  the  realm  of  confidence,  to  a  reality 
which  is  ultimate,  as  far  as  it  goes. 

This  spirit  of  confidence  touches  also  those 
intuitions  of  a  more  distinctively  inward  na- 
ture— those  reactions  of  the  whole  personality 
which  yield  insight.  Under  other  circum- 
stances we  should  have  to  examine  in  detail  the 
claims  of  these  intuitions  to  validity  and  cer- 
tainty. Here  we  need  but  remark  that  Berg- 
son  teaches  that  Truth  exists,  and  that  the 
intuition  can  get  at  it.  Differing  from  the  prag- 
matists  here  as  at  other  points,  Bergson  does 
not  hold  that  truth  is  "  what  works."    Neither 

Bergson  does  not  hold  that  truth  is  mutable.  That 
evolution  has  produced  intellect  does  not  affect  the 
theory  of  the  nature  of  truth.  That  intellect  is  a 
product  of  life  activity  is  different  from  saying  that 
the  understanding  makes  truth  or  that  truth  itself 
is  a  product  of  the  life  activity. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         79 

do  we  ourselves  create  truth.     As  Carr  says. 
Thus   Bergson  conihats   radical  skepticism 
and  agnosticism  by  maintaining  that  the  intui- 
tion enables  us  to  grasp  truth  directly,  even 
though   only   partially.     Certainly   there   are 
practical  tests  of  logic  and  of  fact  that  may 
be  applied,  and  Bergson  recognizes  that  such 
tests  must  be  applied.     He  has  said  most  ex- 
plicitly that,  "  Notwithstanding  his  high  valua- 
tion of  intuition,  he  thought  it  should  always  be 
tested  by  verification ;  regarding  intuition  as  a 
valuable  guideboard,  but  one  that,  like  other 
guideboards,  might  point  wrong."  '"      Never- 
theless,   the   truth    is   self-evidencing,    in   the 
main,  and  the  "  witness  of  the  spirit  "  not  only 
must  be  trusted  but  can  be  trusted.     In  this 
direction,  clearly,  Bergson  is  on  the  side  of 
religion.     If  one   grants   that  the   blow  has 
landed,  then  it  is  inevitably  a  death  blow  to  the 
worst  enemy  of  religion  among  modern  edu- 
cated classes.    He  replaces  the  pale  and  hard- 
ening features  of  the  agnostic  with  the  joyous 
freshness  of  the  believer.    "  Ye  shall  know  the 
Truth,  and  the  Truth  shall  make  you  free." 

"This  statement  was  made  by  Berpson  to  Mr.  Henry  Holt 
during  Bergson's  lecture  tour  in  the  United  States. 


80  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Religion  cannot  subsist  on  mere  hypotheses, 
cut  and  dried.  It  thrives  only  on  a  profound 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  its  object.  Berg- 
sonism  is  not  only  compatible  with  this  con- 
viction but  directly  fosters  it. 

But  religion  needs  not  only  the  conviction  of 
the  reality  of  its  object.  It  needs  also  the  con- 
viction that  the  total  reality  of  God  is  ever  be- 
yond the  power  of  man  to  embrace.  In  other 
words,  religion  thrives  in  the  region  between 
complete  agnosticism  and  absolute  knowledge. 
If  we  cannot  know  God  at  all,  we  cannot  wor- 
ship. If  we  should  know  Him  all,  we  would 
not  worship.  The  religious  man  is  a  "  mero- 
gnostic."  He  knows  "  in  part,"  but  only  in 
part.  Beyond  his  partial  knowledge  stretch 
the  illimitable  regions  of  awe  and  mystery. 
If  he  is  truly  religious  he  will  have  within  him, 
to  a  degree  at  least, 

A  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused 
Whose  dwelHng  is  the  light  of  setting  suns, 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man — 
A  motion  and  a  spirit,  that  impels 
All  thinking  beings,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         81 

Ag  we  have  seen,  it  is  just  this  sort  of  knowl- 
edge, real  hut  partial,  which  Bergson's  theory 
offers  to  us.  In  this  regard,  also,  it  favors  the 
growth  of  that  "  sense  sublime  "  which  is  of  the 
very  essence  of  religion. 

In  one  way  this  theory  of  knowledge  is  even 
more  favorable  to  religion  than  other  theories 
which  also  profess  to  lead  us  to  final  reality. 
The  method  of  approach  to  reality,  according 
to  Bergson,  is  primarily  non-intellectual.  We 
need  not  linger  at  this  point  over  the  charge  of 
anti-intellectual  and  anti-scientific  bias.  Our 
business  now  is  to  bring  out  the  fact  that  Berg- 
son's philosophical  approach  to  reality  is  pri- 
marily non-intellectual,  and  that  the  religious 
approach  to  reality  (God)  is  also  fundamen- 
tally non-intellectual.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
religion  periodically  breaks  out  against  intel- 
lect and  against  culture,  as  if  it  had  an  in- 
stinctive sense  of  danger  lurking  therein. 
Bergson  is  charged  with  a  similar  outbreak, 
and  the  charge  has  a  measure  of  basis  to  it. 
Surely  some  kinship  must  exist  here. 

The  kinship  is  between  the  "  intuition  "  of 
Bergson  and  the  "  faith  "  of  the  religious  man. 
They  are  not  to  be  identified  with  one  another, 


Sa  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

but  they  are  clearly  related.  Widen  the  chan- 
nel of  intuition  and  personalize  fundamental 
reality  and  you  have  the  essence  of  religious 
faith.  Bergson's  influence  is  on  the  side  of  a 
faith  which  is  neither  pure  intellectual  belief 
nor  yet  mere  emotional  mysticism.  The  re- 
ligious faith  of  a  Bergsonian  would  indeed  be 
mystical.  What  religious  faith  is  not  more  or 
less  mystical  ?  But  his  mysticism  would  spring 
out  of  a  wealth  of  fact,  would  be  filled  with 
and  supported  by  fact.  It  is  important  to 
recognize  at  this  point  the  continuous  and  salu- 
tary relationship  which,  according  to  Bergson, 
should  exist  between  intuition  on  the  one  hand, 
and  science  and  intellect  on  the  other  hand.  If 
this  rapprochement  were  carried  over  into  the 
realm  of  religious  faith,  it  might  aid  religion 
in  realizing  the  happy  mean  between  anti- 
cultural  fanaticism  and  easy-going  worldliness 
or  dry  intellectualism. 

This  kinship  between  intuition  and  religious 
faith  yields  still  another  result.  In  it  one  may 
find  a  philosophical  basis  for  the  validity  of 
religious  knowledge  jjer  se.  The  religious 
sense  is  not  to  be  subjected  to  other  phases  of 
man's  conscious  life.     It  does  not  derive  its 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?        83 

charter  from  them.  Like  the  conscience,  Hke 
the  reason,  it,  too,  is  primal,  autonomous,  direct 
from  the  hand  of  God.  Rehgion's  contribution 
to  man's  whole  view  of  life,  of  present  action, 
and  of  future  destiny,  must  be  reckoned  with 
as  a  fact  not  to  be  read  out  of  court  unless  all 
facts  are  to  be  read  out  of  court.  Like  other 
facts  of  a  different  kind — facts  of  conscience, 
facts  of  reason — the  religious  fact  must  be 
tested  before  its  validity  can  be  judged,  but 
its  potential  validity  must  be  admitted  as  easily 
as  the  potential  validity  of  any  other  class  of 
facts. 

This  conclusion,  inevitable  upon  the  Berg- 
sonian  basis,  removes  the  veil  which  hides  from 
many  the  inherent  dignity  of  religion.  Veiled 
religion  has  been;  scarred  oftentimes  by  the 
well-calculated  blows  of  her  enemies  and  the 
ill-calculated  blows  of  her  friends ;  but  the  veil 
and  the  scars  serve  but  to  emphasize  her  long 
and  continued  existence  and  her  compelling 
charm  for  man.  She  charms  because  Reality  is 
beneath  her  features.  If,  as  Bergson  allows 
us  to  infer,  she  is  not  inferior  to  other  phases 
of  human  experience,  not  eliminable,  then  by 
her  very  nature  she  must  be  superior  to  them, 


84  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

for  she  bears  us  up  into  the  region  of  destiny ; 
and  one's  view  of  destiny  necessarily  becomes 
either  a  pillar  of  cloud  or  a  pillar  of  fire,  as  one 
treads  the  path  through  that  portion  of  destiny 
which  we  call  the  human  life.  Is  it  too  much 
to  say,  then,  that  religious  knowledge  is  the 
crown  of  all  knowledge,  according  to  Berg- 
sonian  implications? 

I  shall  draw  but  one  more  religious  inference 
from  Bergson's  theory  of  knowledge.  This 
will  appear  positive  or  negative,  favorable  or 
unfavorable,  according  to  one's  previous  re- 
ligious convictions.  It  has  to  do  with  the  place 
and  nature  of  creed  and  dogma.  The  nature 
and  function  of  dogma  are  noon-day  clear  to 
the  Bergsonian.  Dogmas  are  intellectual  con- 
cepts adopted  by  a  religious  organization  as  its 
basis.  The  nature  of  intellect  is  such  that  the 
dogmas  it  formulates  cannot  give  us  the  abso- 
lute truth.  They  are  not  themselves  absolute 
and  never  can  be.  They  are  cinematograph 
views  of  the  truth,  which  always  overflows  all 
their  clear-cut  limits.  Yet  they  may,  and  prob- 
ably always  do,  contain  truth  because  they 
usually  spring  out  of  real  intuitions  of  the 
final  truth.    Dogmas  are  therefore  necessarily 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         85 

metaphorical  in  nature  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
should  be  so;  for  metaphors  are  fluid  and  there- 
fore best  adapted  for  a  progressive  represen- 
tation of  the  living  and  growing  reality  which 
dogma  seeks  vainly  to  catch. 

A  too  logical  and  intellectualistic  concep- 
tion of  dogma  has  led  to  several  unfortunate 
results.  It  has  created  the  false  pride  of  a 
supposed  and  yet  impossible  achievement.  It 
has  generated  the  inquisitorial  method  and 
spirit.  It  has  hampered  and,  in  certain  quar- 
ters, altogether  stopped  healthy  progress. 
And,  most  unfortunate  of  all,  it  has  tended  to 
take  away  the  emphasis  from  vital  religion  and 
to  place  it  upon  an  external  formulation.  The 
greater  plasticity  of  dogma,  if  molded  on 
Bergsonian  lines,  would,  perhaps,  enable  it  to 
portray  and  embody  more  nearly  the  life  it  is 
supposed  to  represent. 

In  addition  to  this  metaphorical  phase  of 
dogma,  Bergson's  teaching  would  suggest  an- 
other phase  which  some  might  think  more  prac- 
tical and  important.  I  can  best  describe  it  in 
the  very  words  used  by  Bergson  to  describe 
our  ordinary  knowledge.  "  To  think  of  an 
object,"  he  says, 


86  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

,.  .  .  in  the  usual  meaning  of  the  word  "  think" — 
is  to  take  one  or  more  of  these  immobile  views  of  its 
mobility.  It  consists,  in  short,  in  asking  from  time  to 
time  where  the  object  is,  in  order  that  we  may  know 
what  to  do  with  it.  Nothing  could  be  more  legitimate, 
moreover,  than  this  method  of  procedure,  so  long  as 
we  are  concerned  only  with  a  practical  knowledge  of 
reality.  Knowledge,  in  so  far  as  it  is  directed  to 
practical  matters,  has  only  to  enumerate  the  princi- 
pal possible  attitudes  of  the  thing  towards  us,  as 
well  as  our  best  possible  attitude  towards  it.^^ 

If,  in  the  above  quotation,  we  substitute  the 
word  "  God "  for  the  words  "  thing "  and 
"  object,"  we  shall  have  a  very  good  descrip- 
tion of  this  phase  of  dogma,  according  to  Berg- 
son.  Dogmas  are  practical  formulations  de- 
signed to  enable  men  to  see  and  to  assume 
life's  proper  relationships.  Being  practical, 
they  must  be  suited  to  the  age  for  which  they 
are  made.  Being  suited  to  the  age  for  which 
they  are  made,  they  become  unsuited  to  the 
ages  for  which  they  were  not  made  and  there- 
fore must  undergo  periodical  remodelling.  To 
use  the  words  of  Bergson,  the  function  of 
dogma  "  consists,  in  short,  in  asking  from  time 
to  time  where  the  object   (God)   is,  in  order 

^»  Bergson,  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  p.  54. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         87 

that  we  may  know  what  to  do  with  it  (Him) ." 
With  a  few  changes  this  sentence  could  he 
turned  into  an  ideal  definition  of  dogma — a 
definition  and  a  conception  of  dogma  whose 
absence  or  denial  has  cost  the  Church  and 
religion  more  than  man  can  ever  calculate; 
a  conception  whose  hearty  and  intelligent  ac- 
ceptance is  one  of  the  crying  needs  of  modern 
organized  Christianity.  All  that  fair-minded 
liberals  ask  of  the  Church  is  that  she  should 
ask  anew,  "  from  time  to  time,"  where  God  is, 
in  order  that  we  may  know  (anew)  "  what  to 
do  with  Him."  In  an  historical  religion  such 
as  Christianity,  such  a  creed  would  include,  of 
course,  statements  regarding  Jesus  Christ ;  his 
place  in  revealmg  God's  attitude  towards  man; 
his  function  as  the  inspirer  of  "  our  best  pos- 
sible attitude  "  towards  God. 

Finally,  just  as  intuition  is  dumb  without 
conceptual  language,  according  to  Bergson,  so 
a  Bergsonian  faith  would  need  dogma  as  a 
medium  of  expression  and  as  an  aid  to  self- 
propagation.  Language  and  concepts  are 
part  and  parcel  of  the  social  life  of  man. 
Similarly,  if  we  are  to  have  organized  religion, 
we  must  have  dogma.     Sabatier's  words  cor- 


88  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

rectly  portray  the  position  a  Bergsonian  re- 
ligionist must  take  regarding  the  necessity  of 
dogma.  "  Dogma  therefore  is  a  phenomenon 
of  social  life.  One  cannot  conceive  either 
dogma  without  a  Church,  or  of  a  Church  with- 
out dogma.  The  two  notions  are  correlative 
and  inseparable." '°  With  Sabatier,  also,  a 
Bergsonian  would  hold  that  dogmas  are 
mutable;  that  they  do  not  "  die  fatally  the  mo- 
ment they  are  touched  by  criticism  " ;  that, 
though  necessary  to  religion,  they  do  not 
"  form  the  essence  of  religion."  "^ 

To  the  symbolic  view  of  dogma,  therefore, 
which  Sabatier  also  makes  fundamental,  the 
Bergsonian  dogmatist  would  add  a  non-sym- 
bolic and  very  practical  element.  His  creed 
would  "  enumerate  the  principal  possible  atti- 
tudes of  God  towards  us,  as  well  as  our  best 
possible  attitude  towards  Him  " ;  and  this  for 
the  very  practical  purpose  of  inspiring  right 
faith  and  action. 

Thus  Bergson  leads  us  to  a  clear-cut  theory 
of  religious   knowledge   which   places   prime 

"  A.  Sabatier,  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Seed's 
translation,  p.  229. 

"  A.  Sabatier,  op.  cit.,  p.  244. 


HOW  DO  WE  KNOW  REALITY?         89 

emphasis  upon  faith,  religious  experience,  and 
religious  insight,  but  also  insists  upon  the  place 
and  value  of  dogma  when  properly  conceived. 
Though  unsatisfying  to  extreme  dogmatists, 
this  view  is  certainly  not  anti-religious  or  even 
anti-dogmatic.  There  are  elements  in  it 
which  ought  to  appeal  to  the  warm-hearted 
representatives  of  the  "  evangelical "  type, 
and,  as  a  whole,  it  will  be  welcomed  by  all  true 
religionists  who  long  for  God,  but  are  weary 
of  some  of  His  dogmatic,  self-appointed 
emissaries. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CREATIVE  EVOLUTION 

Widely  accepted  as  the  theory  of  evolution 
has  been  for  j^ears,  its  thorough-going  appli- 
cation to  philosophy  has  usually  been  apparent 
rather  than  real.  Hegel  and  Spencer  will  be 
summoned  to  bear  witness  against  this  state- 
ment and,  it  will  be  contended,  Haeckel  was 
thorough-going  enough  to  satisfy  the  most  ar- 
dent. But  Hegel's  Absolute  remained  un- 
moved and  immovable  while  the  drama  of  life 
unfolded.  Manifestations  moved,  changed, 
"evolved";  but  reality  itself  did  not  move, 
change,  or  progress.  Spencer,  on  his  part,  had 
a  picture-block  idea  of  the  evolutionary  proc- 
ess. As  Bergson  points  out,  Spencer  merely 
brings  together  the  severed  parts  of  a  previous 
plan  which  he  himself  had  sketched  and  then 
cut  up  into  bits.  Spencerian  evolution  is,  fit- 
ting these  bits  together  again  according  to  the 
preconceived  plan.  Haeckel's  scheme  rests 
upon  enormous  assumptions  which  stagger  the 
minds  of  the  unthinking,  but  fill  the  minds  of 

90 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  91 

the  penetrating  with  a  deep  suspicion  that  the 
real  process  of  life  has  escaped  him. 

In  spite  of  serious  defection,  the  ranks  of 
the  Hegelian  evolutionists  still  manifest 
strength,  manned  largely,  if  not  wholly,  by 
representatives  of  the  intellectual  aristocracy. 
These  are  the  "  vested  interests  "  of  current 
philosophy.  The  more  patently  mechanical 
views  of  Spencer,  however,  and  especially  those 
of  Haeckel,  have  become,  in  a  degenerate  form, 
a  popular  fetich  with  consequent  far-reaching 
influence.  It  is  such  conceptions  as  these 
which  vulgar  shouters  usually  mean  by  the 
word,  "  evolution,"  and  their  vociferousness 
has  often  been  quite  as  offensive  to  evolution- 
ists as  to  those  who  reject  evolution.  Blind, 
mechanical  evolutionism  has  also  become  a  sort 
of  general  utility  man  on  the  stages  of  the 
scientist,  the  historian,  and  the  philosopher, 
and  by  its  use  they  have  often  deceived 
themselves,  as  well  as  others,  regarding 
the  validity  of  their  explanations  and  the 
progress  of  life  and  thought.  But,  as  Love- 
joy  says,^  "  Evolution  and  mechanism  are 
really  profoundly  uncongenial  notions." 

*  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  "  The  Metaphysician  of  the  Life  Force,"  Xeio 
York  Nation,  September  30,  1909. 


92  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

It  is  no  wonder  that  evolution  has  become 
the  synonym  for  Anti- Christ  in  the  minds 
of  so  many  sincere  rehgious  people.  We 
have  all  suffered  in  many  ways  at  the  hands 
of  its  more  blatant,  coarse,  and  ignorant  ex- 
pounders. The  common  propagandist,  who 
parades  the  names  of  Comte,  Spencer,  and 
Haeckel,  usually  has  not  one-tenth  the  rever- 
ence which  Comte  had,  or  which  Spencer  cer- 
tainly had.  But  religious  believers  far  more 
intelligent  than  those  I  had  in  mind  just  now 
have  been  oppressed,  if  not  actually  repelled, 
not  merely  by  unworthy  representatives  of 
these  great  evolutionary  systems,  but  also  by 
the  philosophical  systems  themselves  and  by 
their  evident  effect  upon  the  chosen  few  as  well 
as  upon  the  rabble.  Thus  a  great  idea,  in 
whose  good  we  all  share  whether  we  know  it  or 
not,  whether  we  like  it  or  not — a  great  idea 
whose  essential  truth  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
escape — this  idea  has  been  made  the  chief 
point  of  attack  by  many  theologians.  They 
attack  it,  believing  that  it  is  an  idea  essentially 
subversive  of  true  religion,  being  deceived  by 
the  first  attempts  to  formulate  the  theory,  by 
the  shallowness  and  vulgarity  of  many  of  its 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  93 

popular  forms,  or  by  their  own  ignorance  of 
the  significance  of  the  theory  itself. 

But  it  was  not  left  to  theologians  alone  to 
assail  these  forms  of  the  evolutionary  theory. 
Sudden  mutations  in  the  development  of 
species,  and  the  rapid  appearance  of  entirely 
new  forms  of  life,  challenged  the  thought  of 
the  biologists.  The  "  Vitalistic  School " 
arose,  with  its  distrust  of  the  prevailing  the- 
ories. It  was  not  a  distrust  of  evolution  itself. 
Far  from  it.  It  was  rather  a  distrust  of  that 
carefully  articulated  system  of  deterministic 
evolution  by  which  every  successive  phase  of 
life  was  thought  to  be  a  mere  unfolding  of 
what  had  previously  existed ;  a  distrust  of  that 
theory  according  to  which  all  life  is  a  mere 
collocation  of  previously  existing  elements — a 
collocation  whose  rise  could  be  adequately  ex- 
plained, whose  meaning  fully  fathomed,  by 
bare  analysis,  and  a  careful  resolution  of  the 
whole  into  its  constituent  "  parts." 

Further,  a  reaction  from  the  rarefied  air 
of  idealism,  and  a  plunge  into  the  stream  of 
real  men  and  things,  gave  rise  to  the  pragmatic 
cult  of  William  James  and  his  disciples.  They 
maintain  that  life  is  not  only  unfixed  and  un- 


94  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

determined,  but  that  the  truth — reality  itself 
— is  whatever  the  changing  fortunes  of  life 
stamp  as  "  workable."  Spontaneity  and  un- 
expectedness are  the  fundamental  character- 
istics of  life,  not  mechanism  and  a  dead  cer- 
tainty. The  "  New  Realists,"  also,'  hold  that 
the  universe  is  wide  open.  "  The  degree  of 
unity,  consistency,  or  connection  subsisting 
among  entities  is  a  matter  to  be  empirically 
ascertained.  ...  In  the  present  stage  of  our 
knowledge  there  is  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
pluralism  .  .  .  there  is  a  present  presumption 
in  favor  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  world  as  a 
whole  is  less  unified  than  are  certain  of  its 
parts." 

It  is  Henri  Bergson  who  has  combined  the 
Open  Door  Theory  ^  with  a  thorough-going 
application  of  the  principle  of  evolution.  In 
Ti7ne  and  Free  Will  he  propounds  his  theory 

"  "  The  Program  and  First  Platform  of  Six  Realists,"  in  the 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  etc.,  1910,  vii:  393.  Re- 
printed as  an  appendix  to  The  New  Realism.  Macmillan,  New 
York,  1912. 

*  I  do  not  mean  by  this  to  identify  Bergson  either  with  the 
pragmatists  or  with  the  new  realists.  They  are  not  identifiable 
by  any  means,  but  they  are  all  alike  in  their  opposition  to  the 
closed  door  of  mechanical  evolution  and  of  absolutistic  de- 
terminism. 


CREATHE  EVOLUTION  95 

of  "  Duration,"  and  in  Creative  Evolution  he 
devolops  the  same  idea  into  a  distinctly  new 
evolutionary  theory,  in  which  the  universe  is 
pictured  as  the  result  of  the  Vital  Impetus 
(the  elan  vital)  at  the  basis  of  things.  Carr 
thus  describes  it :  * 

.  reality  is  change,  not  something  that 
changes,  becoming,  not  something  that  becomes, 
duration,  not  something  that  endures.  When  we 
place  ourselves  in  this  becoming,  time  appears 
to  us  as  the  very  life  of  things,  as  fundamental  real- 
ity.    .    .    . 

A  self-sufficing  reality  is  not  a  timeless  reality. 
Instead  of  the  logical  or  mathematical  conception  of 
a  being  eternally  given  once  for  all,  a  being  whose 
other  is  absolute  naught,  and  which  is  only  defin- 
able in  terms  that  involve  this  supposed  idea,  we 
have  a  reality  whose  essence  is  time  duration.  The 
absolute  is  psychological,  not  mathematical  nor 
logical  in  its  essence. 

The  essential  connection  between  Bergson's 
theory  of  evolution  and  his  idea  of  "  Dura- 
tion "  makes  it  important  that  we  tarry  for  a 
moment  to  make  the  latter  conception  clear. 
This  may  best  be  done  in  his  own  words. 

*  H.  W.  Carr,  "Bergson's  Theory  of  Knowledge,"  Aristote- 
lian  Society  Proceedings,  1908-1909.    New  Series,  IX:  45,  52. 


96  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Pure  duration  is  the  form  which  the  succession  of 
our  conscious  states  assumes  when  our  ego  lets  itself 
live,  when  it  refrains  from  separating  its  present 
state  from  its  former  states.  For  this  purpose  it 
need  not  be  entirely  absorbed  in  the  passing  sensation 
or  idea ;  for  then,  on  tlic  contrary,  it  would  no  longer 
endure.  Nor  need  it  forget  its  former  states:  it  is 
enough  that,  in  recalling  these  states,  it  does  not  set 
them  alongside  its  actual  state  as  one  point  along- 
side another,  but  forms  both  the  past  and  the  present 
states  into  an  organic  whole,  as  happens  when  we 
recall  the  notes  of  a  tune,  melting,  so  to  speak,  into 
one  another. 

Might  it  not  be  said  that,  even  if  these  notes  suc- 
ceed one  another,  yet  we  perceive  them  in  one  another, 
and  that  their  totality  may  be  compared  to  a  living 
being  whose  parts,  although  distinct,  permeate  one 
another  just  because  they  are  so  closely  connected? 
The  proof  is  that,  if  we  interrupt  the  rhythm  by 
dwelling  longer  than  is  right  on  one  note  of  the  tune, 
it  is  not  its  exaggerated  length,  as  length,  which 
will  warn  us  of  our  mistake,  but  the  qualitative 
change  thereby  caused  in  the  whole  of  the  musical 
phrase. 

We  can  thus  conceive  of  succession  without  dis- 
tinction, and  think  of  it  as  a  mutual  penetration, 
an  interconnexion  and  organization  of  elements,  each 
one  of  which  represents  the  whole,  and  cannot  be 
distinguished  or  isolated  from  it  except  by  abstract 
thought.      Such   is    the   account   of   duration   which 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  97 

would  be  given  by  a  being  who  was  ever  the  same  and 
ever  changing,  and  who  had  no  idea  of  space.'' 

We  should  therefore  distinguish  two  forms  of  mul- 
tiplicity, two  very  different  ways  of  regarding  dura- 
tion, two  aspects  of  conscious  life.  Below  liomo- 
geneous  duration,  which  is  the  extensive  symbol  of 
true  duration,  a  close  psychological  analysis  dis- 
tinguishes a  duration  whose  heterogeneous  moments 
permeate  one  another;  below  the  numerical  multi- 
plicity of  conscious  states,  a  qualitative  multiplicity  ; 
below  the  self  with  well-defined  states,  a  self  in  which 
succeeding  each  other  means  melting  into  one  another 
and  forming  an  organic  whole.® 

These  quotations  clearly  show  that,  accord- 
ing to  Bergson,  nothing  at  all  is  static,  unless 
it  is  absolutely  dead.  Everything  that  lives 
also  moves  and  grows,  though  it  may  move  in 
two  directions,  that  is,  towards  the  inert  or 
towards  more  life.  Duration  is  this  continual 
movement,  change,  life,  progress.  Upon  this 
substructure  rests  the  Bergsonian  theory  of 
evolution.    Let  us  summarize  it.^ 

*  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will.  English  translation  by  Pog- 
SOn,  pp.  100-101. 

*  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  p.  128.    Cf.  also  pp.  Q2S-2-29. 

*  Cf.  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  pasxlm.  The  following 
summary  is  largely,  in  fact  almost  entirely,  in  bergson's  own 
language,  hut  I  have  not  iiseci  quotation  marks  because  of  the 
way  in  which  sentences  and  phrases  have  been  cast  together. 


98  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

The  cause  of  evolution  is  not  adaptation  to 
environment,  either  in  the  sense  which  ascribes 
to  the  environment  the  controlhng  power,  that 
is,  natural  selection,  or  in  the  sense  which 
seeks  the  explanation  of  the  resulting  phe- 
nomena in  an  effort  put  forth  by  the  individ- 
ual organisms;  nor  is  evolution  due,  as  the 
finalists  say,  to  an  original  plan  (and  Plan- 
ner) which  foresees  every  detail  and  plans 
each  modification  with  an  end  in  view.  In 
all  these  ideas  there  is  some  truth,  but  the 
real  cause  is  the  Vital  Impetus,  the  life 
impulse,  which  forces  itself  into  matter  as  an 
arm  may  be  thrust  into  a  mass  of  iron  filings 
which  are  thus  rearranged  by  the  movement. 
The  new  arrangement  of  the  filings  due  to  new 
movements  of  the  arm  is,  of  course,  in  a  broad 
sense,  the  result  of  this  vital  "  Cause,"  but  the 
position  and  relations  of  each  particular  filing 
are  not  planned  in  the  sense  that  each  par- 
ticular effect  corresponds  to  a  particular  cause. 

Much  less  can  it  be  said  that  the  nature  and 
structure  of  the  organism,  which  is  propelled 
by  the  Vital  Impetus,  are  controlled  by  the 
surrounding  conditions,  though  they  are 
doubtless  affected  by  them.     The  Vital  Im- 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  99 

petus,  or  life  impulse,  is  the  controlling  factor. 
Thus  neither  mechanism  nor  finalism  explains 
evolution.  The  outside  conditions  limit  the 
form  and  motion  of  the  organism  hut  the  driv- 
ing power  is  from  within.  This  inner  life 
power  does  not  foresee  or  plan  the  particular 
effects  it  will  produce.  In  fact  it  cannot.  It 
drives  ahead  to  unforeseen  and  unforeseeable 
results.  The  mystery  of  the  universe  comes 
from  the  fact  that  we  want  it  all  created  at  one 
stroke  or  the  whole  of  matter  to  be  eternal. 
The  root  of  the  difficulty  is  that  we  think  the 
Absolute  can  have  no  place  in  concrete  time. 
Once  this  prejudice  is  eradicated,  the  idea  of 
creation  becomes  more  clear,  for  it  is  merged 
in  that  of  growth.  But,  then,  we  nmst  not 
speak  of  the  universe  in  its  totality,  for  the 
universe  is  not  made,  but  is  being  made  con- 
tinually. In  vital  activity  we  see  a  reality 
which  is  making  itself  in  a  reality  which  is  un- 
making itself. 

The  life  of  the  body  is  on  the  road  that 
leads  to  the  life  of  the  spirit.  The  current  of 
life  flows  on,  subdividing  itself  into  individ- 
uals, creating  new  souls  continually  which, 
nevertheless,   in  a  certain  sense  pre-existed, 


100  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

little  rills  into  which  the  great  river  of  life 
subdivides  itself,  flowing  through  the  body  of 
humanity.  A  self-sufficient  reality  is  not  nec- 
essarily a  reality  foreign  to  duration.  We 
must  strive  to  see  in  order  to  see  and  no  longer 
to  see  in  order  to  act.  Then  the  Absolute  is 
revealed  very  near  us  and,  in  a  certain  meas- 
ure, in  us.  It  is  of  a  psychological  and  not  of  a 
mathematical  or  of  a  logical  essence.  It  lives 
with  us.  It  endures.  Time  is  necessary  to 
growth,  to  creation,  and  we  realize  that  there 
is  a  progressive  growth  of  the  Absolute  and,  in 
evolution,  a  continual  invention  of  forms  ever 
new. 

Bergson  stoutly  upholds  the  validity  of  the 
general  idea  of  evolution,  concluding  a  discus- 
sion of  this  point  in  these  words : 

Will  it  not,  therefore,  be  better  to  stick  to  the 
letter  of  transformism  as  almost  all  scientists  pro- 
fess it?  Apart  from  the  question  to  what  extent  the 
theory  of  evolution  describes  the  facts  and  to  what 
extent  it  symbolizes  them,  there  is  nothing  in  it  that 
is  irreconcilable  with  the  doctrines  it  has  claimed  to 
replace,  even  with  that  of  special  creations,  to  which 
it  is  usually  opposed.  For  this  reason  we  think  the 
language  of  transformism  forces  itself  now  upon  all 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  101 

philosoplij,  as  tlic  dogmatic  affirmation  of  transform- 
ism  forces  itself  upon  science.** 

Our  author  holds  that  the  real  cause  of  evo- 
lution lies  deeper  than  any  mere  adaptation 
to  environment,  although  adaptation  has  a 
large  part  to  play.    He  says : 

The  truth  is  that  adaptation  explains  the  sinuosi- 
ties of  the  movement  of  evolution,  but  not  its  general 
directions,  still  less  the  movement  itself.  The  road 
that  leads  to  the  town  is  obliged  to  follow  the  ups 
and  downs  of  the  hills ;  it  adapts  itself  to  the  acci- 
dents of  the  ground ;  but  the  accidents  of  the  ground 
are  not  the  cause  of  the  road,  nor  have  they  given  it 
its  direction.  At  every  moment  they  furnish  it  with 
what  is  indispensable,  namely,  the  soil  on  which  it 
lies;  but  if  we  consider  the  whole  of  the  road,  instead 
of  each  of  its  parts,  the  accidents  of  the  ground 
appear  only  as  impediments  or  causes  of  delay,  for 
the  road  aims  simply  at  the  town  and  would  fain  be 
a  straight  line.  Just  so  as  regards  the  evolution  of 
life  and  the  circumstances  through  which  it  passes — 
with  this  difference,  that  evolution  does  not  mark 
out  a  solitary  route,  that  it  takes  directions  without 
aiming  at  ends,  and  that  it  remains  inventive  even 
in  its  adaptations." 

The   following  quotation   indicates  clearly 

*  Creative   Ei'ohition.     English  translation,  pp.  24-26. 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  102. 


102  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Bergson's  teleological  position.  This  bears  so 
directly  upon  certain  phases  of  the  religious 
problem  that  it  should  receive  most  careful 
attention. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  force  which  is 
evolving  throughout  the  organized  world  is  a  limited 
force,  which  is  always  seeking  to  transcend  itself  and 
always  remains  inadequate  to  the  work  it  would  fain 
produce.  The  errors  and  puerilities  of  radical  final- 
ism  are  due  to  the  misapprehension  of  this  point.  It 
has  represented  the  whole  of  the  living  world  as  a 
construction  analogous  to  a  human  work.  All  the 
pieces  have  been  arranged  with  a  view  to  the  best 
possible  functioning  of  the  machine.  Each  species 
has  its  reason  for  existence,  its  allotted  place;  and 
all  join  together,  as  it  were,  in  a  musical  concert, 
wherein  the  seeming  discords  are  really  meant  to 
bring  out  a  fundamental  harmony.  In  short,  all 
goes  on  in  nature  as  in  the  works  of  human  genius, 
where,  though  the  result  may  be  trifling,  there  is  at 
least  perfect  adequacy  between  the  object  made  and 
the  work  of  making  it. 

Nothing  of  the  kind  in  the  evolution  of  life. 
There,  the  disproportion  is  striking  between  the  work 
and  the  result.  From  the  bottom  to  the  top  of  the 
organized  world  we  do,  indeed,  find  one  great  effort ; 
but  most  often  this  effort  turns  short,  sometimes 
paralyzed  by  contrary  forces,  sometimes  diverted 
from  what  it  should  do  by  what  it  does,  absorbed  by 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  103 

the  form  it  is  engaged  in  taking,  hypnotized  by  it 
as  by  a  mirror/" 

Bergson's  mysticism,  with  a  touch  that  al- 
most suggests  pantheism,  pervades  the  suc- 
ceeding sentences: 

From  our  point  of  view,  Hfe  appears  in  its  entirety 
as  an  immense  wave  which,  starting  from  a  center, 
spreads  outwards,  and  which  on  almost  the  whole  of 
its  circumference  is  stopped  and  converted  into  oscil- 
lation: at  one  single  point  the  obstacle  has  been 
forced,  the  impulsion  has  passed  freely.  It  is  this 
freedom  that  the  human  form  registers.  Everywhere 
but  in  man,  consciousness  has  had  to  come  to  a  stand ; 
in  man  alone  it  has  kept  on  its  way.  Man,  then,  con- 
tinues the  vital  movement  indefinitely,  although  he 
does  not  draw  along  with  him  all  that  life  carries  in 
itself.  On  other  lines  of  evolution  there  have  traveled 
other  tendencies  which  life  implied,  and  of  which, 
since  everything  interpenetrates,  man  has,  doubtless, 
kept  something,  but  of  which  he  has  kept  only  very 
little.  It  is  as  if  a  vogue  and  formless  being,  •whom 
we  may  call,  as  we  will,  INIan  or  Superman,  had 
sought  to  realize  himself,  and  had  succeeded  only  by 
abandoning  a  part  of  himself  on  the  way}^ 

After  inveighing  against  the  view  which 
seeks  to  make  the  spiritual  life  immune  from 

"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  126-127. 
"  Op.  cit.,  p.  266. 


104  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

attack  by  removing  it  from  the  world  of  reality, 
Bergson  says  of  the  great  questions — freedom, 
the  existence  of  the  soul,  the  supremacy  of 
man,  and  personal  survival. 

All  these  questions  will  remain  unanswered,  a 
philosophy  of  intuition  will  be  a  negation  of  science, 
will  be  sooner  or  later  swept  away  by  science,  if  it 
does  not  resolve  to  see  the  life  of  the  body  just  where 
it  really  is,  on  the  road  that  leads  to  the  life  of  the 
spirit.  But  it  will  then  no  longer  have  to  do  with 
definite  living  beings.  Life  as  a  whole,  from  the 
initial  impulsion  that  thrust  it  into  the  world,  will 
appear  as  a  wave  which  rises,  and  which  is  opposed 
by  the  descending  movement  of  matter.  On  the 
greater  part  of  its  surface,  at  different  heights,  the 
current  is  converted  by  matter  into  a  vortex.  At 
one  point  alone  it  passes  freely,  dragging  with  it  the 
obstacle  which  will  weigh  on  its  progress  but  will  not 
stop  it.  At  this  point  is  humanity:  it  is  our  privi- 
leged situation. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  rising  wave  is  conscious- 
ness, and,  like  all  consciousness,  it  includes  potentiali- 
ties without  number.  .  .  .  Thus  souls  are  continu- 
ally being  created,  which,  nevertheless,  in  a  certain 
sense  pre-existed.  They  are  nothing  else  than  the 
little  rills  into  which  the  great  river  of  life  divides 
itself,  flowing  through  the  body  of  humanity.^^ 

"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  268-270. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  105 

This  is  Bergson's  idea  of  the  ultimate  reality 
of  the  universe,  and  it  is  to  this  idea  that  we 
must  adjust  our  conception  of  God  if  we  are 
to  be  both  religious  and  Bergsonian.  Can  this 
be  done?    That  is  the  question. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Bergson  has 
not  yet  discussed  the  idea  of  God  in  its  re- 
ligious aspects.  He  has  thus  far  chiefly  sought 
to  find  out  the  underlying  nature  and  explana- 
tion of  biological  facts.  The  moral  and  re- 
ligious nature  of  man,  his  social  history  and 
arrangements,  have  not  yet  been  Bergson's 
concern,  that  is,  in  his  hitherto  published 
works.  Therefore,  I  take  it,  we  would  be  un- 
fair to  Bergson  himself  should  we  attempt  to 
identify  the  Vital  Impetus,  as  thus  far  ex- 
pounded, with  the  God  of  religion.  The  ques- 
tion presents  itself  rather  in  this  form:  Is  this 
philosophical  explanation  of  the  facts  of  exist- 
ence compatible  with  belief  in  the  existence 
of  a  God  who  would  satisfy  the  cravings  of  a 
religious  heart?  And  further:  Does  this  philo- 
sophical conception  suggest  or  compel,  in  one's 
thought  of  God,  any  modifications  which  a 
religious  man  might  consistently  accept, 
or   even    welcome?      If   so,    what    are    these 


106  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

modifications  and  what  is  their  practical 
significance  ? 

Now  there  are  difficulties  which  the  religious 
man  feels  at  once  when  he  understands  clearly 
the  meaning  of  this  philosophy.  Some  may 
feel  with  Corbiere ''  that 

Bergson  ascribes  to  God  consciousness  and  liberty 
but  only  in  a  vague  way.  .  .  .  Life  alone  is  clear 
and  God  is  hardly  more  than  the  central  hearth  of 
the  universe's  energy.  .  .  .  He  is  entirely  imma- 
nent.  .  .  .  Bergson's  conception  leads  to  pantheism. 

Corbiere  admits  that  Bergson's  thought  marks 
a  reaction  against  the  positivist,  the  agnostic, 
and  the  atheist,  but  holds  that  his  evolutionary 
monism  is,  in  the  end,  destructive  of  belief  in  a 
personal  God.  Pluralism,  and  not  monism,  is 
the  correct  answer. 

In  the  minds  of  many  others,  Bergson  has 
indeed  been  associated  with  current  forms  of 
pluralism.  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  in  an  article  in 
which  he  discusses  Bergson  very  sympatheti- 
cally,^* says, 

"  Charles  Corbifere,  "  Le  dieu  de  M.  Bergson,"  Revue  de  th4o- 
logie,  1910. 

^*  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  "  Bergson's  Intuitive  Philosophy  Justi- 
fied," Current  Literature,  April,  1912. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  107 

I  am  impressed  with  two  things — first,  with  the 
reahty  and  activity  of  powerful  but  not  almighty 
helpers,  to  whom  we  owe  guidance  and  management 
and  reasonable  control:  and  next,  with  the  fearful 
majesty  of  still  higher  aspects  of  the  Universe,  in- 
finitely beyond  our  utmost  possibility  of  thought. 

Sir  Oliver  seems  to  find  in  Bergson  support 
for  his  pluralistic  views. 

In  a  very  acute  and  discriminative  article, 
Muirhead  says,^^ 

[There  is  no]  conclusive  ground  for  identifying  ]\I. 
Bergson  with  an  out-and-out  pluralism.  .  .  .  That 
there  is  a  pluralistic  side  to  Professor  Bergson's 
philosophy  has  been  already  admitted  to  the  full.  He 
is  the  champion  of  process.  He  carries  on  an  incessant 
war  against  the  conception  of  a  "bloc  universe."  .  .  . 
If  all  is  this  movement,  "  incessant  life,  action,  lib- 
erty," what  room  is  there  for  the  fixed  thoughts  and 
purposes  that  theists  attribute  to  the  Creator,  or  for 
the  all-embracing  and  therefore  all-limiting  absolute 
of  the  pantheist?  Tluralistic,  too,  is  his  conception 
of  the  two  currents  within  this  creative  movement. 
Life,  we  are  told,  is  one  movement,  matter  is  the  in- 
verse movement ;  each  is  simple  and  individual  in 
itself.  .  .  .   But  we  have  already  seen  reason  to  be 

"  Muirhead,  Review  of  Bergson's  work,  in  the  Hibbert  Jour- 
nal, July,  1911. 


108  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

on  our  guard  against  the  mere  form  of  expression  in 
so  many-sided  a  writer.  ...  So  far  from  resting  in 
any  facile  pluralism,  he  is  led  by  the  very  depths  of 
his  own  monism  to  reject  the  current  statements  of 
it.  His  philosophy  may  be  said  to  be  in  reality  an 
appeal  from  a  shallower  to  a  deeper  form  of  unity. 

It  is  easy  to  see  the  practical  dualism  of 
Bergson's  distinction  between  mind  and  mat- 
ter, but  it  is  also  perfectly  clear  that  both  mind 
and  matter  owe  their  existence,  according  to 
him,  to  the  Vital  Impetus.  As  JNIuirhead  says, 
"  Yet  there  is  unity  under  all."  Bergson  him- 
self has  said,  "It  is  probable  that  matter  and 
consciousness  have  a  common  origin.  Neither 
can  be  explained  by  itself."  In  my  judgment, 
Bergson  is  more  open  to  the  charge  of  being 
a  monistic  pantheist  than  to  that  of  being  a 
pluralist.  But  I  hold  with  Corrance  ''  that 
"  Bergson's  Creator  is  immanent  in  nature,  but 
not,  like  the  God  of  pantheism,  identical  with 

it. 

LeRoy,  the  modernist  defender  and  inter- 
preter of  Bergson,  says,  referring  to  Berg- 
son's thought, 

"  H.  C.  Corrance,  "  Bergson's  Philosophy  and  the  Idea  of 
God,"  Hibbert  Journal,  January,  1914. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  109 

We  cannot  regard  the  source  of  our  life  otherwise 
than  as  personal.  We  cannot  regard  Him  as  imper- 
sonal. We  seek  in  Him  our  personality.  God  is 
personal  in  that  He  is  the  Source  of  our  personality. 
He  is  immanent  in  us  but  also  transcends  us  and 
also  the  world. ^^ 

Bergson  himself  says/^ 

The  considerations  set  forth  in  my  "  Essay  on  the 
Immediate  Facts  of  Consciousness  "  {Time  and  Free 
Will)  are  intended  to  bring  to  light  the  fact  of  lib- 
erty; those  in  Matter  and  Memory  touch  upon 
the  reality  of  the  spirit;  those  in  Creative  Evolu- 
tion present  creation  as  a  fact.  From  all  this  we 
derive  a  clear  idea  of  a  free  and  creating  God,  pro- 
ducing matter  and  life  at  once,  whose  creative  effort 
is  continued,  in  a  vital  direction,  by  the  evolution  of 
species  and  the  construction  of  human  personalities. 

The  most  definite  word  on  this  subject,  from 
Bergson  himself,  has  heen  given  to  us  through 
the  interview  secured  by  Louis  Levine/* 

This  source  of  life  (God)  is  undoubtedly  spiritual. 
Is  it  personal?  Probably.  There  arc  not  sufficient 
data  to  answer  this  question,  but  Professor  Bergson 

"  Cf.  Nicholas  Balthaser,  "  I.e  probl^me  de  dieu  d'apr^s  la 
philosophie  nouvelle,"  Revue  nfn-scoUxstique,  November,  1907, 
and  February,  1908.     14:449-489.     15:90-124. 

"  Cf.  letter  of  Bergson  in  Annals  of  Christian  Philosophy. 
Quoted  by  I.eRoy  in  A  New  Philosophii:  Tlenri  Berpson. 

"Louis  Levine,  in  the  New  York  Times,  February  2-2,  1914. 


110  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

is  inclined  to  think  that  it  is  personah  It  seems  to 
him  that  personahty  is  in  the  very  intention  of  the 
evolution  of  life,  and  that  the  human  personality  is 
just  one  mode  in  which  this  intention  is  realized. 

It  is,  therefore,  very  probable  that  the  spiritual 
source  of  life  whence  our  personality  springs  should 
be  personal  in  itself.  Of  course,  personal  in  a  dif- 
ferent way,  without  all  those  accidental  traits  which 
in  our  minds  form  part  of  personality  and  which 
are  bound  up  with  the  existence  of  the  body.  But 
personal  in  a  larger  sense  of  the  term — a  spiritual 
unity  expressing  itself  in  the  creative  process  of  evo- 
lution. 

This  language  is  clear,  so  far  as  it  goes. 
The  question  is,  does  it  indicate  compatibility 
with  a  theistic  view  of  the  world?  Kant  said, 
"  The  deist  believes  that  there  is  a  God ;  the 
theist  that  there  is  a  living  God."  The  former 
is  purely  rational,  the  latter  is  connected  with 
revelation.  The  theist  thinks  of  God  "  as  a 
Being  who,  by  intelligence  and  freedom,  as 
originator  of  the  cosmos,  contains  within  Him- 
self the  ground  of  all  things.  He  thinks  of 
God  as  entering  into  personal  relations  with 
men;  as  the  Controller  of  the  world  whose 
course  He  directly  affects."  '" 

'"'  Cf.  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy,  article  on 
"  Theism." 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  111 

Unless  by  "  intelligence  "  we  must  mean  de- 
terministic finalism,  it  may  unhesitatingly  be 
said  that  Bergson's  position  is  in  general  con- 
formity with  the  description  of  theism  just 
given.  Nevertheless,  a  recent  re-reading  of 
certain  portions  of  Creative  Evolution  has 
impressed  me  afresh  with  the  ready  adapta- 
bility of  much  of  Bergson's  language  to  the 
uses  of  the  pantheist.  We  need  but  to  think 
of  some  of  the  paragraphs  already  quoted: 

Life  as  a  whole,  from  the  initial  impulsion  that 
thrust  it  into  the  world,  will  appear  as  a  xcarc  xchich 
rises  .  .  .  this  rising  wave  is  consciousness  .  .  .  On 
flows  the  current,  running  through  human  genera- 
tions, suhdividing  itself  into  individuals  .  .  .  Thus 
souls  .  .  .  are  nothing  else  than  the  little  rills  into 
which  the  great  river  of  life  divides  itself^  flowing 
through  the  body  of  humanity. 

But  one  must  always  remember  ISIuirhead's 
caution  about  driving  Bergson's  language  too 
hard.  We  must  judge  the  language  of 
Creative  Evolution  in  the  light  of  its  ma- 
terial and  of  its  aim.  Without  the  introduc- 
tion of  unwarranted  theological  terminology, 
we  could  not  expect  to  have  in  such  a  work  a 
description  of  the  Vital  Impetus  in  terms  that 


112         iu:iu;soN  and  iii:li(;ion 

would  clearly  iivoid  the  |)()ssihility  of  pan- 
theistic interpretalion.  IJer^^son  may  event- 
ually come  out  in  hehall'  of  ])antheism,  but  the 
implicates  of  the  principles  he  has  already  laid 
down,  as  well  ns  his  owji  occasional  state- 
ments, point  in  a  moie  thcistic  direction. 
A^ain,  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  continual 
polemic  Jkr^son  wa^^cs  not  only  against  views 
which  are  clearly  antagonistic  to  religion  but 
also  against  views  which  have  hitherto  been  the 
chief  [)rops  of  thcistic  religion,  such  as  those 
of  the  radical  finalists.  This  polemic  affects 
bis  l.'iri/^ua^e  and  must  be  taken  into  account  in 
int(  iprctin/jf  his   words. 

Still,  one  must  readily  ^rant  that  lier^^son's 
doctrine  leads  to  a  mystic  faith  which  is  not 
entirely  dissimilar  to  certain  aspects  of  panthe- 
ism; but  should  we  not  ask,  at  the  same  time, 
whether  there  is  not  some  truth  in  pantheism, 
in  spite  of  its  defects?  No  religious  thinker 
today  should  refuse  to  allow  that  the  pafithc- 
istic  faiths  of  the  Kast  present  j)hases  of  truth, 
^ood,  and  beauty  which  have  too  generally 
escaped  occidentals — spiritual  emphases  which 
we  sorely  nc^ed.  One  of  those  relipfious  lessons 
for  which  the  West  needs  to  go  to  school  to 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  113 

the  East  again,  has  to  do  witli  the  central  re- 
h'gious  coneeptio!)  of  incarnation.  No  douht 
the  extreme  en)i)Iiasis  of  eacli  hernis])hcre  is 
wrong  in  its  extremeness.  Certainly  the  nn- 
Christian  character  of  so  much  of  our  western, 
so-called  "  Christian,"  civilization  has  heen  due 
in  part  to  a  i'aihn-e  to  realize,  even  in  theor5% 
the  exact  nature  of  the  Christian  revelation. 
It  is  my  confident  helief  that  oriental  Chris- 
tians will  prove  to  he  not  mere  recipients  of 
the  Gospel,  hut  active  interpreters  of  it,  and 
that  western  conceptions  of  the  Christian  in- 
carnation will  he  the  richer  therefor  and  truer 
to  the  original  type.  At  any  rate,  we  have  of 
late  })een  learning  again  from  the  Kast  and 
modifying  om*  too  rigid  and  unvital  concep- 
tions. 

Bergsonism  avoids  hoth  extremes,  the  In- 
dian and  the  Scholastic,  and  ihiough  the  doc- 
trine of  an  Ahsolute  which  is  not  foreign  to 
duration  may  prepare  the  way  for  a  re-state- 
ment of  this  central  concept  of  religion.  It 
is  a  fair  (juestion,  however,  whether  the  neces- 
sary inferences  from  Bergson's  thought  in  this 
direction,  valuahle  as  they  ni:iy  he  hy  way  of 
suggestion  and  criticism,  will  he  acceptahle  to 


114  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

a  Christian  believer.  Certainly  incarnation 
must  be  conceived  of  by  a  Bergsonian  as  quali- 
tative and  not  quantitative.  His  position  is 
clearly  incompatible  with  a  belief  in  the  com- 
plete, quantitative  incarnation  of  the  Abso- 
lute in  a  single  historical  being.  But  there  is 
a  far  more  serious  difficulty.  The  consistent 
Bergsonian  must  ever  keep  open  the  possibility 
of  future  incarnations  which  would  surpass 
those  already  given.  To  most  Christian  be- 
lievers the  thought  of  a  future  improvement 
upon  Christianity  is  thoroughly  repugnant. 

We  are  evidently  face  to  face  with  some- 
thing that  cuts  deep.  Still,  the  case  against 
Bergsonian  compatibility  with  Christianity  in 
this  particular  is  not  as  simple  as  some  would 
make  it,  although  this  depends,  of  course,  upon 
one's  idea  of  what  is  essential  to  Christianity. 
Let  us  look  at  the  matter  from  several  angles. 
In  the  first  place,  this  conception  of  evolution, 
unlike  others  more  dogmatic,  does  not  make 
the  passing  of  present  norms  inevitable.  As 
far  as  positive  prediction  goes,  one  must  be 
agnostic  about  the  developments  of  the  future. 
Granted  a  Bergsonian's  acceptance  of  the 
Christian  norm  as  regards  the  present,  if,  while 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  115 

admitting  the  possibility  of  a  more  complete 
norm  in  the  future,  he  beheved  in  the  improb- 
abihty  of  the  rise  of  such  a  norm,  we  could 
hardly  deny  him  the  name  "  Christian." 

But  would  this  not  be  a  position  incom- 
patible with  Bergsonism?  Not  necessarily. 
The  fundamental  Bergsonian  attitude  towards 
the  future  is  not  one  of  the  possibility  of  this 
or  the  probability  of  that  but,  as  far  as  definite 
knowledge  and  prediction  are  concerned,  one 
of  agnosticism.  INIight  not  a  Bergsonian 
Christian  consistently  do  what  we  all  have  to 
do  in  any  case,  namely,  maintain  a  faith  in  the 
finality  of  the  Christian  revelation  by  basing 
it  on  trust  in  the  character  of  God  as  thus  far 
revealed  to  us?  But  let  us  examine  the  most 
extreme  case,  that  of  the  Bergsonian  who,  im- 
pressed by  the  theory  that  life  is  "  becoming," 
believes  in  the  probabilitij  of  the  rise  of  new 
and  superior  religious  norms  in  human  life. 
If  he  gives  his  present  adherence  to  the  Chris- 
tian norm,  he  should,  I  suppose,  be  called  a 
Christian;  and  if  his  present  norm  is  based  on 
truth,  we  might  conceive  of  the  new  norm  not 
as  excluding  the  present  one  but  as  including 
and  expanding  it.    In  such  a  case,  while  a  new 


116  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

historic  center  might,  and  probably  would, 
create  new  names  and  forms,  it  would  not 
thereby  be  necessarily  incompatible  with  the 
old.  The  very  principle  of  Christian  growth 
itself  might  be  summoned  in  support  of  such 
a  position."'  Our  conclusion,  then,  would  be 
that  even  this  extreme  position  might  be  con- 
sidered compatible  with  Christianity,  pro- 
vided the  norm-to-be  supplanted  the  existing 
norm  in  an  inclusive  way. 

•  «••••• 

The  foregoing  discussion  raises  the  whole 
question,  hinted  at  a  few  moments  ago,  of  in- 
telligence and  finalism,  and  we  shall  have  to 
push  our  thought  further  on  before  we  can 
decide  whether  the  Bergsonian  conception  of 
evolution  is  compatible  with  theism,  and  espe- 
cially with  Christian  theism. 

According  to  Bergson,''  the  great  Life 
Power,  the  Vital  Impetus,  is  neither  omniscient 

'^ "  Except  a  grain  of  wheat  fall  into  the  earth  and  die, 
it  abideth  by  itself  alone;  but  if  it  die,  it  beareth  much  fruit." 
John  12:24. 

(Consider  also  the  essential  compatibility  between  Chris- 
tianity and  the  highest  achievements  of  the  Hebrew  Prophets; 
a  compatibility  insisted  upon,  in  fact  overemphasized,  by 
orthodox  Christianity  from  the  beginning.). 

*=*  Of.  Creative  Evolution,  Chapter  I. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  117 

nor  omnipotent.  Evolution  is  not  due,  as  the 
finalists  say,  to  an  original  plan  (and  Plan- 
ner) which  foresees  every  detail  and  plans  each 
modification  with  an  end  in  view.  Nor  is  it 
due  to  mere  ada2:)tation  to  environment.  In 
such  ideas  there  is,  of  course,  some  truth,  hut 
the  real  cause  of  evolution  is  the  Vital  Imjietus. 
To  he  sure,  everything  is,  in  a  hroad  sense,  the 
"  result  "  of  this  vital  "  cause,"  but  the  posi- 
tion and  relations  of  particular  things  are  not 
planned  in  the  sense  that  each  particular  effect 
corresponds  to  a  particular  cause,  or  individ- 
ual thought.  Thus  neither  mechanism  nor 
finalism  explains  evolution.  The  outside  con- 
ditions limit  the  form  and  the  motion  of  the 
organism,  but  the  driving  power  is  from 
within.  This  inner  Life  Power  does  not  fore- 
see or  plan  the  particular  effects  it  will  pro- 
duce. In  fact,  it  cannot.  It  drives  ahead  to 
unforeseen  and  unforeseeable  results.  There 
is  a  progressive  growth  of  the  Absolute  itself 
and,  in  evolution,  a  continual  invention  of 
forms  ever  new. 

God  is  unceasing  life,  action,  freedom.  Ho  had 
no  beginning  nor  can  we  conceive  of  His  having  any 
end.     He  is  not  omnipotent ;  He  is  doing  the  best  He 


118  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

can  with  stubborn  substance.  He  has  not  created 
the  world  yet ;  it  is  being  created  under  our  very 
eyes.^^ 

Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  viewpoint 
is  very  disturbing  to  customary  rehgious  feel- 
ing; to  many  it  will  seem  downright  blas- 
phemous. If  there  be  no  omniscience  any- 
where in  the  world,  how  can  we  be  sure  that 
"  all  things  work  together  for  good,"  even  "  to 
them  that  love  God?"  Even  if  there  were 
omniscience,  but  without  omnipotence,  how 
could  we  be  sure  that  the  omnisciently  wise 
plan  could  be  carried  out?  We  are  so  per- 
plexed and  uncertain  ourselves  oftentimes, 
not  only  about  the  future  but  also  about  the 
present,  that  it  has  been  a  great  comfort  to 
take  refuge  in  the  thought  that  God  knows  all 
from  the  beginning  and  that  even  all  the  de- 
tails are  in  His  hands.  The  remembrance  of 
an  all-wise  and  all-powerful  Providence  has 
undergirded  our  prayers  and  made  us  feel  that 
their  answer  was  certain.  The  thought  of  the 
unchangeable  God,  "  the  same  yesterday,  to- 
day, and  forever,"  has  been  a  rock  of  defense; 
the  thought  of  Him  as  "  infinite  in  His  being 

"Cf.  Current  Literature,  May,  1911.     50:518-520. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  119 

wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness, 
and  truth,"  a  source  of  solace  and  of  strength 
to  the  humble  worshiper  conscious  of  his  own 
finiteness,  limitation,  and  weakness. 

If  God  grows,  does  He  not  become  too  like 
ourselves  to  command  the  final  homage  of  the 
heart?  If  God  grows,  how  can  we  ever  tell 
j  ust  what  He  is  ?  Where  are  fixitj^  of  character, 
permanence  of  purpose,  clearness  of  aim  and 
end  ?  Is  not  all  final  truth  and  certainty  placed 
in  jeopardy  and  our  religious  pyramid  turned 
upon  its  apex?  Such  are  the  fearsome 
thoughts  which  assail  us  as  we  consider  this 
phase  of  Bergson's  teaching,  and  here  many 
who  might  otherwise  go  with  him  will  depart 
from  him.  Those  who  have  all  their  days 
trusted  in  the  omnipotence  and  omniscience  of 
God  can  at  most  say:  If  this  be  true,  at  least 
give  us  time  to  make  our  readjustments  lest  all 
go  down  in  wreck  during  the  transition. 

Let  us  try  to  look  at  the  matter  calmly  and 
honestly.  The  prevailing  theory  has  not  been 
without  its  difficulties.  It  lays  everything  at 
the  door  of  Providence,  the  good  and  the  bad 
alike.  In  so  doing  it  has  been  obliged  to  es- 
cape from  a  difficult  dilemma.    Either  God  is 


120  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  author  of  evil,  at  the  least  particeps 
criminis,  or  He  is  not  omnipotent.  The  usual 
way  of  avoiding  the  dilemma  has  been  to  hold 
that  God  was  not  the  "  author  "  of  evil  but 
"  permitted  "  it,  preserving  his  omnipotence 
by  "  overruling  "  it  for  His  ends.  We  have 
all  seen  good  come  out  of  evil,  or  so-called  evil, 
and  we  are,  therefore,  familiar  with  the  prin- 
ciple. Some  have  even  risen  with  Paul  to  the 
point  of  "  rejoicing  in  tribulation."  Nor  do  I 
mean  by  that  the  common  malingering  of  the 
ailing  egotist.  I  mean  the  rare  and  easily 
abused,  and  as  easily  misunderstood,  quality  of 
a  more  than  resigned  acceptance  of  pain,  hard- 
ship, and  sorrow — an  even  glad  acceptance  of 
it — not  merely  in  the  faith  that  an  inscrutable 
Providence  "  doeth  all  things  well,"  but  in  the 
firm,  and  often  partially  verified,  conviction 
that  "  truth  heals  the  wounds  which  she  her- 
self hath  made  ";  that  pain  and  suffering  build 
the  path  to  the  higher  life,  to  the  divine  life 
itself. 

Still,  even  the  most  believing  sometimes  ex- 
perience difficulty  in  trying  to  cover  existing 
evils  with  the  mantle  of  a  faith  in  an  all-wise 
and  all-powerful,  not  to  say  all-loving  God. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  121 

At  such  times  they  would  be  relieved  to  be 
able  to  put  aside  that  faith  in  favor  of  one 
which  did  not  ascribe  so  much  to  God;  in  fav^or 
of  a  faith  which,  at  the  same  time,  continued 
to  picture  Him  as  the  active  and  successful 
foe  of  evil,  a  protagonist  who  summons  men 
to  struggle  rather  than  to  mere  acquiescence. 
I  do  not  say  that  we  should  be  relieved  of  the 
dilemma  indicated,  but  I  can  understand  the 
advantage  possessed  at  times  by  one  who  could 
be  so  relieved. 

The  belief  in  a  Providence  which  maps  out 
every  detail  of  our  life  is  undoubtedly  a  be- 
lief full  of  energizing  power  and,  to  many,  a 
vital  thing.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  matter  of 
common  observation  that  it  often  results  in  a 
practical  fatalism  which  induces  laziness  and 
a  general  irresponsibility  necessitating  extra 
activity  and  care  on  the  part  of  those  most 
nearly  in  contact  with  the  "  believers."  Gen- 
eral earnestness  and  initiative,  and  a  sense  of 
personal  responsibility,  are  often  displayed  by 
those  who  have  this  faith,  but  seemingly  at 
the  expense  of  their  logic.  A  faith  that  would 
not  easily  allow  men  to  make  religion  an 
excuse    for    laziness,    or    a    substitute    for 


122  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

personal  responsibility,  would  have  its  ad- 
vantages. 

Then,  too,  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  divine 
plan,  complete  in  all  its  details,  has  constantly 
engendered,  as  a  corollary,  faith  in  certain 
men's  ability  to  acquire  secret  and  relatively 
complete  information  regarding  this  plan, 
especially  as  regards  impending  events,  or  even 
those  of  the  far  distant  future,  including  de- 
tailed knowledge  of  the  lot  and  activities  of  the 
souls  of  men  in  the  next  world.  This  faith 
needs  but  its  common  accompaniment,  an  "  ex- 
aggerated ego,"  to  blossom  out  into  the  sur- 
reptitious or  openly  avowed  assumption  of 
omniscience  by  these  men.  They  alone  are  the 
appointed  channels  for  the  dissemination  of 
inspired  information  regarding  the  details  of 
God's  future  plans.  Sow  the  seed  of  this  un- 
sound theory  of  revelation  in  the  fertile  soil  of 
credulity,  still  so  marked  a  characteristic  of 
the  mass  of  religious  believers,  and  there  re- 
sults a  harvest  of  unlovely  dogmatism,  tyran- 
nical domination,  crass  superstition,  weakened 
will-power,  and  religious  deterioration. 

Belief  in  a  Providence  which  consciously  and 
purposely  embraces  every  detail  of  existence 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  123 

has  also  widely  influenced  the  prayers  of  re- 
ligious people,  and  not  always  helpfully.  Be- 
lieving in  such  a  Providence,  worshipers  have 
not  been  content  with  a  reverent  acquiescence 
in  the  divine  plan.  They  often  besiege  the 
Throne  with  a  mass  of  petty  petitions,  seeking 
to  overbear  the  divine  will  in  favor  of  their  de- 
sires. The  Christian  view  of  God  does  not 
banish  petitionary  prayer,  but  the  kind  just 
described  is  not  Christian  but  pagan.  This 
pagan  view  is  nourished  by  a  conception  of 
revelation  which  finds  ready  rootage  in  the 
orthodox  theory  of  Providence.  This  theory, 
also,  is  partly  responsible  for  the  spectacle 
regularly  presented  in  times  of  war.  Oppos- 
ing warriors  thank  Providence  for  results  that 
are  manifestly  incompatible,  results  also  which, 
from  any  aspect,  are  often  entirely  abhorrent 
to  neutrals  who  long  for  the  Kingdom  of  God 
and  pray  that  peace  may  speedily  come,  win 
who  may. 

I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  question  of 
war  prayers  is  an  easy  question  to  answer,  nor 
do  I  think  the  problem  of  prayer  in  general, 
from  an  intellectual  standpoint,  a  simple  one. 
I  do  not  purpose  here  to  discuss  this  matter  in 


124  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

itself.  Nor  do  I  need  to  do  so.  This  phase  of 
religion  is  introduced  merely  to  illustrate  my 
main  point.  It  is  my  strong  conviction  that 
detailed  petitions  have  their  place,  and  will  al- 
ways have  their  place,  in  truly  religious  prayer ; 
but  if  prayer  and  religion  can  be  maintained 
on  a  vital  basis  and  at  the  same  time  be  freed 
from  the  narrowness,  selfishness,  superstition, 
and  rank  paganism  of  some  forms  of  petition- 
ary prayer,  religion  "  pure  and  undefiled  "  will 
truly  be  the  gainer.  Whatever  may  be  said 
against  it,  the  Bergsonian  view  of  Providence 
(and  the  conception  would  not  be  entirely 
lacking)  would  encourage  a  kind  of  prayer 
which  would  concern  itself  chiefly,  if  not  solely, 
with  the  central  spirit  of  life.  It  certainly 
would  not  encourage  the  nagging  spirit  so 
characteristic  of  paganism  and  so  evident  even 
in  the  prayers  of  many  Christians. 

Further,  the  thought  of  an  omnipotent, 
omniscient,  and  unchanging  Being  is  one  that 
leaves  us  cold.  That  this  feeling  has  been  gen- 
eral is  clear  from  the  fact  that  men  have  al- 
ways manifested  an  increased  interest  in  go- 
betweens,  mediators,  some  way  of  bringing 
God  nearer  and  of  making  Him  more  human, 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  125 

whenever  the  thought  of  Him  has  tended  to- 
wards these  abstract  extremes.  AVho  has  not 
sometimes  had  the  feehng  that  it  was  a  Httle 
unfair  for  the  omnipotent  and  omniscient  God 
to  judge  human  beings  created  by  Him,  apart 
from  their  own  choice,  in  a  state  of  compara- 
tive ignorance  and  weakness?  The  immeasur- 
able gap  between  us  and  God,  so  conceived,  has 
sometimes  interfered  with  rehgious  commun- 
ion rather  than  helped  it.  The  history  of  post- 
exilic  Judaism,  to  quote  but  one  example,  is  a 
proof  of  this  fact. 

Now  Bergson's  idea  of  a  growing  God — one 
who  has  His  limitations,  battles,  and  even  de- 
feats— has  its  own  difficulties  to  meet  and  is 
novel  to  our  ordinary  thought,  but  it  is  an 
idea  which  we  occasionally  wish  were  true.  In- 
stead of  being  a  lapse  from  truly  religious 
thinking,  it  may  possibly  be  on  the  road  to  new 
truth.  INIayhap  the  loss  of  grandeur  (though 
we  must  not  think  that  God,  thus  conceived, 
would  be  without  power  and  grandeur,  or 
without  the  elements  of  awe  and  mystery) 
might  be  offset  by  a  greater  sense  of  sympathy, 
companionship,  and  cooperation.  God  would 
actually  need  our  help  and  our  help  would 


126  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

count  vitally;  the  Christian  thought  that  "  we 
are  co-workers  with  God  "  would  then  exist  in 
fact  and  not  merely  in  name.  Yet  the  last 
control  would  remain  with  Him  and,  while  He 
would  not  be  all-powerful,  He  would  be  the 
most  powerful — powerful  enough.  Would 
such  a  conception  harm  religion,  or  would  it 
help  it? 

All  these  offsets  make  us  see  that  we  can- 
not cavalierly  dismiss  the  possibility  of  a  vital 
religious  faith  being  maintained  upon  this 
Bergsonian  basis.  But  still  the  lack  of  plan 
and  purpose  remains  to  plague  us.  How  can 
we  think  of  God  as  God  at  all  if  He  does  not 
know  what  the  end  is?  The  interest  so  many 
of  us  have  in  the  omnipotence  and  the  omnis- 
cience of  God  is  due  to  a  very  natural  longing 
for  stability  in  life.  Our  knowledge  is  limited 
and  often  faulty.  We  are  painfully  aware  of 
our  impotence  in  the  face  of  many  an  obstacle, 
in  the  face  of  evil,  pain,  disease,  and  death. 
We  seek  a  faith  which  will  enable  us  to  put  our 
feet  upon  a  rock.  To  many,  if  not  to  most, 
that  rock  has  been  the  omnipotence  and  the 
omniscience  of  God.  He  knows  even  if  we  do 
not  know.    He  can  accomplish  even  if  we  can- 


CREATRT.  EVOLUTION  127 

not  accomplish.  Take  away  this  rock  and  we 
shall  be  plunged  into  the  ever-moving  waves 
of  uncertainty  and  aimless  flux.  The  waves 
may  ebb  or  they  may  flow.  It  does  not  mat- 
ter much.  They  do  not,  in  either  case,  bear  us 
any  whither. 

Is  this  true?     If  so,  then  we  must  dismiss 
Bergson  from  the  ranks  of  those  who  are  on 
the  side  of  religion.    Certainly,  if  Bergson  en- 
tirely eliminated  the  teleological  element  from 
life,  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  hold  that 
his  thought  is  compatible  with  religion.     But 
he  states  clearly  that  he  does  not  do  so.    He 
does  not  deny  the  truth  of  finalism,  only  of  a 
certain  kind  of  finalism.    To  be  sure,  the  kind 
of  finalism  which  he  denies  is  that  which  is  cur- 
rent among  us,  that  which  makes  every  detail 
a  part  of  the  pre-arranged  divine  plan  or,  con- 
versely, subsumes  every  detail  under  the  goal 
to  be  reached.     Both  of  these,  Bergson  says, 
are  the  same  scheme,  the  one  being  merely  the 
inverse  of  the  other.    They  are  both  mechani- 
cal, he  holds ;  indeed  they  are  contrary  to  fact 
and  involved  in  great  difliculties  both  theo- 
retical and  practical. 

But,  contrary  to  common  opinion  of  him. 


128  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Bergson  does  not  put  mere  flux  in  the  place  of 
these  two  discarded  theories.     He  says, 

...  we  try  on  the  evolutionary  progress  the  two 
ready-made  garments  that  our  understanding  puts 
at  our  disposal,  mechanism  and  finality ;  we  show 
that  they  do  not  fit,  neither  the  one  nor  the  other, 
but  that  one  of  them  (finality)  might  be  recut  and 
resewn,  and  in  this  new  form  fit  less  badly  than  the 
other."'' 

Yet  finalism  is  not,  like  mechanism,  a  doctrine  with 
fixed  rigid  outlines.  It  admits  of  as  many  inflections 
as  we  like.  The  mechanistic  philosophy  is  to  be 
taken  or  left :  it  must  be  left  if  the  least  grain  of 
dust,  by  straying  from  the  path  foreseen  by  me- 
chanics, should  show  the  slightest  trace  of  sponta- 
neity. The  doctrine  of  final  causes,  on  the  contrary, 
will  never  be  definitely  refuted.  If  one  form  of  it 
be  put  aside,  it  will  take  another.  Its  principle, 
which  is  essentially  psychological,  is  very  flexible. 
It  is  so  extensible,  and  thereby  so  comprehensive, 
that  one  accepts  something  of  it  as  soon  as  one  re- 
jects pure  mechanism.  The  theory  we  shall  put  for- 
ward .  .  .  will  therefore  necessarily  partake  of 
finalism  to  a  certain  extent."^ 

Radical  as  our  own  theory  may  appear,  finality  is 
external  or  it  is  nothing  at  all. 

'*  Cf.  Creative  Evolution.  English  translation.  Introduction, 
p.  xiv. 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  40.  . 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  129 

Consider  the  most  complex  and  the  most  harmo- 
nious organism.  All  the  elements,  we  are  told,  con- 
spire for  the  greatest  good  of  the  whole.  Very  well, 
but  let  us  not  forget  that  each  of  the  elements  may 
itself  be  an  organism  in  certain  cases,  and  that  in 
subordinating  the  existence  of  this  small  organism 
to  the  life  of  the  great  one  we  accept  the  principle 
of  an  external  finality.  The  idea  of  a  finality  that  is 
always  internal  is,  therefore,  a  self-destructive  no- 
tion.^« 

Such  is  the  philosophy  of  life  to  which  we  are  lead- 
ing up.  It  claims  to  transcend  both  mechanism  and 
finalism ;  but,  as  we  announced  at  the  beginning,  it  is 
nearer  the  second  doctrine  than  the  first.  .  .  .  Like 
radical  finalism,  although  in  a  vaguer  form,  our  phi- 
losophy represents  the  organized  world  as  a  harmoni- 
ous whole.  But  this  harmony  is  far  from  being  as 
perfect  as  it  has  been  claimed  to  be.  .  .  .  Harmony, 
therefore,  does  not  exist  in  fact ;  it  exists  rather  in 
principle ;  I  mean  that  the  original  impetus  is  a  covi- 
mon  impetus,  and  the  higher  we  ascend  the  stream  of 
life  the  more  do  diverse  tendencies  appear  complemen- 
tary to  each  other.  ...  It  would  be  futile  to  try  to  as- 
sign to  life  an  end,  in  the  human  sense  of  the  word.  To 
speak  of  an  end  is  to  think  of  a  pre-existing  model 
which  has  only  to  be  realized.  It  is  to  suppose,  there- 
fore, that  all  is  given,  and  that  the  future  can  be 
read  in  the  present.  It  is  to  believe  that  life,  in  its 
movement  and  in  its  entirety,  goes  to  work  like  our 

=">  Op.  cit.,  p.  41. 


130  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

intellect,  which  is  only  a  motionless  and  fragmentary 
view  of  life,  and  which  naturally  takes  its  stand  out- 
side of  time.  Life,  on  the  contrary,  progresses  and 
endures  in  time.  Of  course,  when  once  the  road  has 
been  traveled,  we  can  glance  over  it,  mark  its  direc- 
tion, note  this  in  psychological  terms,  and  speak  as 
if  there  had  been  pursuit  of  an  end."^ 

These  quotations  are,  I  think,  fairly  rep- 
resentative of  Bergson's  position  in  this  mat- 
ter. Regarding  that  position  Corrance  makes 
the  following  comment :  ^^ 

It  has  been  said  that  Bergson's  view  of  freedom 
destroys  the  belief  in  all  finahsm  whatever.  This  is 
not  so.  It  is  true  that  his  view  does  preclude  any 
finalist  scheme  which  is  an  absolute  forecast  of  re- 
sults. .  .  .  His  system  as  a  whole  is  far  more  a  vivid 
and  original  apologetic  for  theism  than  a  criticism 
of  the  grounds  on  which  it  has  previously  been  main- 
tained. .  .  .  The  popular  mind  contains  all  the  ele- 
ments of  philosophy  in  confuso,  as  is  necessarily  the 
case  considering  that  the  great  realities  of  experi- 
ence, which  is  the  only  sure  ground  of  philosophy, 
are  the  same  for  all.  Therefore,  it  contains  and 
recognizes  the  element  of  change  as  well  as  abiding- 
ness.     There  can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that  the 

"  Op.   clt.,  pp.  50-51. 

^'  H.  C.  Corrance,  "  Bergson's  Philosophy  and  the  Idea  of 
God,"  Hibbert  Journal,  January,  1914. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  131 

latter  tendency  has  been  exaggerated  through  Pla- 
tonic and  Christian  idealism  sinking  down,  in  the 
course  of  many  generations,  into  the  general  con- 
sciousness by  means  of  popular  teaching  and  hymns. 
.  .  .  Besides,  it  has  been  identified  with  tlie  moral 
ideals  of  Christianity,  witli  all  that  is  implied  by 
religious  and  moral  sentiment,  which  gives  it  great 
strength  and  prestige.  .   .  . 

Yet,  the  strong,  instinctive  desire  in  mankind  for 
stability  and  permanence  must  have  some  cause  and 
seek  some  satisfaction.  Surely  this  will  be  found,  if 
Bergson's  contentions  are  right,  no  longer  in  static 
concepts,  but  in  the  deep  and  abiding  sense  of  the 
identity  and  permanence  of  personality. 

Bergson  speaks  of  "  tendency  "  in  life,  and 
even  of  "  intention."  The  Vital  Impetus  is  de- 
scribed as  seeming  to  have  the  "  intention  "  of 
developing  spiritual  life,  personality,  man. 
Bergson  tells  us  that  we  can  at  least  fathom 
this  tendency,  or  intention,  as  far  as  it  has  al- 
ready gone.  It  has  been  beyond  the  scope  of 
his  work,  hitherto,  to  discuss  such  things  in  de- 
tail. He  expects  to  do  so  in  time.  When  he 
does,  he  will  doubtless  use  not  only  biology, 
but  also  history  in  all  of  its  phases.  From  the 
varied  past  of  nature  and  of  man  he  will  prob- 
ably form  an  estimate  of  the  character  of  the 


132  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

great,  primal  Force — that  is,  of  God.  This 
estimate  could  then  form  a  basis  for  a  forecast 
regarding  the  probable  future,  a  future  con- 
sistent with  the  character  of  such  a  Force,  such 
a  God.  That  future  could  not  be  known  in 
detail,  but  its  general  nature  and  trend  might 
be  forecasted  from  the  past  so  that  faith,  in 
adjusting  itself  to  the  character  of  God,  could 
adjust  itself  definitely  to  the  future  as  well, 
carrying  action  with  it.  The  future  would  not 
be  inconsistent  with  the  past,  but  still  would 
differ  from  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  is  not  this 
exactly  what  we  are  now  obliged  to  do,  what- 
ever our  theory? 

In  other  words,  God  might  be  subject  to 
growth  and  change  and  still  be  the  ground  of 
stability  and  permanence.  He  might  change 
without  being  changeable.  There  would  still 
be,  in  spite  of  change  and  growth,  a  perma- 
nence and  identity  of  personality  and  of  char- 
acter which  could  attract  the  faith  and  trust  of 
the  religious  worshiper  without  necessarily  in- 
volving the  postulates  of  omniscience  and 
omnipotence.    As  Lyman  Abbott  says,  ^^ 

"  Lyman  Abbott,  "  Bergson,  the   Philosopher  of  Progress," 
The  Outlook,  February  22,  1913. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  133 

Identity  of  personality  and  stability  of  character 
do  not  mean  unchangeability.  God  has  not  created 
the  world.  He  is  creating  it.  What  is  the  End.'' 
There  is  no  end.  "  Eternal  Life,"  "Everlasting 
Life,"  mean  eternal  growth.  Against  Bergson  are 
scientific  and  theological  fatalism.  The  latter  as- 
sumes that  God  once  formed  a  completed  plan  of  life. 
Both  agree  in  a  thing  which  creates  and  things  which 
are  created.  Tliis  creating  thing  is  not  a  living 
God. 

According  to  this  view,  then,  there  is  a  sense 
in  which  God  may  be  thought  of  as  changing 
and  growing,  and  yet  remaining  "  the  same 
yesterday,  today,  and  forever."  As  ^luirhead 
remarks :  ^° 

There  is  unity  of  direction  in  the  creative  impulse, 
even  if  no  definable  end.  He  (Bergson)  insists  on 
the  incxhaustiblencss  and,  with  it,  the  unsearchable- 
ness  of  the  riches  of  creative  life;  but  this  is  not  lack 
of  intelligible  direction,  much  less  essential  vacilla- 
tion or  ambiguity. 

Therefore,  in  spite  of  a  hesitancy  which,  in- 
deed, may  be  due  to  the  unearned  increment 
of  mere  custom,  we  may  safely  conclude  that 
Bergson's  philosophy  is  generally  compatible 

••  Muirhead,  in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  July,  1911. 


134  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

with  theism;  that  it  avoids  some  of  the  re- 
ligious dilemmas  favored  by  other  systems; 
that  it  has  some  distinct  advantages  of  its  own 
in  relation  to  religion. 

But  one  naturally  raises  the  question:  Is 
Bergsonism  compatible  with  Christian  theism? 
The  important  point  here  is,  whether  any  limi- 
tation of  knowledge  and  power  in  God  would 
be  compatible  with  the  Christian  idea  of  God. 
And  by  the  Christian  idea  of  God  I  mean  that 
idea  which  emerges,  crystal  clear,  from  the 
teaching  of  Christ  himself ;  not  the  more  meta- 
physical idea  elaborated  by  the  Church  in  her 
historic  creeds. 

An  adequate  discussion  of  this  matter  would 
have  to  consider  carefully  the  content  of 
Jesus'  special  name  for  God — "  Father."  It 
is  easy  to  see  its  chief  meanings,  however.  It 
emphasizes  love,  and  yet  a  love  which  involves 
the  sternness,  hardness,  and  suffering  inescap- 
able in  the  practice  of  righteousness.  It  em- 
phasizes, too,  the  nearness  of  God  and  the 
directness  of  His  spiritual  relationship  with 
man.  The  "  Father  "  has  a  purpose  and  a  plan 
which  Jesus  describes  under  the  title,  "  The 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  135 

Kingdom  of  Heaven."  A  noteworthy  feature 
of  Jesus'  references  to  the  Kingdom  is  a  re- 
serve regarding  details,  when  it  is  a  question 
of  future  developments.  "  No  one  knoweth," 
is  his  caution  to  liis  interlocutors.  Those  nota- 
ble sections  of  Jesus'  reported  teaching  regard- 
ing the  future,  in  which  we  do  find  no  little 
detail,  are  seriously  open  to  question  regard- 
ing their  genuineness,  at  least  as  they  now 
stand.  They  seem  to  contradict  his  teaching 
and  practice  elsewhere  and  are  also  the  very 
phase  of  his  teaching  whose  report  would  most 
easily  be  affected  by  current  ideas  among  the 
early  Christians  in  the  direction  of  Jewish 
eschatology.  But  let  us  allow  these  teachings 
to  stand  as  they  are.  Even  so  they  do  not 
vitally  affect  the  main  issue.  Certainly,  ac- 
cording to  Jesus,  the  main  thing  is  not  the 
knowledge  of,  or  even  the  existence  of,  a  fully 
detailed  plan  for  the  future.  His  thought  is 
mostly  busy  elsewhere.  Consequentlj^  we  do 
not  find  a  predominant  emphasis  in  Jesus' 
teaching  upon  the  omniscience  and  omnipo- 
tence of  God.  To  be  sure,  he  says  that  "  the 
Father  knoweth,"  but,  this  statement  to  the 
contrary,  it  is  fair  to  say  that,  in  Jesus'  teach- 


136  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

ing,  the  certainty  of  the  future  of  "  the  King- 
dom "  is  grounded  in  the  character  of  the 
"  Father."  Undoubtedly  he  did  accept  and 
teach  an  omnipotence  and  omniscience  of  God, 
as  for  instance,  where  he  says,  "  With  God  all 
things  are  possible."  This  fact,  however,  does 
not  settle  our  present  question,  which  is  pri- 
marily metaphysical.  Apart  from  the  diverse 
content  of  the  terms,  then  and  now,  any  such 
dogma  in  Jesus'  teaching  would  be  religious 
rather  than  metaphysical.  Indeed  I  see  no 
reason  why  a  Bergsonian  also  could  not 
consistently  express  himself  religiously  in 
the  language  of  omniscience  and  omnipo- 
tence. 

The  decision  in  this  matter  depends,  nat- 
urally, upon  one's  view  of  the  essence  of 
Christianity,  and  particularly  upon  one's 
conception  of  Christ.  If  we  accept  the 
foregoing  sketch  of  Christian  teaching,  I 
do  not  see  that  we  shall  find  essential 
incompatibility  between  it  and  an  idea  of  God 
based  upon  Bergson's  conception  of  the  Vital 
Impetus.  I  do  not  contend  that  Bergson  is 
right.  Nor  do  I  say  that  his  philosophical  posi- 
tion is  more  favorable  to  religion  than  other 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  13T 

philosophical  systems  are.  The  main  point 
that  we  have  been  seeking  to  determine  is, 
whether  Bergson's  doctrine  of  evolution  is 
compatible  with  religion,  with  theism  in  gen- 
eral. We  have  decided  that  it  is  so.  In  addi- 
tion, I  venture  the  opinion  that  it  is  also 
compatible  with  Christian  theism;  though 
not  compatible,  of  course,  with  all  that  goes 
under  the  name  of  Christian  theism. 

Perhaps  the  best  test  would  be  to  hold  in 
mind,  as  vividly  as  possible,  a  conception  of 
God  which  conforms  to  the  Bergsonian  posi- 
tion. Then  repeat  slowly  the  petitions  of  the 
"  Lord's  Prayer,"  and  note  whether  there 
arises  any  feeling  of  incongruity  between  the 
petitions  of  the  prayer  and  the  character  of 
God  so  conceived.  In  order  to  make  the  test 
more  clear  and  concrete,  I  shall  reproduce  here 
the  words  of  the  familiar  prayer.^ ^ 

Our  Father  wlio  art  in  heaven, 

Hallowed  be  thy  name. 

Thy  kingdom  come. 

Thy  will  be  done. 

As  in  heaven,  so  on  earth. 

•■•Cf.  Matt.  6:9-15.  American  Revised  Version.  Cf.  also 
Luke  11:2-4.  I  have  given  the  more  inclusive  form  of  the 
prayer,  which  is  the  one  most  commonly  used. 


138  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread. 

And  forgive  us  our  debts, 

As  we  also  have  forgiven  our  debtors. 

And  bring  us  not  into  temptation, 

But  deliver  us  from  the  evil  one, 

For  thine  is  the  kingdom,  and  the  power, 

And  the  glory.    Amen. 

Try  sincerely  to  enter  into  the  original  mean- 
ing and  spirit  of  this  sublime  prayer,  a  difficult 
task  even  for  one  who  may  fortunately  com- 
bine a  devout  spirit  with  deep  historical  ap- 
preciation; then  place  the  impression  along- 
side the  Bergsonian  conception  of  God.  I  do 
not  think  that  a  feeling  of  incongruity  will 
necessarily  arise.  If  such  a  feeling  does  not 
arise,  the  conclusion  follows  that  a  Bergson- 
ian may  consistently  be  not  only  a  theist  but 
also  a  Christian  theist.  Do  not  mistake  my 
meaning.  Bergson  does  not  present  us  with 
a  theistic  position,  much  less  with  a  Christian 
position.  The  contention  is  merely  that  he 
gives  to  those  who  may  wish  it  a  philosophical 
basis  which  is  compatible  with  theism ;  and  with 
Christianity  also,  at  least  as  regards  the  point 
now  under  consideration. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  139 

Bergson's  conception  of  evolution  has,  in 
my  judgment,  a  peculiarly  helpful  suggestive- 
ness  when  brought  into  connection  with  the 
idea  of  development  in  religion,  and  with  the 
problems  of  comparative  religion.  It  is  not 
philosophy  and  academic  historical  study  alone 
which  have  banished  from  informed  minds  the 
thought  of  a  mutual  and  complete  exclusive- 
ness  between  religions.  The  direct  experience 
of  the  progressive  missionary,  whose  sym- 
pathy and  practical  aims  have  led  him  to  open 
his  own  eyes  and  those  of  others  as  well,  sup- 
ports in  the  strongest  fashion  the  contention 
that  there  is  a  "  family  of  religions."  But,  of 
course,  problems  have  thereby  been  multiplied. 
What  do  we  now  mean  by  "  revelation  "  and 
"  salvation  "  ?  What  should  be  the  goal  of 
our  missionary  work,  the  claims  of  essential 
Christianity  upon  our  plans  for  propaganda? 
What  right  have  we  to  hold  to  any  essential 
distinction  between  "  revealed "  Hebraism- 
Christianity  and  unrevealcd  "heathenism"? 
Even  if  one  religion  is  not  "  as  good  as  an- 
other," is  there  not  such  a  thing  as  religious 
comity  by  which  the  value  and  legitimacy  of 
each  religion  in  its  own  habitat  may  be  recog- 


140  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

nized  and  respected,  even  to  the  extent  of  non- 
interference and  the  abandonment  of  all  mis- 
sionary work?  Will  not  a  God  worthy  the 
name  know  and  call  His  own  in  His  own  way? 
These  questions  are  pressed  upon  us  insistently 
today.  On  both  practical  and  theoretical 
grounds,  they  cry  out  for  answer.  Does  Berg- 
son  give  us  any  help? 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  other  evolutionary 
systems,  it  cannot  be  said  of  the  Bergsonian 
idea  that  it  is  unfavorable  to  practical  religion 
or  inconsistent  with  the  facts  of  comparative 
religion  now  so  well  known.  The  Spencerian 
system,  and  others  similar  to  it,  tended  to  re- 
duce religion  and  the  development  of  religion 
to  factors  of  a  non-religious  nature.  The 
Hegelian  philosophy  pictured  a  fictitious  de- 
velopment which  overrode  facts  and  ended  by 
reducing  religion  to  an  idea.  On  the  other 
hand,  recall  to  mind  Bergson's  illustration  of 
the  process  of  evolution  by  means  of  his  well- 
known  sheaf  figure,  or  again,  by  the  figure  of 
a  succession  of  explosive  shells.  These  illustra- 
tions indicate  clearly  the  striking  congruity  be- 
tween his  theory  and  the  facts  of  religious  de- 
velopment.   Let  us  follow  up  the  shell  figure 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  141 

a  little  more  in  detcail.  In  spite  of  its  destruc- 
tive associations  it  will  serve  us  well.  Out  of 
the  original  Vital  Impetus,  the  ground  of  all 
and  itself  a  spiritual  explosiv^e,  comes  a  burst 
of  spiritual  explosives  each  one  of  which,  ex- 
ploding in  turn,  produces  a  new  group  of 
bursting  units;  and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series. 
Not  all  of  these  explosive  units  explode,  and, 
for  those  which  do  not  explode,  further  life, 
development,  and  usefulness  are  past.  Others 
produce  more  numerous  and  more  far-reaching 
results  than  their  neighbors  so  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  us  now,  by  tracing  the  history  of  the 
explosions,  to  determine  that  here  rather  than 
there,  along  this  line  of  development  rather 
than  that,  the  greatest  amount  of  the  original 
propulsion  has  gone,  producing  in  its  train  the 
greatest  development,  the  greatest  promise. 
By  tracing  any  pair  of  explosive  tracks  one 
may  discover  similarities  and  differences. 
They  differ  in  the  amount  of  original  explosive 
power  and  in  the  kind  and  amount  of  deflecting 
opposition  they  have  had  to  meet  in  their  re- 
spective environments.  They  agree  in  the 
kind  of  explosive  even  where  the  amount  is 
very  diverse;  and  they  agree  in  having  the 


142  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

same  origin.  If  one  is  not  a  mere  dilettante, 
but  is  truly  interested  in  determining  the  exist- 
ence of  the  explosive  power  in  question  and  in 
making  practical  use  of  it,  common  sense 
would  dictate  special  attention  to  and  primary 
use  of  the  main  explosive  track. 

Need  I  draw  the  moral  or  adorn  the  tale? 
There  is  truth  in  all  religions  which  are  alive; 
which  still  burst,  even  though  languidly,  with 
their  inherited  charge.  All  go  back  to  the  same 
original  Source  and  in  this  fact  they  find  what- 
ever unity  they  may  possess.  It  is,  however, 
not  only  possible  but,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
very  likely  that  a  few  lines  of  explosive  energy 
will  stand  out — the  great  ethnic  faiths — and, 
among  these  few,  one  which  may  be  adjudged 
supreme — may  we  say,  Christianity?  The 
tolerant  or,  rather,  the  brotherly  attitude 
necessitated  by  this  recognition  of  kinshij)  with 
other  religions  will  not  diminish  the  sense  of 
superiority  arising  from  greater  accomplish- 
ment. Revelation  is  here  rather  than  there, 
but  it  is  not  exclusively  here  and  totally  absent 
there.  It  is  the  more  versus  the  less.  The  be- 
ginnings of  salvation,  also,  may  be  made  in 
one  or  another  of  the  less  vigorous  lines  of  re- 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  143 

ligious  evolution,  })ut  progress  towards  com- 
plete salv^ation,  however  that  may  be  conceived, 
must  follow  the  main  trail — shall  we  say  the 
trail  blazed  by  Christian  explosives?  Is  not 
this  a  basis  good  enough  for  a  lifetime  of  mis- 
sionary work?  It  does  not  predict  the  future 
in  detail,  and  thus  it  makes  large  drafts  upon 
our  faith;  but  religion  is  supposed  to  do  that, 
is  it  not? 

Here  again  we  meet  the  bogey  of  future  un- 
certainty. As  if  we  did  not  meet  it  every- 
where in  life.  Inability  to  foretell  the  future 
lies  against  religion  no  more  than  against  any 
other  human  activity.  A  faith  that  there  is  a 
future,  be  it  what  it  may  in  detail,  is  enough 
to  satisfy  one  religion  or  another;  a  faith  that 
the  future  is  connected  *'  in  principle  "  with 
the  present  of  what  we  call  the  Christian  life, 
should  be  enough  to  satisfy  the  Christian.  In- 
deed, the  greatest  prophets  of  the  Hebrew- 
Christian  development  have  always  been  com- 
paratively reticent  about  the  future.  They 
speak  much  of  the  future,  to  be  sure,  but  in 
general  terms ;  they  believe  in  the  future,  they 
work  for  it,  they  connect  its  life-to-be  with  the 
life  of  the  present;  but  the  details  are  either 


144.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

vague  or  obscure,  or  they  are  left  where  they 
really  belong,  to  the  future  itself.  Jesus'  con- 
trolling attitude  in  this  respect  is  indicated  by 
the  words  he  himself  spoke,  referring  to  this 
very  matter,  "  No  man  knoweth  the  day  or  the 
hour." 

Finally,  a  word  should  be  added  regarding 
the  bearing  of  Bergson's  conception  of  evo- 
lution upon  the  idea  of  the  soul.  Since  the  ad- 
vent of  the  so-called  "  psychology  without  a 
soul,"  we  have  had  so  much  trouble  in  believ- 
ing that  we  had  a  soul  at  all  that  we  have 
usually  neglected  the  further  possibilities  of 
the  case.  Whether  the  soul  grows  and  pro- 
gresses, or  remains  static  in  the  permanence  of 
its  original  nature,  is  of  minor  consequence  so 
long  as  we  are  fearful  for,  or  doubtful  of,  its 
very  existence.  The  recent  vitalistic  trend,  and 
other  similar  tendencies,  have  had  their  effect, 
however,  and  what  JNIcDougall  "  calls  "  an- 
imism "  is  again  stoutly  defended.  McDougall 
means  by  "  animism  "  belief  in  the  existence 
within  us  of  a  "  soul "  which  is  not  reducible 
to  matter  or  to  mechanism.     He  says — and 

"William  McDougall,  Mind  and  Body,  London,  1911. 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  145 

rightly,  I  think — that  religion  depends  upon 
the  truth  of  some  form  of  this  "  animistic  " 
position. 

This  is,  in  general,  just  the  position  which 
Bergson  holds.  For  him  the  soul  is  a  reality 
and  cannot  he  reduced  to  terms  of  matter  and 
motion.  But  what  I  wish  to  make  clear  at 
this  point  is  that  the  "  soul,"  according  to 
Bergson,  shares  in  the  creative  evolution  of 
which  God  is  the  center  and  source.  The  soul 
also  creates.  It  grows.  It  is  being  made  and 
remade  continually.  And  yet  it  persists,  it 
"endures,"  and  (probably)  will  endure  be- 
yond the  existence  of  its  bodily  shell." 

There  are  vital  religious  and  ethical  values 
in  this  doctrine  of  the  soul.  We  are  building 
our  own  souls  all  the  time.  Each  one  of  us  has 
a  part  in  his  own  creation.  Nothing  is  unim- 
portant. While  the  mechanical  views  of  cer- 
tain psychologists,  as  well  as  the  crude  lit- 
eralistic  views  of  certain  theologians,  are 
untenable,  it  is  still  true  in  a  very  real  sense 
that    a    man    must    give    account    for    every 

"  The  basic  discussion  on  which  these  conclusions  rest  is  to 
be  found  in  Bergson's  Matter  and  Memory,  passim.  Com- 
pare, for  example,  pp.  195-197  in  the  English  translation.  Cf. 
also,  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  268-271. 


146  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

thought,  word,  and  deed ;  that  none  of  them  is 
essentially  forgotten  or  lost;  the  "  pure  mem- 
ory," the  soul,  the  character,  preserves  them 
all.  The  development  of  the  soul  may,  and 
therefore  should,  be  fostered  by  a  conscious 
and  vital  relationshijj  between  the  individual 
and  its  source,  namely,  God — the  religious  re- 
lationship. The  individual  may  and  should 
feel  himself  at  one  with  his  Creator  in  the  task 
of  producing  a  "  more  abounding  life,"  and  in 
overcoming  the  obstacles  which  bar  this,  the 
only  true  progress.  The  task  is  one  of  over- 
coming the  ever  present  tendency  towards  ma- 
teriality and  inertness,  and  includes  war 
against  outside  foes  as  well  as  against  the  foes 
that  reside  within  the  house  of  the  soul  itself. 

Bergson's  thorough-going  idea  of  evolution 
cuts  both  ways.  It  contains  religious  and 
ethical  values  which  are  stimulating  and  vital. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  cuts  across  some  of  the 
dominant  religious  conceptions  of  the  past  and 
present.  There  are  those  who  will  decide 
against  the  philosophy  solely  because  of  its 
drastic  religious  implicates.  They  should  not 
be  unwilling,  however,  to  recognize  its  pos- 


CREATIVE  EVOLUTION  147 

sible  religious  value  for  others.  Even  those 
who  are  convinced  of  the  essential  weakness  of 
the  philosophy  in  itself,  will  have  to  grant  the 
possibility  of  maintaining  a  religious  and  even 
a  Christian  faith  in  accord  with  its  postulates. 
Still  others,  religiously  or  philosophically  dis- 
contented with  existing  systems,  may  find  here 
a  satisfying  basis  for  their  religious  thought. 
At  any  rate,  our  final  answer  is  that  the  Berg- 
sonian  theory  of  evolution  is  compatible  with 
religion  and  with  a  Cliristian  faith. 


CHAPTER  V 
INTUITION  AND  THE  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT 

The  primacy  of  spiritual  energy  in  the  uni- 
verse was  not  seriously  questioned  among  men 
until  the  nineteenth  century  began  to  mani- 
fest a  new  emphasis  in  thought.  To  be  sure, 
the  daily  behavior  of  man  has  always  registered 
the  close  and  inescapable  connection  existing 
between  human  life  and  material  things.  But 
in  theory,  at  least,  both  the  masses  and  the 
classes,  a  few  notable  exceptions  apart,  ac- 
cepted as  basic  facts  the  superiority  of  the 
psychic  over  the  material  and  the  non-deriva- 
bility  of  the  inner  life  from  any  material  cause. 
The  existence  of  God  as  an  independent  spirit- 
ual reality;  the  real  and  distinct  existence  of 
the  individual  soul;  the  primacy,  in  the  uni- 
verse, of  God  and  of  the  soul;  these  things 
were  not  fundamentally  doubted  by  many. 

The  nineteenth  century,  however,  was 
marked  by  the  enthronement  of  law  as  its  god ; 
the  law  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  of  the  con- 

148 


INTUITION   AND  PRIMACY  OF   SPIRIT    149 

servation  of  energy,  of  the  indestructibility  of 
matter,  of  evolution.  Under  the  rigorous  and 
vigorous  pressure  of  a  scientific  ideal,  enthu- 
siastically held  and  unremittingly  applied, 
everything  could  be  explained.  Everything 
would  be  explained  when  we  knew  enough. 
By  "  explanation  "  was  meant  the  tracing  out 
of  proximate  and  remote  causes  in  nature,  or 
in  history,  these  causes  constituting  the  "  de- 
termining "  causes  of  the  things  thus  supposed 
to  be  "  explained." 

The  zeal  and  effectiveness  with  which  this 
scientific  determinism  was  taken  up  and  ap- 
phed  exerted  an  immense  influence  upon  phi- 
losophy, upon  men's  fundamental  views  of  life. 
Widespread  doubt  and  disbelief  arose  regard- 
ing the  existence  and  worth  of  spiritual  real- 
ities independent  of  and  underivable  from  ma- 
terial elements.  Champions  of  idealistic  and 
of  specifically  religious  views  of  life  attempted 
to  come  to  honorable  and  satisfactory  terms 
with  the  new  tendency,  seeking  to  harmonize 
the  situation  by  accepting  a  deterministic  proc- 
ess, but  interpreting  it  in  an  idealistic  way. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  century,  however, 
breaks  began  to  appear  in  the  iron  ring  of  de- 


150  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

terminism  encircling  human  life.  These 
breaks  were  caused  by  blows  delivered  from 
various  angles  and  by  different  kinds  of  ham- 
mer-wielders.  Among  them  were  vitalistic 
biologists,  pragmatic  philosophers,  and  those 
psychologists  who  believed  in  and  applied  the 
doctrine  of  the  subconscious  self.  The  con- 
viction grew  that  we  must  draw  a  clearer  line 
of  demarcation  between  organic  and  inor- 
ganic science;  between  the  physical  and  the 
social  sciences.  It  was  seen  with  increasing 
clearness  that  determinism  has  its  limits  and 
that  deterministic  theories  must  be  made  to 
keep  their  place. 

The  outstanding  protagonist  of  this  more 
recent  viewpoint  is  assuredly  Henri  Bergson. 
He  represents  primarily  just  this  spontaneous 
reaction  against  extreme  scientific  and  philo- 
sophical intellectualism.  Years  ago  he  came  to 
feel  that  the  exaltation  of  determinism  had,  in 
opposition  to  many  stubborn  facts,  reduced 
free-will  to  an  illusion,  and  spiritual  activity 
to  a  mere  puppet-show. 

This  revulsion  of  feeling  on  Bergson's 
part  was  due  largely  to  his  biological  studies. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT   151 

He  saw  that,  in  the  formation  of  philosophical 
systems,  the  physical  and  the  mathematical  sci- 
ences had  always  played  the  dominant  role. 
His  thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  was  that  life 
would  be  better  understood  by  approaching 
it  through  the  sciences  of  life  rather  than 
through  the  sciences  whose  subject-matter  is 
inorganic,  or  which  rest  on  pure  logic.  Thus 
his  philosophy,  up  to  the  present,  rests  upon 
biology  and  psychology  rather  than  upon 
physics  and  mathematics  as,  for  example,  was 
the  case  with  Kant.  The  result  has  been  his 
exaltation  of  intuition,  free-will,  and  the 
primacy  of  spiritual  force. 
As  Rene  Gillouin  says: 

Bergson  holds  that  we  live  in  the  Absolute, 
whether  by  thought  or  by  intuition.  In  its  own  do- 
main, matter,  science  touches  the  Absolute.  In  its 
own  domain,  life,  intuition  touches  the  Absolute. 
Determinism  is  an  excellent  method,  within  certain 
limits.  It  has  been  extended  beyond  its  proper  limits 
and  has  been  made  ruinous  by  being  set  up  as  a 
fundamental  doctrine.  .  .  .  Bergson  ends  with  a 
gnosticism  at  once  new  and  traditional — new  in  its 
means  and  methods,  traditional  in  its  ambitions,  for 
the  common  ambition  of  philosophers  has  been  to 
transcend  the  conditions  of  human  life. 


152  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Bergson  himself  says: 

The  reasons  that  determine  us  are  determining 
only  when  the  act  is  accomplished — the  creation  and 
the  free-will  are  in  the  process  by  which  these  reasons 
have  become  determining.^ 

•  •••••• 

Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  the  casual  reader 
of  Bergson,  he  has  been  charged  with  ma- 
terialistic tendencies.  These,  of  com'se,  must 
be  unconscious  tendencies,  for  Bergson's  own 
language  is  explicit  enough.  It  is  maintained 
that  one  center  of  this  unconscious  material- 
ism is  his  theory  of  "  pure  perception."  This 
is  the  theory  by  which,  in  picturing  the  build- 
ing up  of  conscious  life,  he  brings,  or  tries 
to  bring,  mind  and  matter  together.  It  is 
held  that  the  process  Bergson  here  postulates 
leads  straight  to  a  materialistic  explanation 
of  mental  phenomena.^ 

Bergson  admits  gladly  the  important  part 
the  material  universe  plays  in  the  development 
of  consciousness,  but  I  can  not  see  in  his 
theory  of  "  pure  perception  "  any  suspicious 
trace  of  a  materialistic  view  of  the  origin  of 

^  H.   Bergson,  in  an  article  entitled,  "  Liberty,"  in  Reports 
of  the  French  Philosophical  Society. 
*  Cf.  Bergson's  Matter  and  Memory. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY   OF   SPIRIT    153 

consciousness.  Besides  this  there  are  weighty 
considerations  which  fall  on  the  other  side  of 
the  balance. 

Karl  Bornliausen,  who  has  given  us  one  of 
the  sanest  and  most  illuminating  of  the  many 
discussions  brought  forth  by  Bergson's  phi- 
losophy, makes  this  charge  clearly  and  ex- 
plicitly.'' On  religious  grounds  he  is  sym- 
pathetic with  much  that  Bergson  says,  and  yet 
he  voices  a  warning  which  has  to  do  with  a 
concealed  materialism. 

Bornhausen  says:  "  This  philosophy  is  sig- 
nificant for  the  grounding  of  religion,  for  re- 
ligion represents  in  a  special  way  that  phase 
of  life  which  is  accessible  to  intuition  alone." 
He  quotes  Bergson's  answer  to  a  question 
put  by  Frederic  Charpin:  "Religion  is  a 
simple,  unique  element  of  life,  and  will  not 
disappear  since  it  is  more  feeling  than  think- 
ing, and  its  object  in  part  resides  within  it- 
self, as  effect  as  much  as  cause."  Again 
Bornhausen  says:  "His  idea  of  intuition  is 
of  great  significance  for  religion,  but  to  make 
the  life  impulse  the  object  of  religion  is  to 

'  Karl  Bornhausen,  "  Die  Philosophic  H.  Bergsons  und  ihre 
Bedeutung  fiir  den  Religionsbcgriff,"  Zeitschrift  fiir  Theologie 
und  Kirche,  1910. 


164.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

kill  religion.  We  must  exercise  great  caution 
in  the  face  of  this  philosophy  lest  we  lose 
our  individual  superiority  over  nature,  our 
freedom,  and  the  subjectivity  of  our  personal 
faith." 

These  statements  contain  a  criticism  best 
expressed  in  the  phrase,  "  lest  we  lose  our  in- 
dividual superiority  over  nature."  Here  I 
must  remind  my  readers  that  we  are  not 
engaged  in  a  critique  of  Bergson's  philosophy. 
I  take  up  this  point  merely  because  the  fear 
Bornhausen  here  expresses  is,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  a  fear  of  materialism.  If  his  fear  is 
justified,  he  himself  should  modify  the  favor- 
able estimate  of  Bergson's  religious  influence 
which  he  gives  elsewhere  in  the  same  treatise. 
If  this  fear  is  justified,  then,  no  matter  what 
Bergson  himself  may  say  or  think,  his  real 
emphasis  is  not  upon  the  primacy  in  life  of 
an  original,  spiritual  Force;  his  ultimate  in- 
fluence will  make  against  it. 

I  do  not  think  the  fear  is  justified.  Is  it 
true  that  "  to  make  the  life  impulse  the  object 
of  religion  is  to  kill  religion"?  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  god  of  every  religionist  is  looked 
upon  by  him  as  the  life  impulse  and  is  often 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    155 

worshiped  mainly  as  such.  What  Bornhausen 
probably  means  is,  that  Bergson  makes  the 
life  impulse,  conceived  of  as  physical,  the  ob- 
ject of  religion.  If  this  were  true,  then  the 
result  would  indeed  be  materialism,  and  the 
loss  of  any  higher  form  of  religion.  But  it 
is  not  true. 

We  must  remember  that  Bergson's  ideas 
are,  as  yet,  only  partially  worked  out — or,  at 
least,  only  partially  published.  Thus  far 
they  have  been  grounded  almost  exclusively 
upon  biological  and  psychological  phenomena. 
The  biological  basis  of  Creative  Evolution 
accounts  for  the  physical  emphasis  so  promi- 
nent in  that  book.  The  future  works  which 
are  promised  us  will  have  to  give  greater 
attention  to  the  sciences  of  human  life,  espe- 
cially to  the  science  of  history.  In  estimating 
Bergson  this  situation  must  alwaj^s  be  borne 
in  mind. 

But  it  can  not  be  said  that,  even  in  his 
already  published  works,  the  Vital  Impetus 
has  been  identified  with  a  purely  physical  life 
impulse.  Bergson  tells  us  that  he  considers 
life  possible  on  other  planets  and  in  other 
solar  systems.     This  non-earthly  life  would 


156  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

use  chemical  elements  different  from  those 
utilized  by  us,  and  hence  would  differ  in  form 
from  our  known  forms  of  life.  He  considers 
this  inference  a  fair  one  because  life  depends 
upon  the  Vital  Impetus;  and  not  upon  the 
chemical  changes  utilized.  In  fact,  he  says, 
life  might  dispense  with  organized  bodies, 
properly  so-called.* 

These  ideas  convey  a  pronounced  non- 
physical  implication,  but  they  do  not  com- 
pletely prove  my  point.  What  does  prove  it 
is  Bergson's  repeated  insistence  that  this  life 
impetus,  on  which  all  these  forms  of  life 
depend  and  from  which  they  arise,  is  psy- 
chical. Let  us  put  the  matter  in  Bergson's 
own  language:  Supra-consciousness  is  at  the 
origin  of  life.  Man  owes  his  superiority  in- 
deed to  his  superior  brain,  his  powers  of 
language,  and  his  social  system  which  stores 
effort  as  language  stores  thought;  but  all 
these  are  themselves  only  the  external  mani- 
festations of  an  inner  and  spiritual  achieve- 
ment. They  are  the  servants  of  the  Vital 
Impetus,  and  the  Vital  Impetus  is  essentially 

*  Cf.  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution.  English  translation  by- 
Mitchell,  pp.  255-257.  Also  Bergson's  "  Presidential  Address  " 
before  the  Society  for  Physical  Research. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    157 

a  spiritual  force.  The  success  of  man  is  a 
spiritual  success.  In  this  sense,  man  is  truly 
the  end  of  evolution.  That  is,  he  alone 
achieves  that  freedom  which  is  its  goal.  The 
real  evolutionary  process  is  a  psychic  process 
of  which  the  evolution  of  organic  forms  is 
merely  one  result,  although  a  very  important 
result.  It  is  as  if  a  Superman,  that  is,  a 
supernatural,  cosmic  Being,  had  sought  to 
realize  himself.  Thus  the  destiny  of  human 
consciousness  and  of  the  human  soul  is  not 
bound  up  with  the  destiny  of  cerebral  matter. 

This  is  Bergson's  position.  To  identify  his 
"  Vital  Impulse  "  with  a  purely  physical  prin- 
ciple is  thus  clearly  a  violation  of  plain  fact. 
Whatever  we  may  think  of  the  theory,  the 
theory  itself  is  clear;  at  least  in  its  main  out- 
lines. JNIind  and  matter  alike  go  back  to  one, 
great,  original  source  which  Bergson  himself, 
over  and  over  again,  characterizes  as  spiritual 
and  psychic. 

We  have  from  Bergson  a  number  of  in- 
teresting statements  regarding  belief  in  im- 
mortality, and  they  support  our  thesis  in  a 
very  clear  and  emphatic  way.  I  shall  quote 
only  two  of  these  statements.    He  says : 


158  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

If  we  can  prove  that  the  role  of  the  brain  is  to  fix 
the  attention  of  the  mind  on  matter  and  that  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  mental  life  is  independent  of  the 
brain,  then  we  have  proved  the  likelihood  of  survival : 
and  it  is  for  those  who  do  not  believe  it  to  prove  that 
they  are  right,  not  for  us  to  prove  that  they  are 
wrong.' 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  see  that  conscious- 
ness, whilst  being  at  once  creation  and  choice,  is  also 
memory,  that  one  of  its  essential  functions  is  to 
accumulate  and  preserve  the  past,  that  very  prob- 
ably (I  lack  time  to  attempt  the  demonstration  of 
this  point)  the  brain  is  an  instrument  of  forgetful- 
ness  as  much  as  one  of  remembrance,  and  that  in  pure 
consciousness  nothing  of  the  past  is  lost,  the  whole 
life  of  a  conscious  personality  being  an  indivisible 
continuity,  are  we  not  led  to  suppose  that  the  effort 
continues  heyond,  and  that  in  this  passage  of  con- 
sciousness through  matter  (the  passage  which  at  the 
tunnel's  exit  gives  distinct  personalities)  conscious- 
ness is  tempered  like  steel,  and  tests  itself  by  clearly 
constituting  personalities  and  preparing  them,  by 
the  very  effort  which  each  of  them  is  called  upon  to 
make,  for  a  higher  form  of  existence? 

If  we  admit  that  with  man  consciousness  has 
finally  left  the  tunnel,  that  everywhere  else  conscious- 
ness has  remained  imprisoned,  that  every  other  species 
corresponds  to  the  arrest  of  something  which  in  man 
succeeded  in  overcoming  resistance  and  in  expanding 
'  Bergson,  in  The  Literary  Digest,  March  1,  1913, 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY   OF  SPIRIT    159 

almost  freely,  thus  displaying  itself  in  true  person- 
alities capable  of  remembering  all  and  willing  all 
and  controlling  their  past  and  their  future,  we  shall 
have  no  repugnance  in  admitting  that  in  man,  though 
perhaps  in  man  alone,  consciousness  pursues  its  path 
beyond  this  earthly  life.® 

Do  these  statements  point  in  the  direction 
of  materialism  or  in  the  opposite  direction? 

Again,  Bergson  recognizes  the  practical 
dualism  existing  between  mind  and  matter ;"" 
between  soul  life  and  brute  things.  He  also 
traces  the  presence  of  this  dualism  far  back, 
almost,  but  not  quite,  to  the  very  beginning 
of  things.  This  dualism  is  early,  but  not  ulti- 
mate.   It  resolves  itself  into  an  ultimate  unity 

*  Bergson,  "  Life  and  Consciousness,"  The  Hibbert  Journal, 
October,  1911. 

'  I  do  not  agree  with  those  who  hold  that  Bergson's  theory 
of  matter  is  somewhat  Kantian.  The  categories  of  the  in- 
tellect do  not  create  phenomenal  matter;  matter  exists  inde- 
pendently of  the  intellect,  but  in  a  more  fluid,  less  clear-cut 
form  than  that  in  which  we  ordinarily  think  of  it.  For  prac- 
tical reasons,  according  to  Bergson,  the  intellect  cuts  out  cer- 
tain cross-sections  of  the  actual  material  world,  sharpens  their 
outlines,  and  solidifies  their  content.  These  cross-sections  are 
like  cinematograph  pictures,  held  fixed  for  observation  and  for 
practical  manipulation.  Matter  itself  overflows  these  intel- 
lectual pictures  and  is  more  fluid  than  they.  Still,  in  com- 
parison with  the  "  ^lan  vital,''  it  is  relatively  fixed  and  tends 
continually  towards  greater  inertness.  This  is  the  matter  of 
which  I  am  speaking. 


160  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

in  that  both  elements  originally  spring  from 
one  source;  and  that  source  is  psychic.^ 
He  is  also  reported  to  have  said :  ^ 

This  source  of  life  is  undoubtedly  spiritual.  Is  it 
personal?  Probably.  There  are  not  sufficient  data 
to  answer  this  question.  Professor  Bergson  is  in- 
clined to  think  it  is.  It  seems  to  him  that  personal- 
ity is  in  the  very  intention  of  the  evolution  of  life, 
and  that  the  human  personality  is  just  one  mode  in 
which  this  intention  is  realized.  It  is,  therefore,  he 
thinks,  very  probable  that  the  spiritual  source  of 
life  whence  our  personality  springs  should  be  per- 
sonal itself.  Of  course,  personal  in  a  different  way, 
without  all  those  accidental  traits  which  in  our  mind 
form  part  of  personality  and  which  are  bound  up 

»  In  view  of  recent  theories  of  matter,  I  may  be  unwise  in 
making  the  following  observation.  Also,  I  am  not  unmind- 
ful that  ignorance  of  the  "  how "  of  a  supposed  fact  does  not 
necessarily  damn  the  fact.  But  I  must  confess  that  I  do  not 
see  how  Bergson  gets  his  matter  out  of  this  original,  spiritual, 
psychic  force.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  how  the  original 
jet  of  spiritual  spray  (to  use  Bergson's  own  figure)  con- 
densed into  matter.  Why  did  it  not  merely  dry  up  or,  per- 
haps, simply  go  on  spraying?  However,  I  wish  to  repeat  that 
we  are  not  attempting  a  criticism  of  the  philosophy  as  such. 
Whether  or  not  we  understand  his  "  how "  or  agree  with  his 
"  what,"  Bergson  resolves  all  into  the  original  life  impulse  and 
characterizes  that  impulse  as  spiritual,  psychic,  conscious.  In 
this  regard,  therefore,  we  see  that  the  Bergsonian  philosophy 
upholds  the  primacy  of  the  spirit. 

»  Louis  Levine,  "  Interview  with  Bergson,"  New  York  Times, 
February  22,  1914. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    161 

with  the  existence  of  tlie  body.  But  personal  in  a 
larger  sense  of  the  term — a  spiritual  unity  express- 
ing itself  in  the  creative  process  of  evolution. 


But  there  is  another  point  at  which  Bergson 
upholds  the  primacy  of  the  spiritual  quite  as 
strongly  as  he  does  in  accounting  for  the  origin 
of  evolutionary  processes.  That  is,  where  he 
maintains  the  distinct  existence  of  the  soul  of 
the  individual.  Mechanistic,  deterministic 
science  has  driven  all  forms  of  spiritism  or,  as 
McDougall  "  calls  it,  "  animism,"  into  the  out- 
of-the-way  caves  of  human  helief.  The  "  psy- 
chology without  a  soul "  has  been  almost 
triumphant,  leaving  us  psychology  but  no 
soul.  As  IMcDougall  says,  this  issue  is  crucial 
for  religion.  No  soul,  as  a  distinct  spiritual 
entity,  no  religion. 

It  is  Bergson's  theory  of  memory  which 
comes  under  consideration  here,  for  his  doc- 
trine of  the  reality  of  the  soul's  existence  is 
based  upon  this  theory.  Whatever  we  may 
think  of  it,  the  theory  at  least  gives  us  further 
proof  of  Bergson's  insistence  upon  the  funda- 
mental primacy  of  the  spiritual  element  in  all 

**  William  McDougall,  Mind  and  Body.     Introduction, 


162  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

life.  Let  us  briefly  sketch  its  essential  fea- 
tures.'^ 

Perception  and  memory  differ  in  nature  and 
kind.  The  past  is  only  idea;  the  present  is 
ideo-motor.  We  know  matter  only  in  part, 
but  we  know  it  directly.  Hence  matter  can 
not  exercise  powers  different  in  kind  from 
those  we  perceive;  and  hence  it  can  not  create 
consciousness.  The  only  way  to  refute  ma- 
terialism is  to  show  that  matter  is  precisely 
what  it  appears  to  be,  and  hence  the  spiritual 
life  of  man  is  an  independent  reality.  Memory 
is  in  principle  a  power  absolutely  independent 
of  matter.  The  brain  is  the  advancing  point 
of  past  representations  pushing  into  the  future. 
Destroy  the  brain  and  these  representations 
are  not  destroyed,  but  their  action  over  matter 
is  gone. 

Bergson  distinguishes  three  kinds  of  mem- 
ory; "habit  memory,"  which  is  largely  phys- 
ical, the  result  of  motor  reactions;  "  represent- 
ative memory,"  which  is  conscious,  and  plays 
a  large  part  in  directing  action;  and  "pure 
memory,"  which  is  really  an  unconscious 
psychic  state.    This  last  is  really  our  "  soul " 

*^  Cf.  Bergson's  Matter  and  Memory, 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    163 

and  is  what  we  often  deseribe  as  our  "  char- 
acter." It  gathers  up  all  that  is  significant  in 
our  past,  like  a  rolling  snowball,  and  is  always 
present  in  all  our  decisions,  whether  we  are 
conscious  of  it  or  not.  That  is  why  it  is  fair 
and  useful  to  follow  the  common  sense  rule 
of  "  judging  a  man  by  little  things."  This 
"  pure  memory "  or  "  the  soul,"  as  distin- 
guished from  what  we  often  call  "  memory," 
is  essentially  independent  of  matter;  is  power- 
ful over  matter  through  the  medium  of  brain 
and  body ;  and  will  probably  survive  the  body. 
Through  it  communication  takes  place  between 
man  and  the  Supra- Soul  of  the  universe,  for, 
as  Bergson  puts  it, 

Pure  Memory:  Spirit::  Perception:  Matter. 

According  to  Bergson,  therefore,  the  soul  of 
man  is  a  reality.  It  is  a  towering  citadel  of 
spirituality.  It  is  essentially  independent  of 
matter  and  superior  to  it.  It  is  also  distinct 
from  the  Supra-Consciousness,  or  Vital  Im- 
petus, as  well  as  from  other  individual  souls. 
In  spite  of  the  separateness  of  these  lesser  in- 
dividualities from  one  another  and  from  the 
Cosmic    Soul — a   separateness   due    probably 


164  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

to  the  action  of  opposing  forces — the  Cosmic 
Soul  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all.  Thus 
Bergson  again  sounds  the  note  of  the  primacy 
of  the  spirit  in  no  uncertain  way.  The  in- 
dividual soul  is;  it  is  not  subject  to  matter  or 
derived  from  it;  it  points  back  to  a  great, 
original,  psychic  origin. 

The  phases  of  Bergsonian  thought  which 
we  have  been  considering  have  evident  religious 
and  ethical  value.  W.  Scott  Palmer  draws 
from  them  the  following  inferences: 

Permeation,  communication,  the  gift  of  the  Spirit 
and  the  mutual  giving  of  God  and  of  men  is  the 
world's  truth ;  all  else  is  mere  expediency  for  action. 
.  .  .  There  is  no  real  isolation  between  the  spirits 
of  men  or  between  God  and  man.  .  .  .  (The  streams 
of  life)  come  from  God,  they  are  of  Him,  though 
each  has  its  personal  owner.  .  .  .  God  Himself  is 
"  closer  to  each  than  breathing,  nearer  than  hands 
and  feet."  .  .  .  But  He  is  not  immanent  in  the 
stream.  He  is  transcendent  to  it  and  personally  re- 
lated with  it.^' 

In  various  ways  many  other  men  are  reach- 
ing similar  conclusions  based  on  Bergsonian 

"  W.  Scott  Palmer,  "  A  Christian  Study  Aided  by  Bergson. 
Presence  and  Omnipresence,"  Contemporary  Review. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    165 

data.  Bergson  himself  has  once  or  twice  broken 
the  silence  he  has  usually  maintained  regarding 
religious  topics.  To  I.evine  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  "  the  individual  can  not  be  guided 
by  social  ethics  alone  {i.e.,  utilitarianism)  and 
the  craving  for  religious  experience  will  re- 
main and  probably  grow  stronger  as  time  goes 
on.  The  religious  feeling  is  the  sense  of  not 
being  alone  in  the  world;  the  sense  of  a  re- 
lationship between  the  individual  and  the 
spiritual  source  of  life."  ^^ 

Let  me  repeat.  It  is  undeniable  that  the 
elements  of  Bergson's  thought  which  we  have 
been  discussing  are  clearly  compatible  with 
religion;  in  so  far,  then,  they  are  com- 
patible with  the  Christian  religion  also.  His 
conclusions  not  only  lend  themselves  to 
a  theistic  interpretation  of  life,  they  almost 
force  it  upon  one.  Alongside  of  his  tendency 
towards  theism  lies  his  marked  emphasis  upon 
the  spiritual  distinctness  of  the  individual; 
upon  the  reality  of  the  soul.  It  only  remains  to 
bring  these  two  together — the  spiritual  fountain 
head  and  the  individual  will — and  religion  is 
assured.    This  might  be  done  without  violence, 

"  Louis  Levine,  in  the  New  York  Times,  February  22,  1914. 


166  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

and  without  necessarily  departing  from  a 
Bergsonian  basis,  even  if  there  were  no  corre- 
sponding principle  of  connection  in  Bergson's 
system.  There  is  such  a  principle,  however, 
and  it  constitutes  one  of  the  most  striking  and 
important  features  of  the  whole  philosophy — 
the  principle  of  intuition. 

But  before  we  turn  to  this  new  phase  of  the 
subject,  I  wish  to  add  a  word  regarding  the 
ethical  value  of  Bergson's  doctrine  of  the  soul. 
The  soul,  like  human  freedom,  is  to  a  large 
extent  achieved.  It  is  being  built  up  bit  by  bit 
with  every  new  development  of  the  individual's 
life.  Nothing  essential  is  lost;  and  the  soul  is 
really  the  compounded  spiritual  result  of  this 
whole  process.  It  begins  almost  as  a  bare 
capability,  and  it  ends — where?  We  know 
not ;  but  it  may  grow  towards  purer  and  purer 
spirit. 

It  is  evident  that  the  part  played  by  individ- 
ual choice,  in  this  matter  of  soul-building,  is 
very  great.  The  stream  of  spirit  life  is  there 
to  be  drawn  on,  but  a  vast,  inert  mass  of  matter 
is  also  present.  Like  the  Vital  Impetus  itself, 
each  individual  must  meet  obstacle  after  ob- 
stacle.    The  quintessence  of  this  fight  is  the 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    167 

struggle  for  more  soul;  for  soul- freedom  over 
against  mechanism  and  formalism.  As  "  pure 
memory  "  is  connected  with  "  habit  memory  " 
through  conscious  "  representative  memory," 
so  the  soul  is  connected  with  the  inert  mass  of 
dead  matter  through  the  inevitable  activity  of 
the  present.  A  let-down — inertia,  laziness, 
deliberate  rejection  of  the  higher — means  the 
increased  materialization  of  the  soul;  its 
diminution;  its  loss.  Thus,  in  a  sense,  accord- 
ing to  Bergson,  one  has  a  soul  from  the  very 
beginning  of  hfe.  In  another  sense,  equally 
real,  one  must  acquire  his  soul  by  active, 
idealistic  effort.  In  every  way  the  ethical 
appeal  of  this  conception  rivals  in  force  the 
religious  appeal  already  seen  to  be  so 
powerful. 

As  Bornhausen  says,  "  Bergson's  idea  of 
intuition  is  of  great  significance  for  religion." 
In  itself  and  through  its  natural  consequences 
it  is  perhaps  the  most  significant  phase  of 
Bergson's  thought  in  the  direction  of  religion. 
The  discussion  of  this  fundamental  Bergsonian 
doctrine  may  well  be  prefaced  by  the  words  of 
Goethe,  "  Animated  inquiry  into  cause  does 


168  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

infinite  harm  ";  '*  and  by  Plato's  characteriza- 
tion of  metaphysics,  "  It  can  not  be  put  into 
words  as  can  other  inquiries,  but  after  long 
intercourse  with  the  thing  itself,  and  after  it 
has  been  lived  with,  suddenly,  as  when  fire 
leaps  up  and  the  light  kindles,  it  is  found  in 
the  soul  and  feeds  itself  there."  ^^ 
According  to  Lindsay : 

Plato  and  Bergson  both  insist  that  true  knowledge 
must  dispense  with  symbols — it  is  immediate  appre- 
hension, an  act  of  the  spirit.  They  differ  in  that 
Plato  took  the  mathematical  universal  as  the  type 
of  all  universals  and  hence  denied  the  reality  of  time 
and  change.  Kant  and  most  modern  thinkers  con- 
cern themselves  with  applied  science  and  for  them 
the  test  of  truth  is  not  in  its  own  apprehension,  but 
in  results,  coherency,  usefulness.  Bergson  follows 
Plato  in  this  regard.  In  the  sciences  of  life,  the  un- 
predictable individual  compels  a  greater  use  of  intui- 
tion and  the  subordination  of  the  mathematical.  But 
this  does  not  mean  giving  up  science  and  falling  back 
on  feeling.  Intuition  must  supplement  and  not  dis- 
pense with  science.  Metaphysics  differs  from  science 
in  that  it  attempts  to  apprehend  reality  for  itself 
and  not  for  any  practical  use.  This  requires  the 
sympathy  of  long  experience  (op.  cit.). 

^*  The  quotation,  as  given,  is  from  Chamberlain's  Founda- 
tions of  the  Nineteenth  Century. 

^^Cf.  Plato's  Epistles,  VII:  pp.  341,  344.  Quoted  by 
Lindsay  in  his  Philosophy  of  Bergson. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    169 
And  again, 

Intuition  is  not  a  method  practised  by  turning 
away  from  the  sciences,  but  somehow  by  completing 
them.  Bergson  says,  "  If  by  mysticism  be  meant  a 
reaction  against  positive  science,  the  doctrine  which 
I  defend  is  in  the  end  only  a  protest  against  mysti- 
cism "  (op.  cit.). 

These  quotations  serve  not  only  to  silence 
those  who  accuse  Bergson  of  anti-scientific 
bias,  but  also  to  indicate  the  true  nature  of  in- 
tuition in  the  Bergsonian  sense.  He  himself 
has  illustrated  it  by  means  of  the  experience  of 
an  author  who,  after  long  study  and  investiga- 
tion (scientific  research),  seeks  to  put  himself 
at  the  heart  of  his  subject  by  a  supreme  act 
of  concentrated  sympathy  and  imagination. 
Bergson  also  rightly  points  out  the  essential 
part  played  by  intuition,  thus  understood,  in 
the  progress  of  science.  In  fact,  all  new  dis- 
coveries, all  progress,  have  been  due  to  this 
gift.  It  is  fruitful,  however,  only  when  it 
springs  out  of  a  wide  and  intimate  knowledge 
of  fact.  Otherwise  it  is  empty,  barren,  and 
purely  emotional.  Bergson's  own  words  are: 
"  Intuition  and  intellect  do  not  oppose  each 
other,  save  where  intuition  refuses  to  become 


170  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

more  precise  by  coming  into  touch  with  facts 
scientifically  studied,  and  where  intellect,  in- 
stead of  confining  itself  to  science  proper,  com- 
bines with  this  an  unconscious  and  inconsistent 
metaphysic  which  in  vain  lays  claim  to  scientific 
pretensions."  ^^ 

All  great  philosophical  systems  have  sprung 
out  of  great  intuitions.  Too  often,  however, 
their  real  source  has  been  forgotten,  and  they 
have  been  explained  solely  on  the  basis  of  the 
intellectual  elaborations  necessary  for  the  sake 
of  presentation  and  defense.  Thus,  while 
Bergson  maintains  that  dialectic  is  necessary 
to  put  intuition  to  the  proof  and  to  break  it  up 
into  concepts  for  the  sake  of  propagation,  he 
also  insists  that  intuition  is  more  fundamental. 
It  is  really  instinct  become  self-conscious.  In- 
stinct, as  seen  in  the  hymenoptera,  prolongs  the 
work  of  organic  organization  and  is  next  to 
very  life  itself.  Make  this  instinct  conscious, 
that  is,  turn  it  into  intuition,  and  we  can  think 
life.    Otherwise  not. 

As  Carr  describes  it : 

Philosophy   deals  with  life  which   undergoes   real 

changes  in  time.     If  we  had  intellect  alone,  life  would 

"  Bergson,    "  Life    and    Consciousness,"     Hibbert     Journal, 
October,    1911. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    171 

be  unknown  and  unknowable.  Wc  must  install  our- 
selves in  the  life  process  and  use  intuition  instead  of 
intellect.  .  .  .  This  is  not  mysticism.  It  is  based 
on  fact  and  its  philosophical  analysis  is  interpreta- 
tion of  ordinary  experience.  According  to  Bergson, 
this  intuitive  faculty  lies  in  the  fringe  of  conscious- 
ness surrounding  our  intellect,  which  is  limited  to 
practical  purposes. ^^ 

The  method,  therefore,  by  which  alone  we 
may  get  direct  contact  with  the  real  of  the 
whole,  is  the  same  as  that  by  which  we  come 
into  contact  with  fragments  of  reality  in  sep- 
arate spheres  of  investigation.  The  method  of 
the  author  with  his  subject,  the  scientist  with 
his  science,  is  the  method  to  be  followed  by  the 
man  seeking  the  final  reality  of  the  universe. 
He  can  not  neglect  facts.  His  intellect  must 
busy  itself  collating,  analyzing,  applying. 
Without  this  all  would  become  empty  emo- 
tionalism. But  this  alone  will  not  lift  a  man 
above  his  bare  facts.  By  intuition  he  must 
plunge  into  the  stream  of  fact  and  "  get  the 
feel  of  it."  This  is  not  the  blind  instinct  of  the 
animal.  The  "  feel  "  of  the  animal  is  vivid,  but 
so  limited  as  to  be  useless  for  any  purpose  like 
that  now  under  consideration.    It  is  man  alone 

"  H.  W.  Carr,  in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  July,  1910. 


172  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

who,  sharing  instinct  and  intellect,  can  con- 
sciously apprehend  a  wide  range  of  fact,  and 
thus  get  a  survey  broad  enough  to  enable  him 
to  formulate  views  regarding  the  final  real. 
We  have  atrophied  our  gift  of  instinct  by  over- 
emphasis of  intellect.  We  must  now  exalt  the 
despised  faculty  without  losing  what  intellect 
has  gained  for  us. 
Jacks  asks: 

Must  the  meaning  of  life  always  be  expressed  in 
words?  Is  it  not  often  expressed  by  action?  by  be- 
ing? We  do  not  want  a  photograph  of  experience. 
We  want  our  experience  enlarged  and  deepened. 
But  we  need  philosophy  to  expose  false  philosophies 
and  to  lay  bare  the  ultimate  fact.  Its  function  is  to 
enforce  the  attitude  of  meditation — not  to  capture 
reality,  but  to  free  it  from  captivity.  Start  with  the 
notion  that  it  is  you  who  explain  the  object,  and  not 
the  object  which  explains  itself,  and  you  are  bound 
to  end  in  explaining  it  away.  It  is  one  thing  to  dis- 
cover fixity  in  experience,  but  another  thing  to  con- 
fer fixity  on  experience  by  a  form  of  words.  Reality 
must  be  left  to  tell  its  own  story  in  its  own  way.^* 

This,  I  take  it,  is  truly  Bergsonian.  It  is  a 
sort  of  philosophic  quietism,  but,  with  Bergson, 
it  is  superimposed  upon  a  very  active  and  ar- 

"  L.  P.  Jacks,  The  Alchemy  of  Thought. 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    173 

duous  intellectual  task  and  in  itself  requires  a 
herculean  spiritual  effort.  One  feels,  in  con- 
sidering Bergson's  theory  of  intuition,  that 
fusion  of  realism  and  idealism  which  he  claims 
to  effect.  It  is  not  only  real  work,  hut  a  real 
object  directly  and  actually  apprehended. 
And  yet,  this  is  not  accomplished  "  without 
idealism  in  the  soul,"  as  Bergson  says,  and  the 
product  is  an  ideal,  a  spiritual  product.  "  To 
get  a  pure  perception  of  reality,  we  must  have 
a  certain  immateriality  of  life,  i.e.,  idealism. 
Realism  is  in  the  work  when  idealism  is  in  the 
soul."  '' 

It  has  already  become  evident  that  Berg- 
son's teaching  regarding  intuition  has  points 
of  contact  with  mysticism.  ISIuirhead  says, 
"  Bergson  has  a  practical  emphasis,  and  yet 
the  principle  of  spirit  is  a  will  to  know — not  by 
logic,  to  be  sure,  but  by  intuition.  Here  he  is 
more  in  line  with  Plotinus  and  the  gnostics 
than  with  the  pragmatists."  '"  Slosson  ])oints 
out  that  the  study  of  Bergson  has  turned  his 

'*  Quoted  from  Bergson  by  E.  E.  Slosson  in  his  "  Prophets 
of  Today — Bergson,"  The  Independent,  June  8,  1911. 

'"  Muirhead's  review  of  Bergson's  work  in  the  Hibbert  Jour- 
nal, July,  1911. 


174  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

modernist  Catholic  admirers  to  a  study  of  the 
saints  of  mysticism.    Mories  remarks:  "  How- 
ever we  may  name  the  eternal  principle  of  the 
universe,  we  ourselves  (according  to  Bergson) 
are  part  and  parcel  of  it  and,  therefore,  in  most 
direct  contact  with  it.     This  is   against  all 
'  relativism,'  and  is  full  of  constructive  promise 
for    religion.      The    whole    trend    of    recent 
thought  has   been  toward   an   attitude   more 
fundamental  than  formal  religion,  that  is  to- 
wards mysticism.     Lay  the  spirit  open.  .  .  . 
Bergson  gives  an  exposition  of  the  empirical, 
psychological  basis  of  ecstasy."  ''     To  quote 
Macintosh:  "  Bergson  is  especially  sympathetic 
with  religious  mysticism.    Bergson  says,  '  The 
true  metaphysic  will  be  an  immediate  vision  of 
reality  and  the  mystical  experience  is  certainly 
that.'  "  " 

Listen  to  Bergson's  own  words  as  reported 
by  Levine :  "^ 

"  Is  it  not  remarkable,"  Bergson  asked,  "  that  the 
mystics  throughout  the  ages,  without  knowing  one 

"  A.  S.  Mories,  "  Bergson  and  Mysticism,"  Westminster  Re- 
view, June,  1912. 

"Macintosh,  "Bergson  and  Religion,"  Biblical  World,  Jan- 
uary,  1913. 

"  Levine's  interview  in  the  Ne^o  York  Times,  February  22, 
1914. 


INTUITION  AND  PRI^IACY  OF  SPIRIT    175 

another,  came  to  such  similar  conchisions  merely  on 
the  basis  of  their  inner  experience?  Now  what  the 
mystics  tell  us  about  themselves  is  extremely  interest- 
ing and  of  great  value  for  the  understanding  of  the 
life  of  the  spirit.  It  is  ridiculous  to  dismiss  all  this 
with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders,  as  so  many  are  in- 
clined to  do  in  our  so-called  positive  age.  On  the 
contrary,  their  clue  should  be  taken  up  and  followed, 
and  the  chances  are  that  the  deeper  wo  plunge  into 
our  inner  experience,  the  greater  the  treasures  we 
shall  discover  there." 

There  is  a  mystic  element  in  all  religion.  In 
fact,  the  religious  act  itself  is  essentially  mys- 
tical. This  naturally  appears  more  markedly 
in  those  of  an  emotional  temperament  than  in 
those  of  the  practical  or  of  the  intellectual  type. 
But  it  is  present  with  these  also,  even  if  under 
cover,  provided  real  religion  is  there.  If  this 
be  granted,  it  is  also  evident  that  a  philosophy 
which,  by  common  consent,  leans  strongly  to- 
wards mysticism,  must  be  not  merely  com- 
patible with  religion,  but  also  highly  favorable 
to  it  in  this  respect  at  least. 

Such  is  the  case  with  ^I.  Bergson's  philos- 
ophy. The  way  in  which  the  individual  soul, 
according  to  Bergson,  grasps  the  Ultimate 
(the  Vital  Impulse),  is  the  very  way  by  which 


176  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  same  soul  seeks  and  finds  its  religious  goal 
— God.  "  Oh!  that  I  knew  where  I  might  find 
Him!"  "Lift  up  your  eyes  unto  the  hills. 
From  whence  cometh  my  help?  My  help 
Cometh  from  the  Lord  who  made  heaven  and 
earth."  "  As  the  hart  panteth  after  the  water- 
brooks,  so  panteth  my  soul  after  thee,  O  God." 
"  He  giveth  power  to  the  faint;  and  to  him  that 
hath  no  might  he  increaseth  strength.  Even 
the  youths  shall  faint  and  be  weary,  and  the 
young  men  shall  utterly  fall;  but  they  that 
wait  for  Jehovah  shall  renew  their  strength; 
they  shall  mount  up  with  wings  as  eagles ;  they 
shall  run,  and  not  be  weary;  they  shall  walk, 
and  not  faint."  "  In  Him  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being." 

Faith,  defined  in  a  way  compatible  with  the 
Bergsonian  position,  could  be  no  formal  thing, 
no  merely  intellectual  proposition.  It  would 
be  an  act,  or  rather  an  attitude,  of  the  whole 
life,  by  which  the  soul  would  become  fused  with 
its  spiritual  source  and  Creator,  though  re- 
maining consciously  distinct  from  that  source. 
The  good  element  of  pantheism  would  thus  be 
preserved,  in  that  the  all-pervasiveness  of 
divine  life  would  be  recognized ;  but  the  harm- 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    177 

ful  identification  of  God  with  nature  in  toto 
would  be  cast  aside. 

"I  am  the  vine.  Ye  are  the  branches:  he 
that  abideth  in  me  and  I  in  him  the  same  bear- 
eth  much  fruit:  for  apart  from  me  ye  can  do 
nothing."  Applying  these  words  to  the  re- 
lationship between  man  and  God,  a  religious 
Bergsonian  could  honestly  repeat  them ;  in  fact 
they  would  express  his  position  completely. 
The  filial  relationship  between  man  and  God, 
pictured  by  Jesus  in  his  teaching,  is  one  of  trust 
and  communion  as  between  son  and  father; 
this  teaching  is  thoroughly  compatible  with 
Bergson's  doctrine.  Paul's  mystical  nature  is 
well  known  and  his  conception  of  faith  is  ex- 
actly this  mystical  fusion  between  the  believer 
and  his  object  of  worship. 

But  many  will  grant  all  this  and  yet  mis- 
trust Bergson  and  his  religious  influence  just 
because  of  this  pronounced  mystical  emphasis. 
These  critics  would  point  out  the  weaknesses 
of  religious  mysticism — its  vagaries;  its  self- 
centeredness ;  its  flight  from  the  world; 
its  unethical  or  even  anti-ethical  tend- 
encies.     This    objection    is    similar    to    that 


178  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

leveled  at  Bergson's  supposed  anti-scien- 
tific trend.  According  to  that  criticism,  his 
doctrine  of  intuition  is  opposed  to  intellect  and 
to  all  science.  According  to  this  criticism,  the 
effect  of  Bergson's  influence  will  be  an  un- 
fortunate obscurantism;  a  return  to  a  riot  of 
mystical  raptures  which  will  be  harmful  to  re- 
ligion in  the  long  run,  because  unbalanced  and 
possibly  anti-ethical. 

I  have  already  indicated,  somewhat  at 
length,  how  groundless  these  extreme  charges 
are.  Doubtless  those  who  make  them  divine 
correctly  a  tendency  in  Bergsonism  which 
should  be  watched  and  controlled.  But  Berg- 
son  himself  is  keenly  alive  to  this  need.  His 
repeated  emphasis  upon  the  necessity  of  scien- 
tific investigation  is  supported  by  his  own  ex- 
tended labors  in  the  scientific  field.  His  whole 
philosophy  rests  upon  the  basis  of  carefully 
investigated  scientific  fact.  He  knows  that  the 
"  inner  light"  is  often  deceitful  above  all  things, 
and  he  is  insistent  that  intuitions  shall  spring 
out  of  fact  and  not  out  of  abnormal  imagination 
merely.  These  intuitions,  also,  must  be  tested 
and  verified  by  long  and  arduous  scientific  ap- 
plication to  things  as  they  are.    While  on  his 


INTUITION  AND  PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    179 

lecture  tour  in  the  United  States,  "  he  said 
most  explicitly  that,  notwithstanding  his  high 
valuation  of  intuition,  he  thought  it  should  al- 
ways be  tested  by  verification;  regarding  in- 
tuition as  a  valuable  guide-board,  but  one  tliat, 
like  other  guide-boards,  might  prove  wrong."  '* 

Over-subjectivism  in  religion  would  not  be 
an  inescapable  corollary  of  Bergsonism.  His- 
tory would  necessarily  liave  an  important  place 
in  any  truly  Bergsonian  religious  viewpoint. 
The  way  by  which  Bergson  himself  arrived  at 
his  "  intuition  "  of  creative  evolution  was  the 
way  of  natural  history.  As  Loveday  says, 
"  The  original  Impulse  may  be  understood 
by  taking  a  synoptic  view  of  its  actual  de- 
velopments. The  complete  interpretation  of 
ultimate  reality  presupposes  a  complete  nat- 
ural history  and  Bergson  does  not  pretend  to 
do  more  than  sketch  the  general  outlines  of  the 
scheme."  ''" 

For  these  reasons  we  are  safe  in  predicting 
that  Bergson's  promised  discussion  of  religion, 

"  I  am  inclel)ted  to  Mr.  Henry  Holt  for  this  particular 
statement,  which  Bergson  made  to  him  personally.  Compare 
also  Mr.  Holt's  book,  On  the  Cosmic  Reladonif,  Vol.  I,  page 
454. 

"  T.  Loveday,  "  Evolution  Creatrice,"  in  Mind. 


180  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

when  it  comes,  will  be  largely  historical.  The 
faith  he  will  at  least  allow,  and  will  probably 
plead  for,  will  not  be  a  mystic  faith  of  a  purely 
subjective  kind;  but  a  mystic  union  with  an 
object  of  worship  increasingly  made  clear  in 
the  development  of  human  history.  The  Berg- 
sonian  mystic  would  and  should  have  a  scien- 
tific filling  for  his  mysticism.  His  mystic  in- 
tuition, or  faith,  must  spring  out  of  facts  and 
be  tested  carefully  by  them. 

Against  this  sort  of  mysticism  there  is  no 
valid  objection.  In  fact,  it  is  just  this  element 
we  now  so  sorely  lack  and  need.  It  is  the  only 
thing  which  can  enliven  the  soberness  and 
soften  the  hardness  of  those  who  are  too  ex- 
clusively intellectual,  or  too  predominatingly 
practical.  Besides,  mysticism  has  always  been 
an  antidote  for  legalistic  and  absolutistic  stag- 
nation. The  reaction  against  it  has  resulted 
in  part  from  the  lack  of  balance  of  the  old-style 
mystics.  This  reaction  has  cut  off  some  from  the 
Church,  and  others  from  religion  itself.  For 
still  others  it  has  diminished  the  real  solace  and 
stimulus  derived  from  their  professed  faith. 
Bergson's  philosophy  smoothes  the  way  for  a 
revival  of  mysticism  in  religion,  but,  if  his  own 


INTUITION   AND   rRIMACY   OF  SPIRIT    181 

method  be  sincerely  followed,  it  will  be  a  con- 
trolled mysticism  whose  subjective  ecstasy  will 
be  directed,  modified,  and  restrained  by  objec- 
tive considerations  of  a  scientific  and  historical 
nature. 

In  addition,  it  is  gratuitous  to  assume  that 
this  Bergsonian  religion  will  necessarily  be 
predominatingly  theological  and  correspond- 
ingly non-ethical  or  anti-ethical.  Just  how 
Bergson  will  ground  his  ethical  system  can  not 
now  be  said  with  certainty.  We  may  safely 
assert,  however,  that  a  Bergsonian  ethic  will  be 
forthcoming;  that  the  nature  of  his  thought 
excludes  the  probability  that  this  ethic  may  be 
fundamentally  utilitarian ;  finally,  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  conceive  how  this  ethic  can  escape  a 
certain  degree  of  fusion  with  religion,  espe- 
cially in  the  development  of  the  religious 
idea. 

There  is  room  in  the  Bergsonian  view  for 
the  "  categorical  imperative."  The  Vital  Im- 
pulse is  under  the  necessity  of  propagating  it- 
self. Nay  more,  being  psychic  and  conscious, 
this  necessity  gives  rise  to  a  feeling  of  ought- 
ness,  for  "  ought  "  is  the  psychic  counterpart 
of  the  more  physical  "  must."     According  to 


182  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Bergson,  the  Vital  Impetus  can  not  help  ex- 
panding and  extending  its  influence.  It  is  also 
a  growing  thing,  not  static,  finished,  complete. 
Therefore,  Bergson  holds,  it  is  compelled  by- 
inner  necessity  to  reach  out  for  more ;  towards 
a  larger  and  a  fuller  life  for  itself.  Since  the 
Vital  Impulse  is  also,  at  the  same  time,  psychic 
and  conscious;  and  since  "ought"  is  the 
psychic  counterpart  of  the  physical  "  must," 
may  we  not  conclude  that  the  Vital  Impulse, 
this  Cosmic  Soul,  has  necessarily  a  funda- 
mental feeling  of  oughtness  in  two  definite 
directions :  first,  in  the  direction  of  self -propa- 
gation and,  second,  in  the  direction  of  self- 
development  ? 

Now  the  individual  soul,  according  to  Berg- 
son, is  made  of  the  same  cosmic  stuff;  and, 
therefore,  we  may  conclude  that  it  shares  the 
compulsions  of  this  same  inner  imperative. 
The  individual,  qua  individual,  knows  that  he 
ought  to  mantain  and  to  increase  his  own 
spiritual  life;  he  knows  also  that  he  ouglit  to 
maintain  and  to  increase  spiritual  life  as  such, 
in  others  as  well  as  in  himself.  Thus  room  is 
made  for  a  social  ethic,  and  one  is  reminded  of 
Kant's  pronouncement  that  the  test  of  good- 


INTUITION  AND   PRIMACY  OF  SPIRIT    183 

ness  is  the  possibility  of  its  universal  applica- 
tion. 

This  formal  principle  of  oughtness,  accord- 
ing to  Bergsonian  teaching,  would  have  to  re- 
ceive its  vital,  concrete  content  from  experi- 
ence;  not   the   experience   of   the   individual, 
merely,  but  of  the  race  as  well,  that  is,  from 
history.    Kant  said:  "  The  only  good  thing  in 
the  world  is  a  good  will."    But  what  is  a  good 
will,  ultimately?     Bergson  would  say,  "The 
will  which  seeks  to  maintain  and  to  increase  the 
Vital   Impetus   in  its  work  of   freedom   and 
spirituality."     Then,  just  as  history — the  ex- 
perience of  the  individual  and  of  the  race — is 
showing  us  what  the  nature  of  the  Vital  Im- 
petus is,  so  history  (in  the  same  sense)  must 
show  us  what  concrete  relations  must  be  set  up 
in  order  to  realize  this  good  will  and  make  it 
effective.     In  other  words,  the  conscience  can 
and  must  be  educated  through  the  knowledge 
and  consideration  of  concrete  fact.     The  re- 
sulting concrete  relations  will  constitute  posi- 
tive Bergsonian  morality,  the  ground  of  whose 
goodness   is   the   Vital   Impetus   itself.      The 
Bergsonian  religionist,  therefore,  who  identi- 
fies his  God  with  the  Vital  Impetus  can  not 


184  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

separate  his  religion  from  his  ethics  without 
being  inconsistent  and  without  doing  serious 
damage  to  both. 

In  conclusion,  then,  I  take  it  that  they  alarm 
themselves  unnecessarily  who  imagine  that  the 
Bergsonian  trend  towards  religion,  through 
emphasis  on  intuition  and  the  primacy  of  the 
spirit,  is  likely  to  prove  unethical  or  anti- 
ethical.  While  this  trend  is  not  inescapably 
Christian,  on  either  its  religious  or  its  ethical 
side,  it  is  not  inevitably  non-Christian.  In- 
deed, as  far  as  the  phases  here  discussed  are 
concerned,  Bergsonism  is  not  only  compatible 
with  Christianity,  but  even  favorable  towards 
it. 


CHAPTER  VI 

INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM 

If  we  were  inescapably  shut  up  to  a  belief  in 
the  freedom  of  the  will,  we  should  be  irrevo- 
cably shut  out  from  freedom  itself  and  from 
the  possibility  of  establishing  our  belief  on 
rational  grounds.  But  we  are  not  thus  obliged 
to  believe  in  it  even  though  the  full  tide  of 
human  hope,  judgment,  and  action  sets  that 
way.  Indeed,  once  the  idea  is  suggested  to  us 
that  we  are  not  free ;  that  in  some  subtle  way, 
known  only  to  materialistic  philosophers  or  to 
physiological  psychologists,  our  thoughts,  pur- 
poses, ideals,  and  affections  are  only  sparks 
which  fly  where  the  wheels  of  matter  grind  to- 
gether in  the  brain;  we  become  tormented  ])y 
the  thought.  And  there  is  much  in  life  that 
supports  the  latter  theory  and  confirms  our 
fears.  Perhaps  our  sense  of  freedom,  and  with 
it  our  sense  of  duty,  responsibility,  and  per- 
sonal value,  are  illusions;  at  any  rate  we  will 

186 


186  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

cling  to  our  illusions  for  they  are  sweet.  We 
shall  be  none  the  worse  off  at  the  end,  and  in 
the  meantime  we  may  be  cheered  by  them,  ex- 
cept in  the  bad  quarter-hours  when  we  can  not 
keep  our  eyes  shut.  At  the  end,  when  the 
ship  goes  down,  we  will  stand  at  attention,  fly 
the  colors,  play  the  band,  sing  the  anthem,  and 
die  like  men. 

Such  is  the  brave  resolve  of  many  victims  of 
the  Great  Disillusionment.  But  most  of  us 
are  not  disillusioned ;  at  least  not  so  thoroughly 
as  to  make  of  despair  a  conscious  and  con- 
firmed theory.  We  believe  still.  In  fact, 
among  the  mass  of  us,  in  whom  the  surge  of 
life  runs  strong,  whose  springs  have  not  yet 
been  choked  up  by  the  sands  of  a  timorous 
speculation, — among  the  mass  of  us,  I  say, 
there  is  still  a  supreme  confidence  in  freedom. 
The  popular  idea  is  that  one  is  completely  the 
"  captain  of  his  soul."  May  I  not  do  as  I 
please  ?  Am  I  not  free,  absolutely  free,  to  con- 
tract habits  or  to  break  them  off?  It  is  only 
the  submerged  minority  that  cannot  "  stop  at 
any  time."  Who  does  not  feel  within  himself 
the  capability  of  at  least  a  small  amount  of 
new  and  original  endeavor?    The  conventions 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDO:\I  187 

of  life  bind  one,  of  course,  but  only  because 
one  willingly  accepts  them.  He  knows  they 
are  often  foolish,  but  they  save  time  and 
trouble  and,  on  the  whole,  make  for  harmony 
and  efficiency  of  life.  If  they  become  unduly 
oppressive,  a  burden  instead  of  a  crutch,  then 
one  can  easily  shatter  them  to  bits.  In  fact, 
who  does  not  occasionally  do  so?  So  the 
average  believer  in  freedom. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  commonest 
facts  of  life,  at  every  level,  is  a  frank  recog- 
nition of  the  power  of  habit,  custom,  "  circum- 
stances." Wrong-doing  is  excused  or  ex- 
plained by  "  circumstances,"  birth,  up-bring- 
ing, environment.  "  Outside  compulsion  "  is 
the  ready  excuse  of  those  who  have  something 
to  explain  away.  The  poor  as  well  as  the  rich 
recognize  and  observe  distinctions  of  birth  and 
circumstance  and  usually  condemn  marriage 
out  of  one's  rank,  whether  it  be  "  marrying 
up  "  or  "  marrying  down."  Nature  is  uni- 
versally recognized  as  setting  fixed  limits  to 
the  effort  and  ambition  of  man,  and  the  signifi- 
cance of  so-called  "  acts  of  God  "  is  not  lost, 
even  on  the  least  intelligent.  To  the  great 
mass  of  men,  who  necessarily  live  from  hand 


188  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

to  mouth,  death  comes  even  closer  than  to  those 
of  larger  means;  and  the  hnpartiality  of  its 
activity  as  well  as  the  inevitableness  and  far- 
reaching  nature  of  its  effects,  direct  and  in- 
direct, are  fully  realized.  Such  are  the  facts 
which  sober,  if  they  do  not  crush,  belief  in  free- 
dom. 

An  unusual  experience  of  facts  like  these, 
whether  in  one's  personal  life  or  through  wide 
observation  of  the  poor  and  unfortunate,  often 
tends  to  offset  the  natural  belief  in  freedom 
and  to  establish  the  conviction  that  there  is 
no  such  thing.  This  conviction  speedily  finds 
theoretical  support  in  the  conclusions  of  de- 
terministic science,  spread  abroad  in  a  form 
that  is  popular,  but  often  very  crude  and  ob- 
jectionable. Besides,  the  scientists  themselves 
act  and  talk  (indeed,  as  scientists,  they  have 
to)  as  if  all  were  absolutely  determined;  and 
a  large  proportion  of  them  are  convinced  that 
determinism  is  not  merely  a  working  hypoth- 
esis, of  practical  value  and  possibly  of  limited 
validity,  but  a  fact  of  universal  applicability. 
It  is  not  strange  that,  under  these  circum- 
stances, many  have  adopted  the  view  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  m^^a-physics ;  no  spirit-life. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  189 

no  freedom,  no  real  responsibility ;  nothing  but 
an  all-embracing  determinism. 

JNIany  do  not  know,  or  they  lose  sight  of, 
the  limits  and  the  assumptions  of  science;  and 
the  hard  knocks  of  experience  have  driven  un- 
der their  ability  to  appreciate  the  validity  and 
significance  of  those  other  experiences  whence 
arises  faith  in  one's  self,  in  spirit,  freedom,  God. 
They  do  not  know,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
claims  of  determinists  are  met  by  counter- 
claims which  challenge  certain  scientific  as- 
sumptions, at  least  in  so  far  as  they  are  dog- 
matically asserted  to  be  universally  binding. 
Let  me  give  one  of  these  challenges  by  way  of 
illustration.  It  is  now  frequently  maintained 
that  "  the  reality  which  we  call  physical  reality, 
and  which  we  ordinarily  mean  when  we  speak 
of  reality,  is  not  the  physical  reality  of  life  but 
the  schematical  reality  of  things.  So  when  we 
say  there  are  no  things,  there  are  only  actions, 
we  are  denying  the  ultimate  nature  of  that 
form  of  reality  with  which  physical  science 
deals.  We  are  declaring  that  it  is  derived  and 
not  original.  The  necessity  on  account  of 
which  it  exists,  the  purpose  it  serves,  is  the 
activity  that  constitutes  our  life,  but  it  is  not 


190  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

itself  the  reality  of  that  life.  The  mode  of 
our  activity  is  intellectual,  and  the  work  of 
the  intellect  is  to  form  for  us  a  scheme  or  dia- 
gram against  which  to  present  the  world  as  a 
sphere  of  our  activity  and  to  enable  us  to  have 
a  grasp  or  hold  upon  it.  Physical  science  is 
the  apprehension  of  reality  in  a  schematical 
form.  We  have  come  then  to  the  essential 
meaning  of  the  principle  that  living  action  not 
scientific  knowledge  is  the  key  to  the  solution 
of  metaphysical  problems."  ' 

Furthermore,  the  average  man,  carried  away 
by  the  cheap  determinism  of  a  crude,  popular- 
ized science,  forgets  also  that  there  is  no  proof 
that  "  the  brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver 
secretes  bile  ";  that,  in  fact,  there  are  weighty 
reasons  against  it.    Carr  says :  ^ 

There  are  two  reasons  that  must  make  it  seem  to 
every  one  who  studies  the  problem  impossible  to  sup- 
pose that  the  brain  can  produce  the  mind  in  any  way 
that  is  analogous  to  the  secretion  of  a  gland  or  the 
functioning  of  an  organ.  One  reason  concerns  the 
nature  of  scientific  explanation,  the  other  the  content 

^  H.  Wildon  Carr,  The  Philosophy  of  Change,  London,  1914, 
pp.  130-1.  I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  italicizing  certain  words 
in  order  to  bring  out  the  meaning  a  little  more  clearly. 

^  Carr,  op.  cit.,  pp.  45,  52, 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  191 

of  consciousness.  Tlic  first  reason  is  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  explain  anything  as  a  consequence  or 
effect  of  another  thing  unless  there  is  some  common 
measure  that  we  can  apply  to  each,  and  there  is  no 
common  measure  that  we  can  apply  to  mind  and 
brain.  And  the  other  reason  is  that  the  conscious- 
ness which  arises  in  connection  witli  cerebral  process 
is  not  consciousness  of  the  cerebral  process  but  of 
something  wliich  is  independent  of  it,  something 
existing  in  a  different  part  of  space,  it  may  be  thou- 
sands of  miles  away  from  the  brain,  and  something 
existing  at  a  different  time,  it  may  be  ages  before 
or  even  after  the  moment  in  which  the  accompanying 
cerebral  process  is  taking  place.   .   .  . 

These  two  reasons  are,  as  I  have  said,  unanswer- 
able. The  first  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that 
the  chain  of  causes  and  effects  in  the  physiological 
process  of  which  the  brain  is  the  centre  is  complete 
without  the  intervention  of  the  psychical  process, 
while  the  psychical  process  of  consciousness,  though 
a  connected  series  of  events,  is  not  a  relation  of 
effects  to  causes  but  an  association  of  ideas  which 
involves  no  conversion  of  physical  energy.  And  the 
second  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  knowledge, 
if  it  is  knowledge  of  what  is  outside  the  brain,  cannot 
be  manufactured  by  a  process  inside  the  brain. 

Besides  failing  to  appreciate  the  objections 
to  a  thorough-going  scientific  determinism, 
those  who  have  given  up  their  faith  in  freedom 


192  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

often  forget,  or  fail  to  cultivate,  those  phases 
of  life  which  mean  most  to  us  but  which  lose 
all  value  if  pressed  into  a  deterministic  mold. 
The  sense  of  duty  is  fundamentally  a  faith,' 
but  a  faith  without  which  life  would  be  impos- 
sible. This  faith  requires  an  ideal,  or  object 
of  faith,  objectively  existent,  for  "  one  cannot 
hang  a  coat  on  the  idea  of  a  peg."  Real  life, 
too,  is  proportionate  to  the  love  which  this 
ideal,  this  object  of  faith,  engenders  in  the 
heart.  These  are  the  things  men  live  by,  and 
failure  to  live  by  them  cuts  us  off  from  the 
laboratory  where  alone  we  may  test  competing 
theories  of  life.  Now  scientific  determinism 
is  not  controlling  in  the  sphere  of  these  realities 
and,  in  fact,  if  it  exceeds  its  proper  limits  in 
this  direction,  it  becomes  a  destroyer  of  the 
highest  things  in  life. 

It  is  natural,  therefore,  that  those  who  are 
most  keenly  interested  in  these  things  should 
hold  most  strongly  to  belief  in  freedom.  Con- 
sequently, we  are  not  surprised  to  find  religious 
people  shouting  the  praises  of  freedom,  in  this 
connection  at  least,  and  eyeing  with  suspicion 

'  fimile  Boutroux,  Science  et  Religion,  cf.  the  final  chapter, 
whence  I  have  taken  the  thought  of  this  part  of  the  paragraph. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREED0:M  193 

a  science  whose  tendency  has  hitherto  been 
predominantly  deterministic.  With  Paul  they 
cry,  "  But  the  Jerusalem  that  is  above  is  free, 
which  is  our  mother.  .  .  .  Wherefore,  brethren, 
we  are  not  children  of  a  handmaid,  but  of  the 
free  woman.  For  freedom  did  Christ  set  us 
free."  *  And  yet,  religious  believers  have  often 
held  views  quite  inconsistent  with  a  belief  in 
real  freedom.  There  have  been,  and  still  are, 
religions  and  religious  sects  in  which  freedom 
is  either  explicitly  or  implicitly  denied.  In  the 
naturalistic  religions  of  primitive  times,  in 
Islam,  in  Calvinism,  necessity  and  determinism 
supplant  freedom.  But,  in  order  to  progress 
in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  other  prin- 
ciples also  strongly  held,  the  principle  of  free- 
dom has  had  to  be  admitted  in  some  form  or 
other.  In  fact,  no  genuinely  religious  system 
can  deny  it  altogether. 

The  fact  that  Bergson  is  on  the  side  of  free 
will  is,  in  so  far,  a  promise  that  he  is  also  on 
the  side  of  religion.  In  Time  and  Free  Will 
he  pleads  ably  for  the  fact  of  freedom.  As 
Carr  says,"* 

*  Galatians   iv:   26,  31.     v:   1. 

•  Carr,  op.  cit.,  pp.  195-196. 


194.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

What  then  is  the  attraction  that  this  philosophy 
exercises?  What  is  there  of  supreme  value  that  it 
assures  us?    The  answer  is  freedom. 

It  does  not  seem  so.  Our  whole  life  is  regulated 
by  automatisms.  The  life-process  from  beginning 
to  end  seems  to  be  the  formiation  of  habits,  and 
habits  are  only  broken  by  new  habits.  Wherever  we 
look,  whether  at  the  constant  supply  of  daily  needs 
or  at  the  higher  generalizations  of  science  and  phi- 
losophy, all  advance  seems  dependent  on  regular  or- 
derly obedience  to  rule,  all  seems  part  of  a^universal 
determinism.  Our  philosophy  shows  us  the  ground 
of  this  determinism  in  the  intellectual  nature  -of  our 
activity,  and  at  the  same  time  reveals  to  us  in  the 
intuition  of  life  the  underlying  reality  of  an  essen- 
tially free  activity.  The  very  essence  of  life  is  un- 
ceasing creation,  and  our  human  form  seems  to  regis- 
ter the  greatest  freedom  that  life  has*  secured  under 
the  limitations  of  its  existence. 

Bergson  himself  says :  ^ 

We  can  now  formulate  our  conception  of  freedom. 
Freedom  is  the  relation  of  the  concrete  self  to  the 
act  which  it  performs.  This  relation  is  indefinable, 
just  because  we  are  free.  For  we  can  analyze  a 
thing,  but  not  a  process ;  we  can  break  up  extensity, 
but  not  duration.  .  .  .  Thus,  any  positive  definition 
of  freedom  will  ensure  the  victory  of  determinism.  .  . 

*  Henri  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will.  English  translation 
by  Pogson,  pp.  219,  220,  221. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  195 

To  sum  up;  every  demand  for  explanation  in  re- 
gard to  freedom  comes  back,  without  our  suspecting 
it,  to  the  following  question :  "  Can  time  be  ade- 
quately represented  by  space?  "  To  which  we  an- 
swer: Yes,  if  you  are  dealing  with  time  flown;  No, 
if  you  speak  of  time  flowing.  Now,  the  free  act 
takes  place  in  time  which  is  flowing  and  not  in  time 
which  has  already  flown.  Freedom  is  therefore  a 
fact,  and  among  the  facts  which  we  observe  there  'is 
none  clearer. 

Bergson's  strong  assertion  of  the  fact  of 
freedom  has  led  to  much  misunderstanding  of 
his  position.  He  does  not  conceive  of  freedom 
as  without  hmits.    Far  from  it.    He  says :  ^ 

.  .  .  the  outward  manifestation  of  this  inner  state  will 
be  just  what  is  called  a  free  act,  since  the  self  alone 
will  have  been  the  author  of  it,  and  since  it  will  ex- 
press the  whole  of  the  self.  Freedom,  thus  under- 
stood, is  not  absolute,  as  a  radical  libertarian  philoso- 
phy would  have  it ;  it  admits  of  degrees.  .  . 
.  .  .  Here  will  be  found,  within  the  fundamental 
self,  a  parasitic  self  which  continually  encroaches 
upon  the  other.  Many  live  this  kind  of  a  life,  and 
die  without  having  known  true  freedom. 

And  again :  ^ 

Hence  there  are  finally  two  different  selves,  one  of 

'  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  165-166. 
^Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  231-233. 


196  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

which  is,  as  it  were,  the  external  projection  of  the 
other,  its  spatial  and,  so  to  speak,  social  representa- 
tion. We  reach  the  former  by  deep  introspection, 
which  leads  us  to  grasp  our  inner  states  as  living 
things,  constantly  becoming,  as  states  not  amenable 
to  measure,  which  permeate  one  another  and  of  which 
the  succession  in  duration  has  nothing  in  common 
with  juxtaposition  in  homogeneous  space.  But  the 
moments  at  which  we  thus  grasp  ourselves  are  rare, 
and  that  is  just  why  we  are  rarely  free.  The  greater 
part  of  the  time  we  live  outside  ourselves,  hardly 
perceiving  anything  of  ourselves  but  our  own  ghost, 
a  colorless  shadow  which  pure  duration  projects  into 
homogeneous  space.  Hence  our  life  unfolds  in  space 
rather  than  in  time;  we  live  for  the  external  world 
rather  than  for  ourselves;  we  speak  rather  than 
think ;  we  "  are  acted  "  rather  than  act  ourselves. 
To  act  freely  is  to  recover  possession  of  one's  self, 
and  to  get  back  into  pure  duration. 


We  see,  therefore,  that  Bergsonian  freedom 
is  far  from  mere  license  and  that  it  is  rep- 
resented as  having,  in  actual  life,  very  definite 
and  extensive  limitations.  But  let  us  now  pre- 
sent the  doctrine  in  a  more  complete  fashion: 
Bergson  holds  that  the  difficulty  we  have  in 
preserving  our  naive  belief  in  human  freedom 
lies  in  the  tendency  we  have  acquired,  in  the 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  197 

development  of  our  intellectual  life,  of  carry- 
ing over  into  our  picture  of  mental  life  a  con- 
ception of  time  which  is  applicable  only  in  the 
realm  of  physical  science,  that  is,  to  the  inert. 
According  to  this  conception,  time  is  a  quan- 
titative thing,  a  succession  of  moments  which 
are  distinct  from  one  another.  But  the  time 
of  the  inner  life,  for  which  Bergson  prefers  the 
word  "  duration,"  is  not  a  succession  of  sep- 
arate moments,  quantitatively  measured,  but 
an  interpenetration  of  qualitative  states  which 
become  indivisibly  fused  in  the  actual  life  of 
the  mind.  The  quantitative  time  of  our  ordi- 
nary thought  is  indeed  merely  mathematical,  a 
symbol  of  the  reality  not  the  reality  itself,  and 
results  from  the  practical  needs  of  science  and 
of  our  everyday  life,  in  the  task  of  handling 
and  of  overcoming  physical  nature. 
He  says :  ^ 

An  inner  life  with  well  distinguished  moments  and 
with  clearly  characterized  states  will  answer  better 
the  requirements  of  social  life.  Indeed,  a  superficial 
psychology  may  be  content  with  describing  it  with- 
out thereby  falling  into  error,  on  condition,  however, 
that  it  restricts  itself  to  the  study  of  what  has  taken 

•  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  p.  139. 


198  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

place  and  leaves  out  what  is  going  on.  But  if,  pass- 
ing from  statics  to  dynamics,  this  psychology  claims 
to  reason  about  things  in  the  making  as  it  reasons 
about  things  made,  if  it  offers  us  the  concrete  and 
living  self  as  an  association  of  terms  which  are  dis- 
tinct from  one  another  and  are  set  side  by  side  in  a 
homogeneous  medium,  it  will  see  difficulty  after  diffi- 
culty rising  in  its  path.  And  these  difficulties  will 
multiply  the  greater  the  efforts  it  makes  to  overcome 
them,  for  all  its  efforts  will  only  bring  into  clearer 
light  the  absurdity  of  the  fundamental  hypothesis 
by  which  it  spreads  out  time  in  space  and  puts  suc- 
cession at  the  very  center  of  simultaneity.  We  shall 
see  that  the  contradictions  implied  in  the  problems 
of  causality,  freedom,  personality,  spring  from  no 
other  source,  and  that,  if  we  wish  to  get  rid  of  them, 
we  have  only  to  go  back  to  the  real  and  concrete  self 
and  give  up  its  symbolical  substitute. 

The  wrong  use  of  this  physical,  symbolical 
conception  of  time  gives  rise  to  a  wrong  appli- 
cation of  the  words  "  causality  "  and  "  deter- 
minism "  to  psychic  phenomena.  Bergson 
says :  ^" 

Nevertheless  it  will  be  worth  while  to  dwell  on  this 

latter  form   of  the  determinist  argument    (namely, 

that  "  the  action  having  once  been  performed,  any 

other  action  is  seen,  under  the  given  conditions,  to 

"  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  201-202. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  199 

have  been  impossible"),  even  though  it  be  only  to 
explain  from  our  point  of  view  the  meaning  of  the 
two  words  "determinism"  and  "  cuusahty." 

In  vain  do  we  argue  that  there  cannot  be  any  ques- 
tion either  of  foreseeing  a  future  action  in  the  way 
that  an  astronomical  phenomenon  is  foreseen,  or  of 
asserting,  when  once  an  action  is  done,  that  any 
other  action  would  have  been  impossible  under  the 
given  conditions.  In  vain  do  we  add  that,  even  when 
it  takes  this  form :  "  The  same  causes  produce  the 
same  effects,"  the  principle  of  universal  determina- 
tion loses  every  shred  of  meaning  in  the  inner  world 
of  conscious  states.  The  determinist  will  perhaps 
yield  to  our  arguments  on  each  of  these  points  in 
particular,  will  admit  that  in  the  psychical  field  one 
cannot  ascribe  any  of  these  three  meanings  to  the 
word  determination,  will  probably  fail  to  discover  a 
fourth  meaning,  and  yet  will  go  on  repeating  that 
the  act  is  inseparably  bound  up  with  its  antecedents. 
We  thus  find  ourselves  here  confronted  by  so  deep- 
seated  a  misapprehension  and  so  obstinate  a  preju- 
dice that  we  cannot  get  the  better  of  them  without 
attacking  them  at  their  root,  which  is  the  principle 
of  causality. 

Continuing,  Bergson  maintains  "  that  "  cau- 
sality, as  '  regular  succession,'  does  not  apply 
to  conscious  states  and  cannot  disprove  free 
will  " ;  that  "  causality,  as  the  prefiguring  of 

**  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  cf.  pp.  202-215. 


200  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  future  phenomenon  in  its  present  condi- 
tions, in  one  form  destroys  concrete  phenomena 
— it  cannot  bind  the  future  to  the  present 
without  neglecting  duration  " ;  that  "  the  neces- 
sary determination  of  phenomena  imphes  non- 
duration,  but  we  endure  and  are  therefore 
free  ";  and,  finally,  that  "  prefiguring,  as  hav- 
ing an  idea  of  a  future  act  which  we  cannot 
realize  without  effort  does  not  involve  neces- 
sary determination." 
He  then  concludes:  ^^ 

It  follows  from  this  two-fold  analysis  that  the 
principle  of  causality  involves  two  contradictory 
conceptions  of  duration,  two  mutually  exclusive 
ways  of  prefiguring  the  future  in  the  present.  Some- 
times all  phenomena,  physical  or  psychical,  are  pic- 
tured as  enduring  in  the  same  way  that  we  do :  in 
this  case  the  future  will  exist  in  the  present  only  as 
an  idea,  and  the  passing  from  the  present  to  the 
future  will  take  the  form  of  an  effort  which  does  not 
always  lead  to  the  realization  of  the  idea  conceived. 
Sometimes,  on  the  other  hand,  duration  is  regarded 
as  the  characteristic  form  of  conscious  states ;  in 
this  case,  things  are  no  longer  supposed  to  endure 
as  we  do,  and  a  mathematical  pre-existence  of  their 
future  in  the  present  is  admitted. 

Now,  each  of  these  two  hypotheses,  when  taken  by 
*"  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  cf.  pp.  215-216. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  201 

itself,  safeguards  human  freedom ;  for  the  first 
would  lead  to  the  result  that  even  the  phenomena  of 
nature  were  contingent,  and  the  second,  hy  attribut- 
ing the  necessary  determination  of  physical  phe- 
nomena to  the  fact  that  things  do  not  endure  as  we 
do,  invites  us  to  regard  the  self  which  is  subject  to 
duration  as  a  free  force.  Therefore,  every  clear  con- 
ception of  causality,  where  we  know  our  own  mean- 
ing, leads  to  the  idea  of  human  freedom  as  a  natural 
consequence.  Unfortunately,  the  habit  has  grown  up 
of  taking  the  principle  of  causality  in  both  senses  at 
the  same  time,  because  the  one  is  more  flattering  to 
our  imagination  and  the  other  is  more  favorable  to 
mathematical  reasoning. 

Bergson  points  out  that  our  immediate 
problem  is  merely  one  phase  of  a  larger  con- 
flict between  two  rival  systems  of  nature, 
mechanism  and  dynamism. 

Dynamism  starts  from  the  idea  of  voluntary  ac- 
tivity, given  by  consciousness,  and  comes  to  repre- 
sent inertia  b}'  gradually  emptying  this  idea :  it  has 
thus  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  free  force  on  the  one 
hand  and  matter  governed  by  laws  on  tlic  other. 
Mechanism  follows  the  opposite  course.  It  assumes 
that  the  materials  which  it  synthesizes  are  governed 
by  necessary  laws,  and  although  it  reaches  richer  and 
richer  combinations,  which  are  more  and  more  diffi- 
cult to  foresee,  and  to  all  appearance  more  and  more 


202  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

contingent,  yet  it  never  gets  out  of  the  narrow  circle 
of  necessity  within  which  it  at  first  shut  itself 
up." 

But  neither  side  can  rest  content  with  a  mere 
recognition  of  this  fundamental  difference  in 
point  of  view.  The  apostle  of  freedom  must 
establish  his  position  through  defense  and  at- 
tack, or  it  will  be  won  from  him.  Bergson 
says:  ^* 

A  posteriori,  however,  definite  facts  are  appealed 
to  against  freedom,  some  physical,  others  psycho- 
logical. Sometimes  it  is  asserted  that  our  actions 
are  necessitated  by  our  feelings,  our  ideas,  and  the 
whole  preceding  series  of  our  conscious  states ;  some- 
times freedom  is  denounced  as  being  incompatible 
with  the  fundamental  properties  of  matter,  and  in 
particular  with  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of 
energy.  Hence  two  kinds  of  determinism,  two  ap- 
parently different  proofs  of  universal  necessity.  We 
shall  show  that  the  second  of  these  two  forms  is  re- 
ducible to  the  first,  and  that  all  determinism,  even 
physical  determinism,  involves  a  psychological  hy- 
pothesis :  we  shall  then  prove  that  psychological  de- 
terminism itself,  and  the  refutations  which  are  given 
of  it,  rest  on  an  inaccurate  conception  of  the  multi- 
plicity of  conscious   states,  or  rather  of  duration. 

**  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  p.  140  f. 
**  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  142-143. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  203 

Thus,  in  the  light  of  the  principles  worked  out  in 
the  foregoing  chapter,  we  shall  sec  a  self  emerge 
whose  activity  cannot  be  compared  to  that  of  any 
other  force. 

Bergson  then  proceeds  to  show '''  that  "  if 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is 
universal,  physiological  and  nervous  phe- 
nomena are  necessitated,  but  perhaps  not  con- 
scious states  ";  that  "  to  prove  conscious  states 
determined,  we  should  have  to  show  a  neces- 
sary connection  between  them  and  cerebral 
states  and  there  is  no  such  proof  " ;  that,  there- 
fore, "  physical  determinism,  when  assumed  to 
be  universal,  postulates  psychological  deter- 
minism." He  says  ^^  that  "  we  must  not  over- 
rate the  part  played  by  the  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  in  the  history  of  the 
natural  sciences.  In  its  present  form  it  marks 
a  certain  phase  in  the  evolution  of  certain 
sciences;  but  it  has  not  been  the  governing 
factor  in  this  evolution  and  we  should  be  wrong 
in  making  it  the  indispensable  postulate  of  all 
scientific  research."  Further,  "  it  implies  that 
a  system  can  return  to  its  original  state.     It 

**  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  cf.  pp.  145-150. 
*•  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  cf.  pp.  150-155. 


204.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

neglects  duration  and  hence  is  inapplicable  to 
living  beings  and  to  conscious  states." 

Thus  "  the  so-called  physical  determinism  is 
reducible  at  bottom  to  a  psychological  deter- 
minism "  which  "  depends  on  an  associationist 
conception  of  the  mind  "  which,  in  turn,  "  in- 
volves a  defective  conception  of  the  self."  " 
Bergson  concludes :  ^^ 

Therefore  it  is  only  an  inaccurate  psychology,  mis- 
led by  language,  which  will  show  us  the  soul  deter- 
mined by  sympathy,  aversion,  or  hate  as  though  by 
so  many  forces  pressing  upon  it.  These  feelings, 
provided  that  they  go  deep  enough,  each  make  up 
the  whole  soul,  since  the  whole  content  of  the  soul  is 
reflected  in  each  of  them.  To  say  that  the  soul  is 
determined  under  the  influence  of  any  one  of  these 
feelings  is  thus  to  recognize  that  it  is  self-deter- 
mined .  .  .  the  outward  manifestation  of  this 
inner  state  (that  is,  a  state  of  mind  reflecting  the 
whole  personality)  will  be  just  what  is  called  a  free 
act,  since  the  self  alone  will  have  been  the  author  of 
it,  and  since  it  will  express  the  whole  of  the  self. 
Freedom,  thus  understood,  is  not  absolute,  as  a  radi- 
cal libertarian  philosophy  would  have  it ;  it  admits  of 
degrees.  .  .  .  Here  will  be  found,  without  the  funda- 
mental self,   a  parasitic  self  which   continually   en- 

"  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  cf.  pp.  155-165. 
"  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  165-166. 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  205 

croaches  upon  the  otlior.  Many  live  this  kind  of  life, 
and  (lie  without  having  known  true  freedom. 

Finally:^" 

...  we  arc  free  when  our  acts  spring  from  our 
whole  personality,  when  they  express  it,  when  they 
have  that  indefinable  resemblance  to  it  which  one 
sometimes  finds  between  the  artist  and  his  work.  It 
is  no  use  asserting  that  we  are  then  yielding  to  the 
all-powerful  influence  of  our  character — our  charac- 
ter is  still  ourselves ;  and  because  we  are  pleased  to 
split  the  person  into  two  parts  so  that  by  an  effort 
of  abstraction  we  may  consider  in  turn  the  self  which 
feels  or  thinks  and  the  self  which  acts,  it  would  be 
very  strange  to  conclude  that  one  of  the  two  selves 
is  coercing  the  other.  Those  who  ask  whether  we  are 
free  to  alter  our  character  lay  themselves  open  to 
the  same  objection.  Certainly  our  character  is  alter- 
ing perceptibly  every  day,  and  our  freedom  would 
suffer  if  these  new  acquisitions  were  grafted  on  to 
our  self  and  not  blended  with  it.  But,  as  soon  as 
this  blending  takes  place,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  change  which  has  supervened  in  our  character  be- 
longs to  us,  that  we  have  appropriated  it. 

In  a  word,  if  it  is  agreed  to  call  every  act  free 
"  Bergson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  172-173.  I  would  apologize  for  giv- 
ing so  much  detail  in  presenting  Bergson's  doctrine  of  free- 
dom, were  it  not  for  the  general  difficulty  of  the  subject  and, 
especially,  that  I  feel  constrained  to  make  such  a  presentation 
in  order  to  establish  more  clearly  the  validity  of  the  inferences 
I  am  about  to  draw. 


206  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

which  springs  from  the  self  and  from  the  self  alone, 
the  act  which  bears  the  mark  of  our  personality  is 
truly  free,  for  our  self  alone  will  lay  claim  to  its 
paternity.  It  would  thus  be  recognized  that  free 
will  is  a  fact,  if  it  were  agreed  to  look  for  it  in  a 
certain  characteristic  of  the  decision  which  is  taken, 
in  the  free  act  itself. 

Such  are  the  nature  and  the  grounds  of  the 
Bergsonian  doctrine  of  free  will.  What  are 
its  religious  values?  They  are  direct  and  evi- 
dent and,  to  my  mind,  connect  helpfully  with 
the  basal  religious  conceptions  of  human  kin- 
ship, communion,  and  cooperation  with  God. 
In  one  form  or  another,  explicitly  or  implicitly, 
logically  or  illogically,  these  three  ideas  have 
always  accompanied  religion,  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent.  Indeed,  they  seem  to  be  essentially 
bound  up  with  it. 

In  considering  the  religious  conception  of 
hiiisliip  with  God,  we  must  distinguish  be- 
tween the  "  theanthropic  "  and  the  "  theo- 
cratic "  tendencies  of  religions.  The  former 
tendency  emphasizes  the  idea  of  a  natural  kin- 
ship between  man  and  God;  the  belief  that 
"  God  created  man  in  his  own  image,  in  the 
image  of  God  created  He  him."     Upon  the 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  207 

basis  of  this  presupposition,  religion  is  merely 
coming  into  one's  own,  a  growing  up  into  "  the 
measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fulness  "  of  the 
divine  life  already  sown  in  the  soul.  This  is 
religion  of  the  "  once-born  "  type.  The  latter 
tendency,  however,  (namely,  the  "theocratic") 
emphasizes  the  "  natural  enmity "  between 
man  and  God.  With  Paul  it  pits  the  "  natural 
man  "  against  the  "  spiritual  man  "  in  an  in- 
tense struggle  which  can  only  be  ended  by 
divine  intervention  of  a  drastic  sort.  Here 
kinship,  if  it  comes  at  all,  is  acquired,  or  rather, 
it  is  imparted  by  the  bestowal  of  supernatural 
grace  and  power  in  a  marked  way.  We  must 
note,  however,  that  even  here  there  is  a  recog- 
nition of  implicit  kinship  in  the  assumption 
that  humanity  is  capable  of  "  receiving  the 
Spirit."  The  difference  between  these  two 
types  of  religion  is  one  of  emphasis  and  of  in- 
terpretation, due  to  varying  types  of  per- 
sonality, with  consequent  differences  in  the 
nature  and  processes  of  religious  experience. 
There  is  no  abysmal  cleft  between  the  two  and 
neither  should  be  looked  upon  as  exhausting 
the  possibilities  of  religious  truth  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  opposing  type.     Both  have  made 


208  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

large  contributions  to  the  religious  advance  of 
humanity  and  will  doubtless  continue  to  do  so. 

Now  Bergson's  doctrine  of  freedom  looks  in 
both  directions  and  affords  a  fair  basis  for  both 
these  varieties  of  religious  experience.  The 
soul  of  man,  the  only  truly  free  thing  on  earth, 
is  of  the  same  stuflp  as  the  Vital  Impetus  itself ; 
comes  from  it ;  is,  indeed,  in  a  sense  part  of  it, 
and  shares  its  native  freedom  and  creative 
power.  This  is  a  spiritual  kinship  of  the  most 
intimate  kind,  seeming  to  need  scant,  if  any, 
elaboration  in  order  to  become  the  religious 
conception  of  a  natural,  spiritual  relationship 
between  man  and  God.  In  fact,  the  kinship 
may  be  carried  still  further,  too  far  for  some. 
Man  and  God  are  alike  in  the  fact  of  limitation 
as  well  as  in  the  fact  of  freedom  and  power; 
but  of  course  not  by  any  means  alike  in  the 
degree  of  either  power  or  limitation.  A  great 
difference  between  man  and  God  remains.  If 
not,  it  would  be  idle  to  speak  of  any  compati- 
bility between  Bergsonism  and  religion.  But 
this  difference  is  not  one  of  kind,  but  of  de- 
gree of  freedom,  creative  power,  and  spirit- 
uality.   Thus  the  fact  of  kinship  is  clear. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  Bergson  holds  that, 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  '209 

due  to  matter  and  the  development  of  human 
intellect  towards  supremacy  over  matter,  man 
has  had  his  soul  increasingly  bent  towards  mat- 
ter, towards  inertness  and  materiality.  As  a 
consequence,  it  is  hard  to  live  on  the  spiritual 
side  of  our  nature.  It  takes  a  wrench,  a  right- 
about-face, a  plunge  into  the  interior  of  our 
true  being  away  from  superficiality,  determin- 
ism and  lifelessness.  According  to  Bergson, 
life,  in  order  to  be  truly  life,  must  be  for  most 
of  us,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  a  fierce 
struggle  between  the  "  natural  man  "  and  the 
"  spiritual  man."  In  short,  our  author  pre- 
sents us  with  a  philosophical  basis  for  "  theo- 
cratic "  as  well  as  for  "  theanthropic  "  interpre- 
tations of  religion,  for  the  "  twice-born  "  type 
as  well  as  for  the  "  once-born  "  type.  Both 
may  be  retained  and  sanctioned  as  legitimate. 
There  is  great  value  in  this.  Representatives 
of  the  two  types  have  tended  towards  mutual 
exclusiveness,  suspecting  the  reality  or  scorn- 
ing the  value  of  a  religious  experience  vary- 
ing from  the  form  acceptable  to  them.  Each 
has  insisted  that  all  should  be  saved  in  his  way 
or  not  at  all.  "  Orthodoxy  is  '  my  doxy  '  and 
heterodoxy  is  '  your  doxy.'  "    In  this  particu- 


210  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

lar  instance  Bergson  makes  for  an  intelligent 
"  live-and-let-live "  attitude,  but  not  neces- 
sarily for  an  indifferent  tolerance.  According 
to  his  view  it  is  a  matter  of  life,  not  of  toler- 
ance merely.  There  should  be  regard  for  per- 
sonality, individuality,  "  varieties  of  religious 
experience,"  but  at  the  same  time  this  defer- 
ence would  have  necessary  limits  due  to  the  in- 
tense longing  of  the  soul  for  a  spiritual  result. 

Unless  we  wish  to  divest  the  word  religion 
of  all  distinctive  meaning,  we  must  hold  that 
its  essential  characteristic,  at  least  in  its  higher 
forms,  is  a  spiritual  communion  between  per- 
sons. However  difficult  it  may  be  to  conceive 
personality  in  God,  and  however  divine  per- 
sonality may  be  interpreted,  crudely  or  more 
philosophically,  it  is  a  plain  fact  that  historic 
religious  experience  has  always  rested  upon  a 
belief  in  the  reality  of  a  personal  communica- 
tion between  God  and  man.  To  reduce  reli- 
gion to  anything  less,  or  to  transform  it  into 
anything  else,  is  to  reduce  it  to  nothing  or  to 
transform  it  away.  Religion  may  include  the 
sense  of  unity,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  usually 
does,  but  it  is  not  merely  a  sense  of  unity.    It 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  211 

may  include  the  good  and  the  beautiful — often 
it  has  not  done  so — but  it  is  not  merely  the 
recognition  of  ideal  good  and  beauty.  To  say 
that  it  is  the  recognition  of  values,  as  Hoffding 
does,  is  to  confuse  the  fact  rather  than  to  de- 
scribe it.  Such  a  conception  would  eliminate 
the  very  center  from  which,  according  to  the 
religious  man's  own  experience,  all  value  flows. 
It  is  another  doctrine  of  Bergson — the 
doctrine  of  intuition — which  touches  most 
closely  the  phenomenon  of  religious  commun- 
ion. In  fact,  Bergsonian  intuition  is  as  nearly 
a  counterpart  of  this  fundamental  religious  act 
as  anything  purely  philosophical  could  be. 
But  the  doctrine  of  freedom  is  closely  con- 
nected with  it  also.  Without  freedom  as  a 
postulate  it  would  be  impossible  to  argue  in 
behalf  of  intuition,  as  Bergson  understands 
that  word.  In  like  manner,  freedom  is  the 
necessary  postulate  of  religious  communion. 
All  true  social  relationships  of  an  inward  na- 
ture are  based  on  freedom.  No  inward  rela- 
tionship is  possible  between  a  man  and  a  stone, 
even  when  poetic  imagination  is  most  at  work. 
Indeed,  in  the  approximative  social  relation- 
ships, namely,  between  man  and  the  higher 


212  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

animals  in  whom,  to  be  sure,  we  do  find  a  rela- 
tive degree  of  freedom,  a  great  deal  of  the 
social  result — though  not  all,  by  any  means — 
is  due  to  the  poetic  transference  to  the  animal 
of  human  motives  and  thoughts.  Bergson  him- 
self has  pointed  out  ^°  that  our  sense  of  the 
comic  in  animals  is  due  largely  to  this  en- 
dowment of  human  qualities  which  we  bestow 
upon  them. 

It  is  in  our  human  relationships  alone  that 
we  may  truly  speak  of  "  soul  knit  to  soul,"  and 
this  soul  union  can  take  place  only  in  the  at- 
mosphere of  freedom.  We  have  all  observed 
the  fruitlessness  of  the  effort  of  those  who  force 
their  attentions  on  others,  and  cases  of  ap- 
parent success  are  due  to  the  admixture  of 
elements  other  than  that  of  mere  persistent 
pressure.  The  substitution  of  compulsion  for 
free  choice  has  strewn  the  world  with  the 
wreckage  of  individuals,  organizations,  and 
states.  The  life  of  friendship  and  of  love  is 
one  of  free  choice.  We  cannot  force  it  or 
compel  it.  It  comes,  or  it  does  not  come.  It  is 
born  in  spontaneity  or  not  at  all,  and  the  very 
cradle  of  this  spontaneity  is  freedom. 

^^  Cf.  his  "  Essay  on  Laughter." 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  213 

What  is  true  of  human  relationships  is  pre- 
eminently true  also  of  the  relationship  between 
man  and  God.  It  is  signifieant  for  religion, 
therefore,  that  more  than  any  other  philoso- 
pher, Bergson  insists  on  freedom  as  funda- 
mental. God  is  a  free,  creative  Being  sending 
out  His  streams  of  free  life  into  the  universe. 
INIan's  soul  is  a  "  tiny  rill  "  from  this  great 
wave ;  not  wholly  free,  as  we  have  seen,  but  free 
nevertheless.  These  two,  God  and  man,  arc 
the  only  existences  in  which  even  an  appre- 
ciable amount  of  freedom  is  observable.  Hence 
it  is  only  between  man  and  man,  and  between 
man  and  God,  that  communion  can  take  place ; 
and  this  is  so  because  of  the  fact  of  freedom. 
Besides,  this  very  freedom  tends  to  establish 
communion.  In  fact,  Bergson's  idea  of  evolu- 
tion is  that  of  a  spiritual  development  in  which 
there  is  increasingly  free  interaction  between 
the  Vital  Impetus  and  those  individual  off- 
shoots from  it  which  constitute  our  human  per- 
sonalities. Now  it  is  in  this  very  freedom  of 
communion — alike  religious,  between  God  and 
man,  and  ethical,  between  man  and  man — that 
the  heart  of  religion  is  centered.  Other  things 
being  equal,  therefore,  a  philosophy  which  in- 


214  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

sists  on  the  fact  of  freedom  and,  indeed,  makes 
it  central,  is  in  so  far  favorable  both  to  re- 
ligious and  to  ethical  development. 

The  kind  and  degree  of  cooperation  between 
man  and  God,  taught  and  practised  in  any  given 
religion,  depends  upon  the  kind  and  degree  of 
freedom  it  postulates.  All  religion  seems  to  im- 
ply a  certain  amount  of  cooperation.  No  matter 
how  much  may  be  ascribed  to  God,  man  must 
do  something,  or  there  is  no  religion.  Even 
in  the  "  nature  religions  "  of  primitive  times, 
whose  adherents  were  born  into  the  religious 
relationship  as  into  the  tribe,  and  thought  of 
it  as  a  relationship  of  physical  necessity,  the 
devotee  had  to  cooperate  with  his  inescapable 
master,  or  suffer ;  and  in  Islam,  fatalistic  though 
it  be,  the  thought  of  human  cooperation  is  not 
absent.  In  some  religions  it  may  be  present 
by  virtue  of  a  lack  of  logic,  but  present  it  al- 
ways is,  more  or  less.  In  the  higher  forms  of 
religion,  the  element  of  cooperation  is  always 
prominent.  Sectarian  differences  may  produce 
variation  in  the  kind  and  amount  of  the  em- 
phasis, but  they  do  not  eliminate  it.  Predes- 
tinarian  Calvinism,  for  instance,  has  exercised 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  215 

a  tremendous  social  influence  through  its  spirit 
of  cooperative  responsibility  as,  for  example, 
in  its  relation  to  the  rise  of  industrialism  and 
capitalism. 

Now  freedom  may  indeed  be  so  conceived 
as  to  destroy  the  thought  and  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion, but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  possible 
to  conceive  of  any  real  cooperation,  much  less 
to  actualize  it,  without  presupposing  freedom. 
Cooperation  is  not  mere  physical  togetherness. 
The  latter  may  be  due  entirely  to  compulsion, 
or  to  mere  chance.    Cooperation  is  a  together- 
ness of  spirit  in  effort,  and  results  only  from 
the  free  choice  of  two  or  more  beings  who 
may    or    may    not    make    that    choice.      The 
meaning    and    value    of    cooperation    lies    in 
this    very    thing,    that    men    wish    to    work 
together  and  do  work  together — with  God,  or 
with  their  fellows — though  they  need  not.    It 
is  hard  to  think  of  anything  worthy  the  name 
of  religion  which  does  not  include  this  char- 
acteristic.    Certainly  we  may  not  take   this 
feature  out  of  the  Christian  religion  and  ex- 
pect to  find  the  latter  recognizable.     Christ 
taught  his  disciples  to  do  this  or  that,  "  that  ye 
may  be  the  sons  of  your  Father  which  is  in 


216  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Heaven."  The  essential  difference  between 
the  "  sheep  "  and  the  "  goats,"  in  the  famous 
parable,  lay  precisely  in  this,  that  the  "  sheep  " 
cooperated  and  the  "goats"  did  not.  The 
apostle  Paul  continually  urges  his  hearers  to 
become  "  co-workers  with  God."  In!  short, 
Christianity's  preeminent  claim  to  superiority 
has  been  its  inherent  tendency  towards  coope- 
r..tion,  with  the  beneficent  social  and  individual 
results  which  issue  therefrom. 

Bergson's  philosophy  might  as  fairly  be 
called  "  The  Philosophy  of  Freedom  "  as  "  The 
Philosophy  of  Change."  Certainly  freedom 
is  one  of  its  foundation  stones.  But  freedom 
is  also  the  essential  foundation  of  true  coopera- 
tion which,  in  turn,  as  we  have  seen,  is  in  the 
very  center  of  the  religious  structure  itself,  es- 
pecially in  the  case  of  the  higher  religions. 
The  direct  and  essential  relation  of  this  Berg- 
sonian  doctrine  to  the  welfare  of  religion  and 
to  the  progress  of  morality,  is  evident.  In  fact, 
the  whole  Bergsonian  theory  makes  the  rela- 
tion of  action  to  development  very  close  and 
fundamental.  In  spite  of  his  tendency  towards 
mysticism,  or  rather,  because  of  the  special  way 
in  which  he  conceives  the  more  or  less  mystical 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  217 

act  of  intuition,  Bergson  may  he  said  to  teach 
that  we  must  do  in  order  to  be.  Indeed  he 
holds  that  we  most  truly  exercise  the  special 
birthright  of  our  being  in  a  certain  kind  of  act, 
namely  the  act  in  which  our  whole  personality 
finds  expression — the  free  act  par  ejccellence. 

In  addition  to  these  three  ideas  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  find  a  favoring  basis  in  Berg- 
son's  emphasis  on  freedom,  there  are  several 
other  religious  values  which  suggest  them- 
selves. The  very  idea  of  freedom  itself  finds 
a  ready  response  in  the  heart  of  the  truly  re- 
ligious. Politicians,  and  all  guardians  of 
"  things  as  they  are,"  have  always  reckoned 
with  and  feared  religious  sentiment  because 
it  has  always  displayed  a  notorious  willingness 
to  break  out  against  "  things  as  they  are  "  for 
the  sake  of  "  things  as  they  ought  to  be."  Like 
mankind  at  war,  religion  has  often  developed  a 
free  carelessness  regarding  the  existing  order. 
The  defects  of  this  quality  should  not  blind  us. 
When  a  man,  a  race,  or  a  religion  loses  the 
power  or  the  desire  to  push  through  existing 
opposition,  then  life  itself  departs.  Bergson's 
idea  of  freedom  does  not  frown  upon  the  legiti- 


218  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

macy  of  such  profound  and  fundamentally 
non-rational  uprisings.  Some  think  that  the 
chief  weakness  of  the  philosophy  lies  in  the  pos- 
sible encouragement  it  may  give  to  this  very 
kind  of  action. 

We  need  not  here  discuss  the  relative  value 
to  human  progress  of  emotional  movements 
on  the  one  hand,  and  rational  guidance  on 
the  other  hand.  I  merely  wish  to  point  out  that 
a  religious  freedom  molded  on  Bergsonian 
lines  would  not  be,  and  could  not  be,  mere 
caprice.  His  conception  of  human  freedom  is 
very  far  from  that  of  wilfulness  or  capricious- 
ness.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  neither  complete 
nor  continuous,  even  in  the  best  of  us.  In  fact, 
moments  of  real  freedom  are  rare.  We  are 
most  of  the  time  in  the  grip  of  forces  which  we 
can  not  change  or  control.  We  live  for  the 
most  part  on  the  superficial  plane  of  habit  and 
we  are  bound  by  external  realities  which  we 
can  not  ignore.  Great  emotional  crises  in  in- 
dividuals, fateful  emotional  movements  among 
men,  can  only  be  occasional.  They  are  indeed 
very  rare.  But  rare  though  they  be,  are  they 
not  capricious  and  harmful  when  they  do  come  ? 
And  does  not  Bergson's  theory  legitimatize 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  219 

this  harmful  element  in  life?  \Vilful  action 
is  doubtless  afforded  favorable  opportunity  by 
such  great  upheavals  but,  on  the  contrary,  his- 
tory shows  tliat  the  best  we  have  has  often  come 
in  this  way.  It  is  as  if  men,  individually  or 
as  a  race,  had  taken  unconscious  counsel  with 
their  deeper  selves  and  had  risen  in  the  might 
of  the  resultant  conviction  to  heights  other- 
wise unattainable.  Whether  this  be  true  of  all 
movements  of  this  kind,  it  is  certainly  very 
largely  true  of  many  of  them,  especially  those 
of  a  religious  natin*e. 

To  say  that  Bergson's  doctrine  of  freedom 
legitimatizes  these  movements  is,  therefore,  not 
tantamount  to  saying  that  it  fosters  caprice 
and  license.  Its  emphasis  is  rather  upon  the 
fact  and  right  of  such  deep-going  and  far- 
reaching  spiritual  forces,  the  guerdon  of  whose 
freedom  is  the  very  human  progress  we  all  ac- 
claim. Certainly  religion  can  not  but  wel- 
come as  favorable  a  philosoj^hic  idea  so  gen- 
erous tow^ards  its  greatest  moments.  It  is  only 
the  timidly  conventional,  or  the  selfish  up- 
holders of  "  things  as  they  are,"  who  should 
be  troubled  by  this  kinship.  In  their  foolish 
wisdom  they  try  either  to  discredit  religion 


220  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

per  se,  or  so  to  emasculate  it  as  to  render  it 
harmless  and  unfruitful.  Bergson's  theory  of 
freedom  would  do  neither,  and  that  is  why 
many  do  not  relish  it. 

But  there  is,  I  think,  still  more  to  be  said. 
Freedom  has  always  been  conceived  by  religion- 
ists as  freedom  through  subjection,  as,  for  in- 
stance, in  Paul's  epistle  to  the  Galatians  which 
is,  of  course,  our  classic  source  regarding  "  the 
freedom  of  the  Christian  man."  Now  Paul 
was  charged  by  his  opponents  with  exerting 
just  the  sort  of  immoral  and  destructive  influ- 
ence whose  shadow  has  just  been  flitting  across 
our  apprehensive  minds — the  immorality  and 
destructiveness  of  unrestrained  freedom.  But 
Paul  justifies  by  its  fruits  the  freedom  he  has 
been  inculcating,  characterizes  it  as  the  free- 
dom of  subjection  to  the  spirit  of  Christ,  and 
urges  his  followers  to  "  stand  fast  in  the  liberty 
wherewith  Christ  hath  made  them  free."  It  is, 
indeed,  characteristic  of  religious  freedom 
that  it  is  a  freedom  of  voluntary  subjec- 
tion to  a  Higher  Power  who  enters  into 
inward  and  vitalizing  relations  with  the 
worshiper. 

Now,  the  moral  caliber  of  the  freedom  will 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  221 

depend  entirely  upon  the  moral  character  of 
this  power.  Bergson,  of  course,  does  not  carry 
his  discussion  into  this  field  and  we  are  there- 
fore dependent  upon  reasonable  inference 
from  what  he  does  say.  But  the  nature  of  free- 
dom and  the  process  accompanying  the  free 
act,  according  to  his  account,  are  strikingly 
parallel  to  the  nature  and  process  of  religious 
freedom  as  just  described.  There  is  the  same 
plunge  into  the  depths  of  the  inner  life,  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  outward  and  the  superficial 
to  the  inward  and  the  fundamental;  there  is 
the  intuitive  act,  by  which  the  life  of  reality 
itself — the  Vital  Impetus — pours  into  the  soul 
with  all  its  own  freedom;  there  is  the  same 
resolution  of  difficulties,  the  overcoming  of 
obstacles,  and  the  freedom  of  oneness  with 
reality — an  inner  and  an  outer  harmony.  As 
in  religion,  so  here  the  moral  content  of  the 
freedom  depends  upon  the  moral  content  of 
the  inpouring  reality  itself.  Bergson  has  said 
that  we  can  note  the  direction  of  the  tendency 
we  call  life — the  Vital  Impetus — by  studying 
its  past  results.  How  else  has  religion  come 
to  appreciate  the  moral  character  of  its  God? 
The  Bergsonian  doctrine  of  freedom,  there- 


22a  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

fore,  is  not  necessarily  divorced  from  the  so- 
called  restraints  of  morality.  Unless  the  Vital 
Impetus  is  immoral,  or  a-moral — and  we  have 
reason  to  think  that,  in  Bergson's  idea,  it  is 
neither — we  need  not  especially  fear  the  influ- 
ence of  Bergsonian  freedom.  Certainly  reli- 
gion need  not  fear  it. 

Bergson's  doctrine  of  freedom  also  affords 
interesting  parallels  to  the  religious  doctrine  of 
conversion.  To  my  mind,  conversion  is  a  fun- 
damental element  of  religion.  I  do  not  mean 
to  identify  the  word  merely  with  those  ex- 
tremes of  emotional  reaction  which  embody  ob- 
jectionable  and  un-religious  features.  Still, 
for  one  of  a  strong,  decided  nature,  whose  life 
has  been  proceeding  rapidly  and  energetically 
in  an  immoral  direction,  a  change  is  apt  to  be 
just  as  rapid  and  just  as  decided,  a  "  right- 
about-face," if  change  comes  at  all.  But  even 
in  the  "  decent "  man,  whose  life,  in  spite  of 
its  decency,  has  been  supremely  selfish,  a  real- 
ization of  a  soul-hardened  state  may  produce, 
and  has  produced,  a  great  emotional  reaction 
with  a  sudden  change  of  life-direction.  More 
difiicult  to  observe,  but  none  the  less  real,  are 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  223 

the  innumerable  little  "  conversions "  which 
mark  the  life  e\'en  of  those  whose  general  trend 
is  upward.  In  what,  pray,  does  this  upward 
trend  consist,  if  not  in  turning  the  hack  upon 
the  lower  motives  which  tempt  or  win  us,  and 
in  turning  the  face  towards  the  opposite  mo- 
tives and  ideals?  The  fact  of  conversion,  then, 
is,  I  hold,  fundamental  to  all  religious  life  of 
a  higher  sort. 

We  must  consequently  expect  a  philosophy 
to  be  favorable  to  the  phenomena  of  conver- 
sion, if  it  is  to  be  deemed  compatible  with  re- 
ligion. Bergson's  philosophy  is  so,  as  we  have 
already  suggested.  Freedom,  according  to 
Bergson,  is  both  something  achieved  and  some- 
thing which  is  presented  to  us.  It  is  some- 
thing to  be  achieved  in  that  we  must  turn  our 
backs  upon  the  indolence,  inertness,  and  ma- 
teriality which  shadow  our  life.  If  I  may  em- 
ploy religious  language,  we  must  "  become 
sons  of  God  "  by  a  deliberate  act  of  the  will. 
No  easy  sliding  from  stage  to  stage,  by  an 
unconscious  or  semi-unconscious  process. 
Heroism,  rather,  is  demanded. 

To  quote  Bergson's  own  words :  '^ 

"  Bergson,  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp.  169-170. 


^M  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

Moreover  we  will  grant  to  determinism  that  we 
often  resign  our  freedom  in  more  serious  circum- 
stances, and  that,  by  sluggishness  or  indolence,  we 
allow  this  same  local  process  to  run  its  course  when 
our  whole  personality  ought,  so  to  speak,  to  vibrate. 
When  our  most  trustworthy  friends  agree  in  advis- 
ing us  to  take  some  important  step,  the  sentiments 
which  they  utter  with  so  much  insistence  lodge  on  the 
surface  of  our  ego  and  there  get  solidified  in  the 
same  way  as  the  ideas  of  which  we  spoke  just  now. 
Little  by  little  they  will  form  a  thick  crust  which 
will  cover  up  our  own  sentiments ;  we  shall  believe 
that  we  are  acting  freely,  and  it  is  only  by  looking 
back  to  the  past,  later  on,  that  we  shall  see  how  much 
we  were  mistaken. 

But  then,  at  the  very  minute  when  the  act  is  going 
to  be  performed,  something  may  revolt  against  it. 
It  is  the  deep-seated  self  rushing  up  to  the  surface. 
It  is  the  outer  crust  bursting,  suddenly  giving  way 
to  an  irresistible  thrust.  Hence  in  the  depths  of  the 
self,  below  this  most  reasonable  pondering  over  most 
reasonable  pieces  of  advice,  something  else  was  go- 
ing on — a  gradual  heating  and  a  sudden  boiling  over 
of  feelings  and  ideas,  not  unperceived,  but  rather  un- 
noticed. If  we  turn  back  to  them  and  carefully 
scrutinize  our  memory,  we  shall  see  that  we  had  our- 
selves shaped  these  ideas,  ourselves  lived  these  feel- 
ings, but  that,  through  some  strange  reluctance  to 
exercise  our  will,  we  had  thrust  them  back  into  the 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  225 

darkest  depths  of  our  soul  whenever  they  came  up 
to  the  surface. 

This  very  quotation  also  shows  that,  in  a 
sense  perhaps  even  more  fundamental  than 
that  of  achievement,  freedom  is  sometliing 
which  is  presented  to  us — a  gift  from  without, 
or  "  from  above."  Certainly,  according  to 
Bergson,  the  ultimate  source  of  our  ability  to 
aim  for  and  to  achieve  freedom  is  outside  our- 
selves. It  is  the  Vital  Impetus,  coming  into  us 
and  urging  us  on.  And,  when  freedom  is 
achieved  in  any  instance,  it  is  merely  that  we 
have  merged  our  life  more  completely  in  the 
Vital  Impetus ;  we  have  captured  more  of  it  for 
our  very  own.  For  this  very  freedom  itself 
means,  sharing  in  the  creative  power  of  the 
great  Source  of  life.  May  we  not  call  it  God? 
Also,  the  path  to  this  freedom  is  a  turning  from 
the  lower  to  the  higher  self  or,  as  Bergson  pre- 
fers to  put  it,  a  plunge  from  the  superficial  self 
down  into  the  deeper  self,  by  intuition.  In 
the  Pauline  sense  of  the  word,  this  is  an  act 
of  vital  "  faith  " — not  merely  faith  in  one's 
self  but  faith  in  the  Source  of  life  also. 


226  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

But  we  may  go  a  step  farther  and  find  still 
another  interesting  parallel.  From  one  point 
of  view,  salvation  is  the  be-all  and  end-all  of 
religion.  Whether  it  be  thought  of  as  an 
escape  from  something  evil  or  as  the  bestowal 
of  something  good,  or  both,  salvation  is  the 
heart-cry  of  religion.  "  The  harvest  is  past, 
the  summer  is  ended,  and  we  are  not  saved," 
cries  the  discouraged  believer.  That  is,  the 
main  object  of  his  religion  has  not  yet  been 
attained.  We  need  not  discuss  the  variety  of 
detail  embroidered  upon  this  conception  in  the 
course  of  religious  history.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  the  general  tendency  has  been  to  represent 
salvation  as  a  matter  both  of  the  present  life 
and  of  the  beyond,  the  latter  emphasis  usually 
predominating.  But  what  interests  us  now  is 
that,  in  either  case,  in  some  way  or  other,  sal- 
vation has  always  meant  joy  and  freedom 
through  union  with,  or  subjection  to,  God,  the 
Source  of  all  joy  and  freedom. 

According  to  Bergson,  the  goal  of  evolution 
is  freedom,  achieved,  though  only  partially 
achieved  as  yet,  in  man  alone.  This  freedom 
is  the  very  life  of  the  Final  Reality  itself — 
the  Vital  Impulse — for  which  Bergson  himself 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  227 

does  not  hesitate  occasionally  to  use  the  word 
God,  though  not  in  a  specifically  religious 
sense,  of  course.  In  other  words,  the  goal  of 
life  is  the  freedom  of  glad  creativeness,  a  free- 
dom from  the  bondage  of  the  inert,  through 
union  with  and,  may  we  not  fairly  say,  sub- 
jection to  the  Source  of  life.  As  has  been  said, 
this  goal  has  been  attained  by  man,  but  only 
in  part  and  rarely.  But  the  whole  philosophy 
of  "  Creative  Evolution  "  breathes  the  hope 
and  expectation  of  more — more  freedom,  more 
life,  a  glorious  future.  Indeed,  in  personal 
conversation  and  in  occasional  writings  and  ad- 
dresses, Bergson  has  given  definite  expression 
to  an  open-mindedness,  not  to  say  a  hope,  re- 
garding life  after  death,  and  even  in  his  more 
formal  writings  he  has  gone  out  of  his  way  to 
give  an  occasional  hint  in  that  direction. 

Here  again,  as  elsewhere,  the  concrete  com- 
patibility of  these  ideas  and  suggestions  with, 
for  instance,  the  Christian  idea  of  salvation, 
depends  upon  the  character  that  may  be  as- 
signed to  the  Vital  Impetus — the  ground  of 
these  facts  and  hopes.  Bergson  has  declared 
that  we  may  understand  the  Vital  Impetus, 
and  trace  its  tendency  hitherto,  by  means  of 


BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  facts  of  life  itself.  In  addition  to  this,  cer- 
tain definite  statements  assure  us  that  his  con- 
ception of  it  is  not  divorced  from  the  moral  and 
spiritual  development  of  mankind.  If  this  be 
so,  it  would  be  quite  possible,  within  the  sphere 
of  Bergson's  influence,  to  maintain  a  highly 
ethical  and  spiritual  doctrine  of  salvation.  In 
certain  ways,  in  fact,  the  Bergsonian  teaching 
would  stimulate  such  a  doctrine.  Bergson's 
influence  would  certainly  be  against  any  doc- 
trine of  salvation  which  consisted  in  "  World- 
Flight  "  merely.  The  "  world  "  is  not  to  be 
ignored.  It  cannot  be.  In  fact,  it  is  good,  for 
it  is  a  necessary  element  in  the  achievement  of 
the  goal.  Matter  is  indeed  an  enemy,  but  it  is 
also  a  challenge;  and  the  "world"  is  to  be 
transcended,  not  ignored  or  escaped.  In 
other  words,  while  purely  mystic  religions  of 
contemplation  may  find  much  sympathy  in 
Bergson,  legal  religions  will  find  none ;  and,  in 
this  particular  at  least,  Bergsonism  will  favor 
that  union  of  mysticism  and  active  participa- 
tion in  the  world  as  it  is,  which  is  so  marked 
a  characteristic  of  Christianity. 

A  Bergsonian  could  consistently  conceive  of 
salvation  as  a  continual  growth  in  spiritual 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  229 

life — a  life  beginning  in  this  world,  hut  con- 
tinuing in  "  the  next  world."  Whether  death 
would  mean  the  entire  elimination  of  bodily 
factors,  or  merely  a  change  in  their  form 
(either  would  be  possible,  on  this  basis),  it 
would  still  be  an  incident  of  life,  and  not  life's 
necessary  terminus.  No  abyss  would  separate 
the  sphere  of  salvation  here  from  the  sphere  be- 
yond. They  would  remain  morally  and  spirit- 
ually continuous.  The  Bergsonian  philosophy 
would  not  only  sanction  such  a  doctrine  as  this ; 
it  would  seem  actively  to  suggest  it. 

One  feature  of  Christianity  which  is  an  im- 
portant element  in  its  superiority,  is  the  value 
which  it  places  upon  the  individual,  and  the 
consequent  sense  of  personal  worth  which  it 
thus  arouses.  Religions  that  tend  towards 
pantheism,  whose  goal  is  absorjDtion  in  the  In- 
finite, lack  this  energetic  and  valuable  factor; 
and  even  the  legal  religions,  such  as  Judaism 
and  Islam,  which  do  indeed  stimulate  per- 
sonal activity  of  a  sort,  tend  to  lessen  in- 
dividuality by  subjecting  it  to  external  rules. 
Judaism,  of  course,  possesses  powerful  coun- 
ter-forces, inherited  from  Hebrew  Prophetism, 


230  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

which  offset  this  tendency,  but  Islam,  on  the 
other  hand,  suffers  even  further  in  this  direc- 
tion because  of  its  thorough-going  fatalism. 
A  sense  of  personal  worth  is  essential  to  the 
development  of  the  highest  life,  and  is  often 
essential  to  life  itself ;  it  is  also  essential  to  the 
development  of  the  highest  type  of  religious 
experience.  However  we  may  explain  it,  this 
quality  is  found  in  Christianity  above  all  other 
religions. 

Bergson's  doctrine  of  freedom  is  quite  in 
line  with  this  phase  of  Christian  emphasis. 
The  increasing  freedom,  in  the  development  of 
organic  life,  through  vegetative  torpor  and  the 
lower  animals  to  the  higher,  wide-ranging  ani- 
mals, results  in  greater  and  greater  individua- 
tion. In  man  individuality  is  most  marked 
and,  in  a  new  sense,  it  may  again  be  said  that 
man  is  the  center  of  the  universe.  He  alone 
can  achieve  inner  freedom,  and  that  triumph 
of  personality  elevates  him  to  genuine  fellow- 
ship with  the  reality  of  the  universe,  in  whose 
creative  power  he  shares.  What  he  does,  as  a 
free  man,  counts — eternally  counts — and, 
waiving  for  the  moment  all  thought  of  a  pos- 
sible future  existence,  even  if  his  personal  ac- 


INDIVIDUAL  FREEDOM  231 

tivity  is  limited  to  this  life  alone,  he  must  have 
a  sense  of  its  eternal  significance  and  of  his 
own  permanent  value  as  an  active  and  self- 
determining  participator  in  the  destiny  of  the 
universe.  A  philosophy  which  did  not  sup- 
port this  feeling  of  personal  worth  might  be 
compatible  with  certain  religions,  but  it  would 
surely  not  be  compatible  with  Christianity. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  philosophy  in  which  this 
sense  of  individuality  and  of  personal  value  is 
inherent,  would  seem  in  so  far  to  be  more 
compatible  with  Christianity  than  with  any 
other  religion.  "  Bergson  holds  the  essentially 
Christian  view  that  man  is  the  chief  concern  of 
God.  '  I  see  in  the  whole  evolution  of  life  on 
our  planet  an  effort  to  arrive  ...  at  some- 
thing which  is  only  realized  in  man.'  "  " 

Finally,  there  are  several  by-products  of 
Bergson's  doctrine  of  freedom  which  we  should 
note.  In  the  first  place,  without  real  freedom 
there  can  be  no  real  morality.  "  The  essence 
of  morality  is  in  deciding  new  issues  for  which 
we  have  no  past  to  guide  us — the  vanguard  of 

"  Cf.  article  on  Bergson  in  Current  Literature,  February, 
1912. 


232  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  development  of  the  moral  code."  ^* 
"  Morality  is  a  voluntary  rise  to  a  higher  level 
...  a  new,  original,  creative,  unprecedented 
act."  ^*  Physical  duress  changes  the  legal 
status  of  an  act.  Duress  of  any  sort,  inward  or 
outward,  not  only  changes  the  moral  status  of 
an  act.  It  abolishes  it.  They  who  are  afraid 
of  such  doctrines  as  those  of  Bergson  need  to 
be  reminded  that  the  very  values  for  whose 
existence  they  fear  have  been  created  by  free- 
dom and  are  maintained  by  it.  "  Safety  zones  " 
may  do  for  momentary  stopping  places  e7i 
route,  but  one  must  leave  the  "  zone  "  to  get 
across  the  street  in  either  direction,  else  night 
will  fall  and  one  will  remain  under  its  shadow 
and  that  of  a  policeman. 

In  the  fight  for  freedom  Bergson  gives  us  a 
"  moral  equivalent  for  war."  Matter  is  our 
enemy  and  we  must  overcome  it.  We  can, 
therefore  we  must.  Some  do,  therefore  others 
try  to  follow  them.  We  may  become  the  mas- 
ters of  our  fate,  the  "  captains  of  our  souls," 
hence  we  are  responsible  and  ethical  beings. 
Both  growth  and  deterioration  are  possible. 

"  L.  P.  Jacks,  The  Alchemy  of  Thought. 
"  L.  P.  Jacks,  quoted  by  E.  E.  Slosson,  in  the  Independent, 
June  8,  1911. 


INDHIDUAL  FREEDOM  233 

If  it  is  not  the  one,  then  it  will  be  the  other. 
There  is  no  neutral  territory  in  this  war.  It 
is  either  conquer  or  be  conquered.  "  He  that 
is  not  with  me  is  against  me,"  cries  the  Vital 
Impetus.  This  call  to  join  in  the  creative 
work  of  the  world  admits  of  no  parleying,  no 
dallying.  One  must  decide  to  go  in  on  one 
side  or  the  other.  The  issue  is  so  sharp  and  so 
tremendous  that  it  stirs  the  blood,  rouses  sleep- 
ing forces,  and  furnishes  all  the  essential  ele- 
ments of  progress  and  self-development — in- 
terest, attention,  opposition,  struggle,  the  inner 
call  to  the  more  and  the  higher,  the  sense  of 
conquest,  the  realization  of  personal  and  eter- 
nal values.  As  Steenbergen  pictures  it,"  in 
his  excellent  account  of  Bergson's  philosophy, 
"  Freedom  and  spirit  are  all  too  easily  over- 
come by  matter  through  habit.  Xew  life  and 
effort  are  needed  when  thought  becomes  a 
mere  formula.  We  must  preserve  ourselves 
from  automatism.  ]Moral  action  is  limited  by 
the  double  activity  of  spirit,  namely,  concen- 
tration upon  action,  and  self-consciousness  re- 
garding our  true  nature.  We  must  gird  our- 
selves through  attention  to  practical  life  for 

*'  A.  Steenbergen,  Henri  Bergson's  Intuitive  Philosophie. 


234  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

the  sake  of  strength,  and  we  must  also  turn 
away  from  practical  life  to  see  the  way." 

But  this  emphasis  upon  individuality  and 
personal  effort  does  not  carry  with  it  a  crass 
individualism.  In  the  first  place,  Bergson  does 
not  identify  the  experience  of  the  individual 
with  his  passing  consciousness.  The  experi- 
ence of  a  man  is  the  sum  total  of  his  conscious 
experience  wi-apt  up  in  the  unconscious 
memory,  his  soul,  his  character.  But  more 
than  this,  beyond  the  individual  there  are  the 
experiences  of  his  fellowmen  which  are  also 
expressions  of  the  Vital  Impetus,  individual 
"  rills  "  of  experience  of  independent  value. 
Thus  the  "  experience  of  the  race  "  becomes  a 
life  factor  to  be  reckoned  with,  and  room  is 
made  for  social  relations  and  social  values,  and 
for  that  interaction  between  individuals  and 
groups  which  is  so  fundamental  to  all  develop- 
ment, both  social  and  individual.  Levine  says,''* 
"  Bergson  believes  that  mankind  is  tending 
more  and  more  towards  social  ethics  ...  (a) 
social  ethics  based  on  the  principles  of  har- 
monious collective  action  and  social  solidarity." 
This  can  only  mean  that  Bergson  recognizes  a 

"  Louis  Levine,  "  Interview  with  Bergson."  cf.  the  New  York 
Times,  February  22,  1914.. 


INDWIDUAL  FREEDOM  235 

necessary  social  element  in  the  activity  of  the 
Vital  Impulse  itself.  Indeed  we  might  say 
that,  on  this  view,  the  nature  and  workings  of 
the  Vital  Impulse  would  be,  in  certain  re- 
spects, more  evident  and  more  authoritative 
in  social  life  than  in  individual  life.  At 
any  rate,  there  could  be  no  narrow  in- 
dividualism. There  must  be  a  recognition 
of  social  life,  its  arrangements  and  responsi- 
bilities. The  fundamental  responsibility  is 
that  of  spreading  and  increasing  the  life  of 
which  the  Vital  Impulse  is  the  source.  This 
means  a  social  activity  and  a  social  interaction 
out  of  which  new  values  and  new  energies  will 
come — a  free  combination  of  individual  auton- 
omy with  social  responsibility,  ^^^lat  is  this 
but  a  "  Creative  Evolution  "  which  is  essen- 
tially ethical?  Is  not  such  a  fusion  of  individ- 
uality and  subordination  the  very  gist  not  only 
of  morality  but  also  of  all  higher  forms  of  re- 
ligion, and  especially  of  Christianity? 

This  social  emphasis  suggests  a  concluding 
thought  which,  very  fittingly,  leads  us  back 
again  to  religion.  "  True  religion  and  unde- 
filed  "  has  always  been  a  great  leveler.    "  God 


236  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

is  no  respecter  of  persons."  This  is  why  cer- 
tain men  do  not  worship  Him;  or,  if  they  do 
support  religion,  they  try  to  twist  it  and  turn 
it  to  suit  their  own  theories  of  human  nature. 
Religions  generally,  and  Christianity  particu- 
larly and  most  emphatically,  insist  that  all  men 
are  equal  before  God.  There  is,  therefore,  an 
element  of  universality,  sociality,  and  even  of 
democracy,  in  the  very  nature  of  religion. 
The  tendency  of  Bergsonism  to  include  social- 
ity as  well  as  individuality,  points  in  the  same 
direction,  especially  when  we  consider  the 
basis  of  that  tendency.  Its  ground  is  in  the 
Vital  Impetus,  the  source  of  all  life,  before 
which  free  souls  are  equal ;  through  which  and 
because  of  which  they  are  enabled,  are  morally 
obliged  in  fact,  to  enter  into  social  relations 
with  a  full  recognition  of  one  another's  status 
and  value.  While  there  is  no  basis  here  for  in- 
ferring the  elimination  of  all  differences  and 
distinctions,  a  firm  basis  is  given  for  the  re- 
ligious tenet  of  equality  "  in  the  spirit,"  and 
for  the  negation  of  all  narrow  and  selfish  ex- 
clusiveness. 


CHAPTER  VII 
IMMORTALITY 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  the  desire  for 
immortality  and  some  form  of  belief  in  it  are 
universal,  or  well-nigh  universal,  human  traits. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  Dr.  Osier  points  out  in 
his  Ingersoll  lecture,'  one  may  talk  with  many 
today  to  whom  the  future  life  is  a  matter  of 
apparently  complete  indifference,  if  not  of 
actual  agnosticism  or  of  positive  disbelief.  As 
one  observes  the  common  run  of  men  also,  one 
may  note  in  general  a  fixed  course  of  action 
whose  motives  seem  to  spring  out  of  considera- 
tions limited  to  this  life  alone.  "  Getting  and 
begetting  "  explain  most  of  men's  actions,  and 
human  life  in  its  individual,  social,  and  political 
aspects  does  not  seem  to  be  shot  through  with 
any  lively  hope  regarding  what  lies  beyond  the 
grave. 

It  may  indeed  be  true  that  this  undoubted 
fact  is  due  to  causes  that  have  been  operative 

*  William  Osier,  Science  and  Immortality,  Boston,  1901. 
237 


238  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

only  within  recent  years,  and  that  we  have  now 
to  reckon  with  a  phenomenon  which  may  be  but 
a  phase  through  which  human  thought  is  pass- 
ing— a  lack  of  proper  adaptation  to  new  knowl- 
edge. However  that  may  be,  it  is  certain  that 
new  knowledge  has  tended,  even  though  tempo- 
rarily, to  turn  men  away  from  dependence  upon 
a  belief  in  immortality ;  in  fact  it  has  tended  to 
turn  them  towards  disbelief,  or  at  least  towards 
agnosticism.  The  evolutionary  conception  of 
the  universe,  according  to  which  man  appears 
as  an  infinitesimal  speck  upon  a  minor  planet 
which  is  set  in  the  midst  of  an  infinite  number 
of  rolling  spheres  in  a  cosmos  whose  age  and 
size  defy  imagination;  the  modern  biological 
view  of  life,  according  to  which  the  great 
primal  life  energy  brings  forth  a  myriad  of 
passing  forms,  man  among  them,  which,  in 
their  purely  biological  aspect,  seem  to  exist 
only  for  the  continuance  of  that  primal  phys- 
ical force  itself;  the  tendency  among  psychol- 
ogists to  assume  that  the  mind  is  only  a  func- 
tion of  the  brain,  that  all  mental  activity  is  not 
only  accompanied  by  brain  activity  but  is  also 
caused  and  conditioned  by  it — that,  as  Cabanis 
said,  "  The  brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver 


IMMORTALITY  239 

secretes  bile,"  or,  as  Moleschott  said,  "  No 
thought  without  phosphorus  " ;  finally,  our  pre- 
vailing absorption  in  the  task  of  subduing 
physical  nature  to  our  will,  making  it  prac- 
tically profitable  to  us ;  all  these  modern  tend- 
encies have  united  to  dim  the  vision  of  a  future 
life  and  to  make  such  a  life  seem  vague,  un- 
certain, unpractical,  or  unbelievable. 

But  one  may  well  raise  the  question  whether 
even  past  ages  have  treasured  this  faith  with 
the  universality,  pertinacity,  and  conviction  so 
often  ascribed  to  them.  Certainly  it  was  for- 
merly more  easy  than  now  to  pass  from  a  nat- 
ural longing  for  immortality  to  a  belief  in  it, 
but,  to  one  living  in  their  midst,  the  most  pas- 
sionate and  permanent  devotion  of  the  ancients 
would  probably  have  appeared  a  devotion  to 
the  here  and  the  now,  as  that  of  our  contempo- 
raries appears  to  us.  Whatever  their  formal 
faith,  they  attended,  as  we  attend,  to  the  things 
that  are  nearest  and  most  tangible.  Indeed, 
in  certain  striking  instances,  of  recognized  im- 
portance, even  a  formal  faith  seems  to  have 
been  lacking,  or  practically  lacking.  While 
the  early  Hebrews  had  their  Sheol,  they  so 
conceived  it  as  to  make  death  the  end  of  all  that 


240  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

was  worth  while  to  them.  As  a  result  they  be- 
sought Jehovah  for  length  of  days  that  they 
might  have  as  much  blessedness  as  possible  be- 
fore death  came ;  they  treasured  the  gift  of  chil- 
dren, among  other  reasons,  that  they  might 
have  at  least  that  measure  of  increased  con- 
tinuance; they  pictured  a  messianic  kingdom 
whose  blessings  were  purely  temporal  and,  to 
a  considerable  extent  also,  purely  physical. 
The  Buddhist  also,  while  fearing  the  proba- 
bility of  a  succession  of  future  existences,  as- 
serts the  possibility  of  avoiding  a  future  which 
he  dreads,  and  prescribes  a  definite  course  of 
action  to  that  end. 

And  yet,  all  said  and  done,  it  is  still  true 
that  mankind  throughout  the  ages  has  held  and 
treasured  a  belief  in  life  after  death  and  that, 
in  the  main,  it  still  does  so.  The  Chinese  cher- 
ish the  hope  that  they  too  may  some  day  be- 
come worshiped  ancestors,  after  having  so  long 
been  worshiping  descendants.  The  early  He- 
brew conception  of  Sheol,  shadowy  and  un- 
moral as  it  was,  contained  the  germ  of  the 
later  eschatology  of  Judaism,  or  was  at  least 
a  form  which  readily  lent  itself  to  the  recep- 
tion of  new  content  in  the  natural  course  of 


IMMORTALITY  241 

Jewish  development.  The  Sheol  of  later 
Judaism  became  highly  personalized  and 
moralized,  sometimes  as  the  abode  of  the  right- 
eous alone,  sometimes  differentiated  in  its  inner 
arrangements  so  as  to  receive  both  "  the  sheep 
and  the  goats."  The  very  desire  and  plan  of 
the  Buddhist  to  achieve  Nirvana  are  proofs  of 
liis  conviction  that  most  men  are  unfortunately 
condemned  to  another  personal,  individual  life 
after  death ;  probably  a  series  of  lives ;  in  some 
cases,  perhaps,  an  unending  series  of  them.  In 
other  vi'ords,  the  prevailing  idea  that,  in  past 
ages,  a  belief  in  a  future  life  was  universal,  is 
at  least  very  near  the  truth. 

Today,  also,  we  must  recognize  the  fact  that 
most  men,  the  world  over,  remain  compara- 
tively untouched  by  the  new  considerations 
previously  mentioned.  Whether  illusion  or 
fact,  their  belief  in  a  future  life  is  as  strong  as 
their  desire  for  it.  And  most  men  desire  it,  at 
least  in  a  vague  sort  of  way.  Even  with  most 
of  those  who  have  achieved  sophistication  re- 
garding this  and  other  religious  problems, 
there  is  a  longing  and  a  hope,  at  least  at  times, 
which  protests  against  the  negative  and  un- 
satisfying conclusions  of  their  intellect.     At 


242  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

times  the  upwelling  of  fundamental  feeling  so 
nearly  overbears  intellectual  sturdiness  and 
honesty  that  they  are  almost  ready  to  say  with 
Cicero  that  they  would  rather  be  wrong  with 
those  who  affirm  it  than  right  with  those  who 
deny  it. 

But  it  is  not  my  purpose  in  this  chapter  to 
argue  the  general  question  of  immortality. 
My  intention  is  merely  to  discuss  the  matter  in 
relation  to  the  religious  significance  of  Berg- 
son's  philosophy.  We  shall  come  in  a  moment 
to  the  more  direct  phases  of  our  subject. 
Meanwhile  it  will  not  be  totally  beside  the  mark 
to  point  out  that  this  widespread  sense  of  un- 
satisfied longing,  among  those  who  doubt  or 
disbelieve  in  a  future  existence,  is  deeply 
grounded  in  the  needs  of  human  thought  and 
life.  The  demand  of  the  intellect  for  ration- 
ality in  the  universe,  and  the  demand  of  the 
whole  man  for  what  may  be  called  a  law  of  the 
conservation  of  spiritual  energy  and  value — 
these  two  demands  go  to  the  root  of  things  and 
thus  necessarily  enter  into  the  problem  of  im- 
mortality as  well  as  into  that  of  religion 
generally. 

The    first    demand    expresses    itself    thus: 


IMMORTALITY  24-3 

Human  life  appears  to  be  the  noblest  product 
of  evolution.  Can  a  universe  be  rational  which 
presents  such  an  appearance  and  continually 
tempts  us  to  act  upon  such  an  assumption,  if 
it  is  not  really  true  that  man  is  the  highest? 
And  by  "  highest,"  of  course,  we  must  mean 
a  distinctively  psychical  thing.  This  demand 
then  continues  by  asking,  "  Is  a  universe  ra- 
tional in  which  so  nmch  labor  is  spent  on  its 
finest  product  only  to  dash  the  product  to 
pieces  after  a  span  of  years  which  is  as  nothing, 
a  mere  watch  in  the  night? " 

The  second  demand  expresses  itself  thus: 
The  continued  exertion  of  the  will  depends 
upon  a  feeling  of  worth-whileness  in  the  work, 
upon  the  feeling  that  somehow  there  will  be 
permanent  value  in  what  is  done.  While  one 
may  be  so  self-forgetful  as  not  to  need  his  own 
continued  existence  and  blessedness  as  a  sj^ur 
(very  few  are),  he  would  surely  be  definitely 
affected  by  the  thought  of  the  certain  extinc- 
tion of  all  men.  The  incentive  afforded  by  a 
regard  for  subsequent  generations  also  loses 
its  edge  when  the  final  extinction  of  all  these 
generations  is  postulated.  Besides  there  is  no 
guarantee  of  the  unending  existence  of  our 


244.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

planet.  Quite  the  opposite.  What  then?  On 
such  a  view  the  transitory  effect  and  value  of 
all  human  effort  would  bear  down  upon  pres- 
ent motive  and  enthusiasm  in  an  insupportable 
fashion.  We  might  banish  the  thought  and 
continue  our  altruistic  plans  on  a  purely  emo- 
tional basis,  but  those  who  could  do  that  suc- 
cessfully for  any  length  of  time  would  be  those 
who  had  inherited  that  tendency  and  inspira- 
tion from  forbears  who  acquired  and  main- 
tained it  on  the  very  basis  now  swept  away. 

My  chief  reason  for  these  possibly  too  ex- 
tended introductory  remarks  is  to  emphasize 
my  conviction  that  it  does  make  a  great  deal 
of  difference  to  a  man  whether  he  believes  in 
a  future  life,  and  what  he  believes  about  the 
future  life.  A  fortiori  it  makes  a  great  deal  of 
difference  whether  or  no  this  faith  plays  a  vital 
part  in  the  thought  and  ideals  of  a  people,  a 
country,  a  generation.  It  intimately  concerns 
our  estimate  of  a  philosophy,  therefore,  whether 
that  philosophy  tends  towards,  or  away  from,  a 
belief  in  immortality.  In  view  of  the  influence 
of  Kant  upon  the  ideals  of  nineteenth  century 
Germany,  not  to  extend  the  illustration  more 
widely,  it  is  idle  to  assert  that  philosophy  and 


IMMORTALITY  245 

philosophers  make  httle  difference  and  do  not 
count.  Even  Napoleon  feared  the  "  German 
ideologists,"  as  he  called  them,  and  in  so  say- 
ing, he  meant  the  philosopher  Fichte  in  par- 
ticular." Bergson  may  not  be  another  Kant, 
or  not  even  a  Fichte,  but  he  is  widely  influ- 
ential. It  is  therefore  significant  to  remark,  in 
connection  with  the  general  considerations  just 
adduced,  that  Bergson's  thought,  as  we  are 
about  to  see,  is  distinctly  favorable  to  a  belief  in 
the  continuance  of  individuality  and  person- 
ality after  death. 

It  is  most  natural  that  belief  in  a  future  life 
should  always  have  close  connections  with  re- 
ligion. Certainly  God  may  be  conceived  so 
as  to  make  any  belief  in  future  life  unessential 
to  His  worship.  With  the  reservation  already 
made  in  an  earlier  paragraph,  one  may  instance 
in  this  connection  the  worship  of  Jehovah  by 
the  early  Hebrews.  Still  it  holds  true  that 
belief  in  God  and  in  a  future  life  have  mani- 
fested themselves  in  human  history  as  counter- 
parts. One  often  has  reason  to  regret  this  his- 
toric  connection.      The    limited   or   distorted 

'  Cf.  Priest,  Oermanij  Since  lUiO,  p.  57. 


246  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

views  of  earlier  days  are  nowhere  more  clearly 
manifested  than  in  the  pictures  of  the  future 
life  drawn  by  pious  artist  or  learned  theologian. 
No  Turk  would  desire  for  an  Armenian  a  lot 
different  from  that  which  Tertullian  assigns  to 
non-believers.  The  only  reason  we  can  enjoy 
Dante's  vivid  pictures  is  because  we  know  they 
are  merely  poetry.  For  the  day  in  which  these 
word  pictures  were  drawn  they  were  not 
merely  poetry.  Michelangelo's  "  Last  Judg- 
ment "  is  a  revelation  to  one  who  has  not  pre- 
viously realized  what  once  went  under  the 
name  "  Christian."  Doubtless  one  reason  for 
modern  disbelief  in  a  future  life  has  been  the 
concrete  picturing  of  that  life  in  ways  that  were 
either  inadequate  or  actually  offensive.  Henry 
Holt  expresses  the  unvoiced  feeling  of  many 
who  are  weary  of  such  unjustifiable  and  un- 
true concreteness  when  he  says,  with  his  cus- 
tomary downrightnes's,  that  one  thing  is  cer- 
tain about  heaven,  "  there  will  be  no  damned 
nonsense  there."  ^ 

Yet  it  must  be  admitted  that,  granted  the 
possibility  of  faith,  the  more  concrete  the  pic- 
ture the  more  lively  the  belief.     But  the  day 

*  Henry  Holt,  On  the  Cosmic  Relations,  New  York,  1915. 


IMMORTALITY  247 

of  such  concrete  characterizations  is  gone  and 
with  their  passing,  one  must  admit,  an  inevita- 
ble diminution  in  the  Hveliness  of  the  hope 
must  come  in.  On  tlie  other  hand,  there  is 
manifest  danger  in  a  too  pronounced  interest 
in  the  future.  Self-seeking,  lack  of  interest 
in  the  present  task,  lack  of  social  consciousness 
— all  these  are  well  known  accompaniments 
of  an  undue  emphasis  upon  the  future  life. 
The  solution  seems  to  be  to  maintain  a  lively 
faith  that  it  is  along  with  a  fitting  modesty  of 
opinion  as  to  what  it  is,  at  least  as  far  as  de- 
tails are  concerned. 

As  we  have  just  said,  religion  usually  carries 
with  it  some  form  of  belief  in  a  life  after  death. 
The  work  of  Charles  *  has  demonstrated  that 
the  centuries  immediately  preceding  the  Chris- 
tian era  were  centuries  of  unsurpassed  spirit- 
ual growth  in  Judaism.  One  striking  feature 
of  this  period  is  the  change  from  a  belief  in  an 
unblessed  Sheol,  or  shado^vj^  abode  of  the  dead, 
to  a  faith  in  a  blessed  immortality  for  the  in- 

*  Cf.  The  Apocrypha  and  Pseudepigrapha,  edited  by  R.  H. 
Charles;  Eschafolnriy — flebrcir,  Jewish  and  Christian,  by  R. 
H.  Charles,  London,  1899.  In  this  connection  I  would  espe- 
cially recommend  Charles'  popular  but  scholarly  little  book, 
Religious  Development  Between  the  Old  and  New  Testaments. 
Home  University  Series,  Holt  and  Co. 


248  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

dividual.  Christianity  entered  into  the  in- 
heritance of  this  late  Jewish  development  and, 
consequently^  the  future  life  has  alvi^ays  had 
a  prominent  place  in  its  teaching.  But,  apart 
from  historical  connections  of  this  sort,  any 
religion  based  upon  a  lofty  spiritual  conception 
of  God  is  bound,  sooner  or  later,  to  meet  and 
attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  continued  in- 
dividual existence.  In  varying  form  the  ques- 
tionings of  Job  and  of  Ecclesiastes  are  sure  to 
recur  again  and  again,  and  no  lofty  faith  in 
God  can  stand  unimpaired  if  the  scope  of  His 
activity  is  limited  to  this  world  alone,  no  mat- 
ter how  broadly  social  the  conception  may  be. 
In  the  Christian  religion  the  situation  is  most 
acute  because  of  the  two- fold  primal  emphasis 
upon  the  supreme  worth  of  the  individual  and 
upon  the  loving  character  of  God. 

Therefore,  in  discussing  the  religious  value 
of  a  philosophy,  it  is  very  much  to  the  point 
to  ask  whether  and  how  it  is  favorable  to  faith 
in  a  future  life.  In  discussing  a  philosophy's 
compatibility  with  Christianity,  these  questions 
are  essential.  We  are,  as  yet,  without  any 
formal  discussion  of  this  jDroblem  from  Berg- 
son's  own  pen.    A  few  informal  statements  by 


IMMORTALITY  249 

him  are  helpful  and  will  he  given  here  in  due 
course.  In  general,  however,  we  must  rely 
upon  reasonable  inferences  drawn  from  his 
dominant  philosophical  doctrines. 

In  my  judgment,  the  existing  sensitiveness 
regarding  faith  in  individual  immortality  cen- 
ters about  two  points.  One  point  is  marked 
by  the  motto,  "  The  mind  is  only  a  function  of 
the  brain  ";  the  other  by  the  phrase,  "  The  in- 
dividual is  nothing — the  organism  is  every- 
thing." The  first  of  these  two  storm  centers  of 
disbelief  may  be  described  thus:  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  an  independent  existence  of  the 
soul  of  man.  What  we  really  mean  by  this 
old-fashioned  and  antiquated  word,  "  soul,"  is, 
in  fact,  only  a  comparatively  ephemeral  men- 
tal life  which  owes  its  rise  entirely  to  the  ki- 
netics of  nervous  tissue  in  the  brain,  owes  its 
variety  and  individuality  to  its  connection 
with  a  certain  distinct  physical  organism  and 
will  lose  all  its  individuality,  nay  even  all  ex- 
istence, with  the  disappearance  of  brain  and 
body.  We  see  at  once  that  if  the  human 
"  soul  "  is  to  be  explained,  or  explained  away, 
in  this  fashion  there  is  no  use  in  proceeding 


250  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

further.  The  question  is  settled.  For  what  we 
mean  by  "  immortality,"  "  the  future  life,"  is 
the  continuance  of  distinctive  personality  and 
individuality  after  death,  and  the  position  just 
sketched  puts  an  end  to  the  possibility  of  such 
a  thing.  We  may  deceive  ourselves  as  we 
please  with  interpretations  which  define  im- 
mortality in  terms  of  continuing  remem- 
brance in  the  thought  of  others,  in  terms  of  a 
legacy  of  benefit  left  to  our  descendants.  The 
heart  of  the  matter  is  gone  and  our  question 
is  answered — negatively. 

The  second  storm  center  is  marked  by  the 
fundamental  question :  Has  the  individual  any 
primary  value?  Has  he  eternal  significance  in 
and  for  himself?  Approaching  this  question 
from  the  standpoint  of  our  intimate  friend- 
ships, our  hearts  predispose  us  in  favor  of  an 
affirmative  answer.  Observation  of  men  in  the 
mass,  however,  often  impresses  and  oppresses 
us  with  the  likeness  of  men  to  animals,  with 
the  blindness,  the  senselessness,  the  pure  phys- 
ical drive  of  ordinary  human  life;  and  we  feel 
that  man  is  after  all  little,  if  any,  better  than 
the  dumb  beast  which  perisheth,  little  better 
than  the  flower  that  bloometh  for  a  season  and 


IMMORTALITY  251 

then  fadeth  and  withereth  away  into  the  phys- 
ical elements  from  which  it  sprang.  Contem- 
plation of  tlie  hugeness  of  the  universe,  with  its 
forces  and  its  distances  staggering  to  thought, 
gives  rise  to  doubtful  wonder  that  man  should 
ever  have  been  described  as  "  but  a  little  lower 
than  the  angels,"  an  object  of  permanent  value, 
the  center  and  end  of  all  the  mighty  travail 
of  the  £eons.  Also,  close  consideration  of  the 
progress  of  organic  evolution  reveals  an  ap- 
parent disregard,  on  nature's  part,  of  the  wel- 
fare and  existence  of  the  individual  and  an 
equally  apparent  solicitude  for  the  welfare  and 
preservation  of  the  species,  of  the  race.^  The 
resulting  impression  is  that  the  individual  man, 
like  all  other  individual  objects,  is  merely  a 
small  link  in  a  great  chain  or,  more  accurately, 
an  unessential  by-product  of  a  great  imper- 
sonal force  to  which  he  is  entirely  secondary 
and  entirely  unnecessary. 

To  one  who  is  mastered  by  an  emotional  re- 
action of  this  sort,  or  to  whom  this  kind  of 
reasoning  has  brought  an  abiding  conviction, 

'  Cf.  Hermann,  graf  von  Keyserlinpr,  Unsterblichkeit,  Miin- 
chen,  1911.  This  book  takes  the  position  just  indicated  in  the 
text.  One  puts  it  down  with  an  inescapable  feeling  of  de- 
pression. 


252  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

belief  in  immortality  must  appear  as  a  chimera 
— beautiful  and  helpful,  perhaps,  but  still  only 
a  chimera.  In  other  words,  faith  in  a  future 
life  is  essentially  bound  up  with  the  conviction 
that  man  is  the  pinnacle  of  creation,  that  in 
man  we  do  have  the  goal  towards  whose  attain- 
ment the  whole  of  creation  has  been  groaning 
and  travailing  until  now.  This  latter  convic- 
tion does  not  necessarily  carry  with  it  convic- 
tion of  personal  immortality,  but  faith  in  im- 
mortahty,  at  least  for  us  today,  is  directly 
dependent  upon  faith  in  the  supreme  worth  of 
individual  human  existence. 

We  see,  therefore,  chat  a  philosophy  which 
is  to  be  adjudged  compatible  with  belief  in  per- 
sonal immortality — and,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
carries  with  it  compatibility  with  an  essential 
tenet  of  the  Christian  religion  and  of  other  re- 
ligions as  well — such  a  philosophy,  I  say,  must 
maintain  the  independent  existence  of  the 
human  soul  and  must  also  favor  a  view  which 
gives  to  the  individual  man  supreme  value. 
Now,  Bergsonism  squares  itself  clearly  with 
both  these  tests  of  religious  compatibility.  Our 
author  directly  attacks  those  theories  which 
reduce,  or  tend  to  reduce,  mind  to  a  purely 


i:mmortality  253 

physical  basis.  In  speaking  of  the  problem 
of  the  relation  between  soul  and  body,  he 
says : " 

This  relation,  though  it  has  been  a  favorite  theme 
througliout  the  history  of  phihjsoph}',  has  really 
been  very  little  studied.  If  we  leave  on  one  side  the 
theories  which  are  content  to  state  the  "  union  of 
soul  and  body  "  as  an  irreducible  and  inexplicable 
fact,  and  those  which  speak  vaguely  of  the  body  as 
an  instrument  of  the  soul,  there  remains  hardl}'  any 
other  conception  of  the  psycho-physiological  rela- 
tion than  the  hypothesis  of  "  epiphcnomenalism  "  or 
that  of  "  parallelism,"  which  in  practice — I  mean  in 
the  interpretation  of  particular  facts — both  end  in 
the  same  conclusions.  For  whether,  indeed,  thought 
is  regarded  as  a  mere  function  of  the  brain  and  the 
state  of  consciousness  as  an  epiphenomenon  of  the 
state  of  the  brain,  or  whether  mental  states  and  brain 
states  are  held  to  be  two  versions,  in  two  different 
languages,  of  one  and  the  same  original,  in  either  case 
it  is  laid  down  tliat,  could  we  penetrate  into  the  in- 
side of  a  brain  at  work  and  behold  the  dance  of  the 
atoms  which  make  up  the  cortex,  and  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  possessed  the  key  to  psycho-physiology,  we 
should  know  every  detail  of  what  is  going  on  in  the 
corresponding  consciousness. 

This,  indeed,  is  what  is  most  commonly  maintained 
by  philosophers  as  well  as  by  men  of  science.     Yet 
•  Cf.  Bergson's  Matter  and  Memory,  Int.  pp.  x-xii. 


254.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

it  would  be  well  to  ask  whether  the  facts,  when  ex- 
amined without  any  preconceived  idea,  really  suggest 
an  hypothesis  of  this  kind.  That  there  is  a  close 
connection  between  a  state  of  consciousness  and  the 
brain  we  do  not  dispute.  But  there  is  also  a  close 
connection  between  a  coat  and  the  nail  on  which  it 
hangs,  for,  if  the  nail  is  pulled  out,  the  coat  falls  to 
the  ground.  Shall  we  say,  then,  that  the  shape  of 
the  nail  gives  us  the  shape  of  the  coat,  or  in  any  way 
corresponds  to  it.''  No  more  are  we  entitled  to  con- 
clude, because  the  physical  fact  is  hung  on  to  a  cere- 
bral state,  that  there  is  any  parallelism  between  the 
two  series  psychical  and  physiological.  When  phi- 
losophy pleads  that  the  theory  of  parallelism  is  borne 
out  by  the  results  of  positive  science,  it  enters  upon 
an  unmistakably  vicious  circle ;  for,  if  science  inter- 
prets connection,  which  is  a  fact,  as  signifying  paral- 
lelism, which  is  an  hypothesis  (and  an  hypothesis  to 
which  it  is  difficult  to  attach  an  intelligible  meaning), 
it  does  so,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  for  reasons 
of  a  philosophic  order :  it  is  because  science  has  been 
accustomed  by  a  certain  type  of  philosophy  to  be- 
lieve that  there  is  no  hypothesis  more  probable,  more 
in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  scientific  inquiry. 

But  Bergson  does  more  than  pull  down  the 
barns  of  his  opponents.  He  attempts  to  build 
greater  on  his  own  account,  and  this  attempt 
is  in  the  direction  of  positive  evidence  for  the 
independent  existence  of  the  spirit — or  soul- 


IMMORTALITY  255 

life  of  man.  His  predominate  use  of  the  word 
"  memory  "  does  not  conceal  the  real  issue  for, 
as  he  himself  says :  ^ 

Any  one  who  approaches,  without  preconceived 
idea  and  on  the  firm  ground  of  facts,  the  classical 
problem  of  the  relations  of  soul  and  bod}',  will  soon 
see  this  problem  as  centering  upon  the  subject  of 
memory.  .  . 

Again  he  says:  ^ 

We  must  now  add  that,  as  pure  perception  gives 
us  the  whole  or  at  least  the  essential  part  of  matter 
(since  the  rest  conies  from  memory  and  is  super- 
added to  matter),  it  follows  that  memory  must  be, 
in  principle,  a  power  absolutely  independent  of  mat- 
ter. If,  then,  spirit  is  a  reality,  it  is  here,  in  the 
phenomenon  of  memory,  that  we  may  come  into  touch 
with  it  experimentally.  And  hence  any  attempt  to 
derive  pure  memory  from  an  operation  of  the  brain 
should  reveal  on  analysis  a  radical  illusion. 

Let  us  put  the  same  matter  in  clearer  language. 
We  maintain  that  matter  has  no  occult  or  unknow- 
able power,  and  that  it  coincides,  in  essentials,  with 
pure  perception.  Thence  we  conclude  that  the  living 
body  in  general,  and  the  nervous  system  in  particu- 
lar, are  only  channels  for  the  transmission  of  move- 
ments, which,  received  in  the  form  of  stimulation,  are 
transmitted  in  the  form  of  action,  reflex  or  voluntary. 

'  Cf.  Matter  and  Memory,  Int.  pp.  xii-xiii. 

«  Op.  cit.,  pp.  80-82. 


256  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

That  is  to  say,  it  is  vain  to  attribute  to  the  cerebral 
substance  the  property  of  engendering  representa- 
tions. Now  the  phenomena  of  memory,  in  which  we 
believe  that  we  can  grasp  spirit  in  its  most  tangible 
form,  are  precisely  those  of  which  a  superficial  psy- 
chology is  most  ready  to  find  the  origin  in  cerebral 
activity  alone ;  just  because  they  are  at  the  point  of 
contact  between  consciousness  and  matter,  and  be- 
cause even  the  adversaries  of  materialism  have  no 
objection  to  treating  the  brain  as  a  storehouse  of 
memories.  But  if  it  could  be  positively  established 
that  the  cerebral  process  answers  only  to  a  very  small 
part  of  memory,  that  it  is  rather  the  effect  than  the 
cause,  that  matter  is  here  as  elsewhere  the  vehicle  of 
an  action  and  not  the  substratum  of  a  knoxdedge,  then 
the  thesis  which  we  are  maintaining  would  be  demon- 
strated by  the  very  example  which  is  commonly  sup- 
posed to  be  most  unfavorable  to  it,  and  the  necessity 
might  arise  of  erecting  spirit  into  an  independent 
reality.  In  this  way  also,  perhaps,  some  light  would 
be  thrown  on  the  nature  of  what  is  called  spirit,  and 
on  the  possibility  of  the  interaction  of  spirit  and 
matter.  For  a  demonstration  of  this  kind  could  not 
be  purely  negative.  Having  shown  what  memory  is 
not,  we  should  have  to  try  to  discover  what  it  is. 

This  independent  spirit-reality  does  not 
have  to  be  continually  conscious  in  order  to 
exist.® 

»  Op.  cit.,  p.  181. 


IMMORTALITY  257 

Without  as  yet  going  to  the  heart  of  the  matter, 
we  will  confine  ourselves  to  the  remark  that  our  un- 
willingness to  conceive  unconscious  psychical  states 
is  due,  above  all,  to  the  fact  that  we  hold  conscious- 
ness to  be  the  essential  property  of  psychical  states : 
so  that  a  psychical  state  can  not,  it  seems,  cease  to 
be  conscious  without  ceasing  to  exist.  But  if  con- 
sciousness is  but  the  characteristic  note  of  the 
present,  that  is  to  say  of  the  actually  lived,  in  short 
of  the  active,  then  that  which  does  not  act  may  cease 
to  belong  to  consciousness  without  therefore  ceasing 
to  exist  in  some  manner.  In  other  words,  in  the  psy- 
chological domain,  consciousness  may  not  be  the 
synonym  of  existence,  but  only  of  real  action  or  of 
immediate  efficacy.  .  . 

This  means  that  our  "  soul  "  is  much  more 
than  present  consciousness.  Our  conscious 
life  is  always  a  present  focal  point  at  which  the 
whole  past  of  our  stored-up  experience,  our 
unconscious  spirit-life,  seeks  to  bore  its  way 
through  the  plane  of  the  immediate  into  the 
future  which  lies  beyond.  One  should  read  the 
whole  of  Chapter  IV  of  Matter  and  Memory 
where  Bergson  sums  up  his  case  regarding  the 
relation  of  soul  and  body.  The  following  quo- 
tations give  only  a  suggestion,  and  a  very  in- 
adequate one  at  that,  of  the  course  and  conclu- 
sions of  the  argument : 


258  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

One  general  conclusion  follows  from  the  first  three 
chapters  of  this  book:  it  is  that  the  body,  always 
turned  towards  action,  has  for  its  essential  function 
to  limit,  with  a  view  to  action,  the  life  of  the  spirit.^" 
.  .  .  the  orientation  of  our  consciousness  towards 
action  appears  to  be  the  fundamental  law  of  our 
psychical  life. 

Strictly,  we  might  stop  here,  for  this  work  was 
undertaken  to  define  the  function  of  the  body  in  the 
life  of  the  spirit.  But,  on  the  one  hand,  we  have 
raised  by  the  way  a  metaphysical  problem  which  we 
cannot  bring  ourselves  to  leave  in  suspense ;  and  on 
the  other,  our  researches,  although  mainly  psycho- 
logical, have  on  several  occasions  given  us  glimpses, 
if  not  of  the  means  of  solving  the  problem,  at  any 
rate  of  the  side  on  which  it  should  be  approached. 

This  problem  is  no  less  than  that  of  the  union  of 
soul  and  body.  It  comes  before  us  clearly  and  with 
urgency,  because  we  make  a  profound  distinction  be- 
tween matter  and  spirit.  And  we  cannot  regard  it 
as  insoluble,  since  we  define  spirit  and  matter  by  posi- 
tive characters,  and  not  by  negations.  It  is  in  very 
truth  within  matter  that  pure  perception  places  us, 
and  it  is  really  into  spirit  that  we  penetrate  by  means 
of  memory.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  whilst  introspec- 
tion reveals  to  us  the  distinction  between  matter  and 
spirit,  it  also  bears  witness  to  their  union.  Either, 
then,  our  analyses   are  vitiated  ab  origine,  or  they 

^"Matter  and  Memory,  p.  233. 


IMMORTALITY  259 

must  help  us  to  issue  from  the  difficulties  they  raise, ^^ 
...  to  touch  the  reality  of  spirit  we  must  place  our- 
selves at  the  point  wliere  an  individual  consciousness, 
continuing  and  retaining  the  past  in  a  present  en- 
riched by  it,  thus  escapes  tlic  law  of  necessity,  the 
law  which  ordains  that  the  past  shall  ever  follow  it- 
self in  a  present  which  merely  repeats  it  in  another 
form,  and  that  all  things  shall  ever  be  flowing  away. 
When  we  pass  from  pure  perception  to  memory,  we 
definitely  abandon  matter  for  spirit." 

For  Bergson,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  the 
human  soul.  It  does  not  owe  its  origin  to  the 
brain,  to  matter.  Indeed,  the  brain  is  merely 
a  kind  of  central  telephonic  exchange  for  the 
transmission  of  messages  both  ways,  between 
physical  nature  and  the  soul.^^  The  existence 
of  the  soul,  therefore,  is  not  dependent  upon 
the  brain.  It  seems  clear,  however,  that  the 
soul  is  not  a  static  entity,  but  a  growing  thing 
whose  growth,  at  least  under  existing  human 
conditions,  depends  upon  action;  and  action 
means  the  use  of  the  brain  for  definite  practical 
ends. 

The  acceptance  of  this  phase  of  Bergson's 
teaching  certainly  leaves  the  way  entirely  open 

"  Oj).  cit.,  pp.  234-235.  "  Op.  cit.,  p.  313. 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  19. 


260  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

for  belief  in  individual  immortality.  It  does 
more  than  that.  It  creates  a  presumption  in 
favor  of  such  a  faith.  More  could  hardly  be 
expected  of  a  philosopher  who  has  until  now 
definitely  postponed  the  consideration  of  this 
particular  subject.  At  present  we  can  only 
draw  inferences,  for,  in  his  formal  works, 
Bergson  offers  us  nothing  more  definite  in  the 
direction  of  a  positive,  constructive  position. 
One  important  fact  is  certain:  Bergson's 
theory,  if  true,  sweeps  away  one  set  of  stub- 
born objections  to  belief  in  a  future  life ;  it  then 
proceeds,  positively,  to  set  up  a  basis  upon 
which  one  is  free  and  even  encouraged  to  build 
his  structure  of  faith. 

We  now  turn  to  consider  the  Bergsonian 
estimate  of  the  individual.  Our  contention  is 
that  a  philosophy,  in  order  to  show  itself  com- 
patible with  a  belief  in  personal  immortality, 
must  favor  a  view  which  ascribes  supreme  value 
to  the  individual.    Does  Bergsonism  do  that  ? 

In  Blatter  and  Memory  we  are  led  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  spirit  of  man  is  not  the 
offspring  of  matter,  nor  yet  its  slave.  Indeed, 
the  general  impression  resulting  from  Berg- 


IMMORTALITY  261 

son's  thesis  regarding  the  relations  of  mind  and 
matter,  soul  and  bodj^  is  one  of  heightened 
appreciation  of  the  place  of  man  in  the  uni- 
verse. An  examination  of  Time  and  Free 
Will  yields  the  same  result.  Bergson  contends 
that  free  will  is  a  fact.  To  be  sure,  even  man 
achieves  it  only  rarely  but  man  alone  achieves 
it  at  all.  The  free  act  is  preeminently  a  soul- 
ful act,  and  in  its  manifestation  we  may  see, 
according  to  the  philosophy  of  Creative 
Evolution,  the  workings  of  the  Vital  Impetus, 
the  final  reality  of  the  universe.  It  takes  but 
little  imagination  to  see  that  this  is  only  a  mod- 
ern way  of  saying  ancient  things  about  the 
supreme  value  of  man. 

It  is  in  Bergson's  volume  on  Creative  Evo- 
lution that  this  doctrine  of  man  is  set  forth 
most  clearly  and  explicitly.  No  shallow  opti- 
mism prevents  Bergson  from  recognizing  the 
present  inferiority  of  man  in  certain  directions, 
as,  for  example,  in  his  powers  of  instinct;  nor 
does  he  fail  to  give  full  play  to  the  limiting  and 
determining  effect  of  physical  forces.  In 
speaking  of  man,  also,  as  the  goal  of  evolution, 
his  distinctive  teleological  theory  forces  upon 
him  a  reserve  and  a  restraint  which  may  puzzle 


262  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

those  who  are  orthodox  in  their  teleology.  It 
may  make  them  wonder  whether  Bergson's 
left  hand  does  not  take  away  what  his  right 
hand  giveth.  In  spite  of  these  considerations 
it  is  correct  to  say  that  Creative  Evolution  up- 
holds belief  in  the  supreme  worth  of  man,  and 
by  that  I  mean  not  merely  man,  the  species,  but 
man,  the  individual.  A  few  quotations  will 
illustrate  this.^* 

From  this  point  of  view,  not  only  does  conscious- 
ness appear  as  the  motive  principle  of  evolution,  but 
also,  among  conscious  beings  themselves,  man  comes 
to  occupy  a  privileged  place.  Between  him  and  the 
animals  the  difference  is  no  longer  one  of  degree,  but 
of  kind.^' 

If,  now,  we  should  wish  to  express  this  in  terms  of 
finality,  we  should  have  to  say  that  consciousness, 
after  having  been  obliged,  in  order  to  set  itself  free, 
to  divide  organization  into  two  complementary  parts, 
vegetables  on  the  one  hand  and  animals  on  the  other, 
has  sought  an  issue  in  the  double  direction  of  instinct 
and  of  intelligence.  It  has  not  found  it  with  instinct, 
and  it  has  not  obtained  it  on  the  side  of  intelligence 
except  by  a  sudden  leap  from  the  animal  to  man.     So 

^*  One  should  read  the  whole  book,  but  especially,  in  this 
connection,  Chapters  II  and  III.  In  addition  to  the  quotations 
given,  I  would  call  particular  attention  to  pp.  101-102,  105, 
126-134,  151,  191-192. 

^^  Creative  Evolution,  p.  182.     One  should  read  from  p.  181. 


IMMORTALITY  263 

that,  in  the  last  analysis,  man  niiglit  be  considered 
the  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  entire  organiza- 
tion of  life  on  our  planet.*" 

Radical  therefore,  also,  is  the  difference  between 
animal  consciousness,  even  the  most  intelligent,  and 
human  consciousness.  For  consciousness  corresponds 
exactly  to  the  living  being's  power  of  choice ;  it  is  co- 
extensive with  the  fringe  of  possible  action  that  sur- 
rounds the  real  action :  consciousness  is  synonymous 
with  invention  and  with  freedom.  Now,  in  the  ani- 
mal, invention  is  never  anything  but  a  variation  on 
the  theme  of  routine.  Shut  up  in  the  habits  of  the 
species,  it  succeeds,  no  doubt,  in  enlarging  them  by 
its  individual  initiative ;  but  it  escapes  automatism 
only  for  an  instant,  for  just  the  time  to  create  a 
new  automatism.  The  gates  of  its  prison  close  as 
soon  as  they  are  opened ;  by  pulling  at  its  chain  it 
succeeds  only  in  stretching  it.  With  man,  conscious- 
ness breaks  the  chain.  In  man,  and  in  man  alone,  it 
sets  itself  free.   .   . 

They  express  the  difference  of  kind,  and  not  only 
of  degree,  which  separates  man  from  the  rest  of  the 
animal  world.  They  let  us  guess  that,  while  at  the 
end  of  the  vast  springboard  from  which  life  has 
taken  its  leap,  all  the  others  have  stepped  down,  find- 
ing the  cord  stretched  too  high,  man  alone  has 
cleared  the  obstacle. 

"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  184-185.  The  rest  of  this  paragraph  modi- 
fies the  force  of  the  last  sentence  quoted,  in  the  direction  of 
Bergson's  teleogicnl  theory,  but  does  not  take  away  its  value 
for  our  present  purpose. 


264.  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

It  is  in  this  quite  special  sense  that  man  is  the 
"  term  "  and  the  "  end  "  of  evolution.   .   . 

From  our  point  of  view,  life  appears  in  its  entirety 
as  an  immense  wave  which,  starting  from  a  center, 
spreads  outwards,  and  which  on  almost  the  whole  of 
its  circumference  is  stopped  and  converted  into  oscil- 
lation: at  one  single  point  the  obstacle  has  been 
forced,  the  impulsion  has  passed  freely.  It  is  this 
freedom  that  the  human  form  registers.  Everywhere 
but  in  man,  consciousness  has  had  to  come  to  a  stand; 
in  man  alone  it  has  kept  on  its  way.  Man,  then,  con- 
tinues the  vital  movement  indefinitely,  although  he 
does  not  draw  along  with  him  all  that  life  carries  in 
itself.  On  other  lines  of  evolution  there  have  traveled 
other  tendencies  which  life  implied,  and  of  which, 
since  everything  interpenetrates,  man  has,  doubtless, 
kept  something,  but  of  which  he  has  kept  only  very 
little.  It  is  as  if  a  vague  and  formless  being,  whom 
we  may  call,  as  we  wUl,  Man  or  Superman,  had 
sought  to  realize  himself,  and  had  succeeded  only  by 
abandoning  a  part  of  himself  on  the  way.^^ 

As  the  smallest  grain  of  dust  is  bound  up  with  our 
entire  solar  system,  drawn  along  with  it  in  that  un- 
divided movement  of  descent  which  is  materiality  it- 
self, so  all  organized  beings,  from  the  humblest  to 
the  highest,  from  the  first  origins  of  life  to  the  time 
in  which  we  are,  and  in  all  places  as  in  all  times,  do 
but  evidence  a  single  impulsion,  the  inverse  of  the 
movement  of  matter,  and  in  itself  indivisible.  All 
"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  263-266.    Selected  sentences. 


IMMORTALITY  265 

the  living  hold  together,  and  all  yield  to  the  same 
tremendous  push.  The  animal  takes  its  stand  on  the 
plant,  man  bestrides  animality,  and  the  whole  of  hu- 
manity in  space  and  in  time,  is  one  immense  army 
galloping  beside  and  before  and  behind  each  of  us  in 
an  overwhelming  charge  able  to  beat  down  every  re- 
sistance and  clear  the  most  formidable  obstacles,  per- 
haps even  dcath/^ 

However  one  may  quarrel  with,  or  fail  to 
appreciate,  Bergson's  teleology,  one  cannot 
deny  that  the  definite  result  of  his  view  of  evo- 
lution is  to  place  the  crown  upon  the  head  of 
man.  INIan  is  the  goal,  the  very  intention  of 
creation,  the  finest  flower  of  the  organic  proc- 
ess; and  not  only  man  the  species,  to  which 
the  individual  is  merely  subordinate  and  sec- 
ondary, but  man  the  individual,  since  it  is  in 
the  spiritual  manifestations  of  his  inner  life 
that  his  superiority  resides.  We  see,  there- 
fore, that  our  philosophy  supports  that  faith 
which  we  have  postulated  as  the  second  of  the 
two  necessary  presuppositions  of  belief  in  in- 
dividual immortality. 

But  one  or  two  statements  in  the  quotations 
just  given  point  to  an  even  more  positive  con- 

"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  270-271. 


266  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

elusion.  One  cannot  overlook  the  phrase, 
"  able  to  beat  down  every  resistance  and  clear 
the  most  formidable  obstacles,  perhaps  even 
death"  ^^  Such  statements  must  not  be  pressed 
too  hard  and  indeed,  as  they  stand,  they  do  not 
necessarily  imply  belief  in  personal  survival. 
They  are,  however,  strictly  compatible  with 
such  a  faith.  Further,  more  definite  state- 
ments made  by  Bergson  elsewhere,  in  an  in- 
formal way,  show  that  these  sentences  in 
Creative  Evolution  probably  bore  in  his  own 
mind  at  the  time  of  writing  a  certain  amount 
of  individualistic  interpretation.  Let  us  glance 
at  some  of  these  informal  observations. 

If  we  can  prove  (as  Bergson  thinks  he  can)  that 
the  role  of  the  brain  is  to  fix  the  attention  of  the 
mind  on  matter  and  that  by  far  the  greater  part  of 
mental  life  is  independent  of  the  brain,  then  we  have 
proved  the  likelihood  of  survival;  and  it  is  for  those 
who  do  not  believe  it  to  prove  that  they  are  right, 
not  for  us  to  prove  they  are  wrong.**' 

On  the  other  hand,  when  we  see  that  consciousness, 
whilst  being  at  once  creation  and  choice,  is  also  mem- 
ory, that  one  of  its  essential  functions  is  to  accumu- 
late and  preserve  the  past,  that  very  probably   (I 

*'  The  italics  are  mine. 

^''  Bergson,  quoted  in  the  Literary  Digest,  March  1,  1913. 


nniORTALITY  267 

lack  time  to  attempt  the  demonstration  of  this  point) 
the  brain  is  an  instrument  of  forgetfulncss  as  much 
as  one  of  remembrance,  and  that  in  pure  conscious- 
ness nothing  of  the  past  is  lost,  the  whole  of  a  con- 
scious personality  being  an  indivisible  continuity, 
are  we  not  led  to  suppose  that  the  effort  continues 
heyondy  and  that  in  this  passage  of  consciousness 
through  matter  (the  passage  which  at  the  tunnel's 
exit  gives  distinct  personalities)  consciousness  is 
tempered  like  steel,  and  tests  itself  by  clearly  consti- 
tuting personalities  and  preparing  tliem,  by  the  very 
effort  which  each  of  them  is  called  upon  to  make,  for  a 
higher  form  of  existence?  If  we  admit  that  with  man 
consciousness  has  finally  left  the  tunnel,  that  every- 
where else  consciousness  has  remained  imprisoned, 
that  every  other  species  corresponds  to  the  arrest  of 
something  which  in  man  succeeded  in  overcoming  re- 
sistance and  in  expanding  almost  freely,  thus  dis- 
playing itself  in  true  personalities  capable  of  re- 
membering all  and  willing  all  and  controlling  their 
past  and  their  future,  we  shall  have  no  repugnance 
in  admitting  that  in  man,  though  perhaps  in  man 
alone,  consciousness  pursues  its  path  beyond  this 
earthly  life." 

A  part  of  Levine's  interview  with  Bergson 
runs  as  follows :  " 

''Bergson,  "Life  and  Consciousness,"  in  the  Ilibbert  Jour- 
nal, October,  1911. 

"  Louis  Levine,  "  Interview  with  Bergson,^'  New  York  Times, 
February  22,  1914. 


268  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

The  religious  feeling,  he  (Bergson)  thinks,  not 
only  connects  the  individual  with  the  spiritual  source 
of  life,  it  creates  in  him  the  hope  in  the  continuation 
of  spiritual  existence  beyond.  There  is  no  reason, 
according  to  Professor  Bergson,  to  deny  the  con- 
tinuity of  individual  existence  after  death.  The 
facts  do  not  warrant  such  a  conclusion.  What  we 
observe  in  death  is  the  destruction  of  the  material 
organism  and  of  the  brain.  Now  that  would  mean 
total  spiritual  destruction  if  the  brain  was  commen- 
surate with  the  totality  of  spiritual  life.  But  it  is 
not.  What  Professor  Bergson  believes  to  have 
proved  is  that  the  brain  is  but  a  part  of  the  spiritual 
life  of  the  mind. 

Bergson  thinks  that  the  brain  concentrates  certain 
psychological  processes  necessary  for  action.  It 
focuses  the  attention  of  the  organism  upon  the  ma- 
terial surroundings  within  which  it  has  to  move  and 
to  live.  It  is,  therefore,  limited  and  expresses  only 
a  part  of  the  spiritual  life.  He  holds  that  outside 
of  it  and  independently  of  it  there  goes  on  a  wider 
spiritual  life  in  us — the  life  of  the  instincts,  the  life 
of  the  emotions,  the  life  of  vague  aspiration  and  of 
infinite  longing,  and  that  life  is  not  dependent  upon 
the  brain,  and  it  must  not  disappear  with  the  brain. 
There  is  the  greatest  probability  that  it  continues 
as  an  individual  spiritual  existence  after  the  brain 
has  been  destroyed. 

Why  is   it   improbable  that   this   spiritual  unity 
should  continue  to  experience  its  connection  with  the 


IMMORTALITY  269 

original  source  of  life  and  to  develop  its  own  possi- 
bilities? Personally,  Professor  Bergson  believes  that 
it  is  not  at  all  improbable.  On  the  contrary,  he  has 
the  feeling  of  certainty  about  it.  He  does  not  think, 
however,  that  the  data  at  hand  as  yet  warrant  more 
than  an  affirmation  of  high  probability. 

This  report  is  of  great  value  in  spite  of  its 
occasional  crudeness  and  clumsiness  of  form. 

Bergson  has  given  the  best  evidence  of  his 
faith,  or  at  least  of  his  openmindedness,  by  ac- 
cepting the  presidency  of  the  Society  for 
Psychical  Research.  In  his  presidential  ad- 
dress before  the  Society  in  London,  he  said," 

The  more  we  become  accustomed  to  this  idea  of  a 
consciousness  which  overflows  the  organism,  the  more 
natural  and  probable  we  find  the  hypothesis  that  the 
soul  survives  the  body. 

Were,  indeed,  the  mental  molded  exactly  on  to 
the  cerebral,  were  there  nothing  more  in  a  human 
consciousness  than  what  could  be  read  in  a  human 
brain,  we  might  have  to  admit  that  consciousness 
must  share  the  fate  of  the  body  and  die  with  it. 

But  if  the  facts,  studied  without  any  preposses- 
sions, lead  us  on  the  contrary  to  regard  the  mental 
life  as  much  more  vast  than  the  cerebral  life,  sur- 

"  Quoted  from  a  report  in  the  Neio  York  Times,  Septem- 
ber 27,  1914. 


270  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

vival  becomes  so  probable  that  the  burden  of  proof 
comes  to  lie  on  him  who  denies  it  rather  than  on  him 
who  affirms  it. 

For,  as  I  have  said  elsewhere,  "  The  one  and  only 
reason  we  can  have  for  believing  in  an  extinction  of 
consciousness  after  death  is  that  we  see  the  body  has 
become  disorganized,"  And  this  reason  no  longer 
has  any  value,  if  the  independence,  however  partial, 
of  consciousness  in  regard  to  the  body  is  also  a  fact 
of  experience. 

In  spite  of  the  encouragement  which  these 
remarks  bring  to  us,  we  must  not  draw  from 
them  hasty  and  unwarranted  conclusions  re- 
garding the  relation  of  Bergson's  philosophy, 
as  such,  to  the  problem  of  immortality.  Carr 
points  out  clearly  the  status  of  the  question  on 
the  basis  of  the  philosophy  of  change.^^  After 
discussing  the  interrelations  of  spirit  and  mat- 
ter, he  continues : 

The  same  considerations  apply  to  the  question  of 
personal  immortality.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  pos- 
sible to  regard,  nay  that  we  must  regard,  the  soul 
as  a  reality  distinct  in  every  respect  from  the  body, 
the  body  being  an  extension,  the  soul  a  duration, 
and  there  is  no  single  attribute  which  is  common  to 

"  H.  Wildon  Carr,  The  Philosophy  of  Change,  cf.  pp.  193- 
195. 


IMMORTALITY  271 

both.  But  then  we  have  seen  that  it  is  only  in  action, 
and  in  the  change  which  action  imphcs,  that  the  soul 
endures,  and  it  is  only  in  the  solidarity  of  mind  and 
body  that  action  is  known  or  conceivable.  Conse- 
quently if  we  could  give  any  meaning  at  all  to  the 
soul  in  entire  separation  from  its  activity  in  the  body, 
we  must  in  imagination  supply  something  to  take 
the  place  of  the  body.  It  certainly  seems  that  mind 
exists  quite  apart  from  the  particular  circumstances 
of  the  organism  in  which  its  individual  activity  be- 
gins and  ends,  each  at  a  definite  moment,  for  life 
passes  from  one  individual  to  another  by  means  of 
the  most  slender  material  thread.  It  seems  to  have 
the  power  of  concentrating  itself  in  a  germ  which, 
when  we  judge  it,  as  we  needs  must,  by  its  mass,  ap- 
pears infinitely  insignificant.  Yet  it  also  seems  that 
this  material  continuity  is  absolutely  essential  in 
order  that  life  and  mind  may  pass  from  generation 
to  generation.  Consequently  the  difl'iculty  there  is 
in  believing  in  personal  immortality  is  much  more 
a  scientific  than  a  philosophic  difficulty.  There  is 
nothing  inconceivable  or  inconsistent  in  the  idea  in 
the  sense  that  it  can  be  shown  to  be  logically  con- 
tradictory or  metaphysically  impossible.  It  is  cer- 
tainly impossible  that  the  soul  of  an  individual  can 
exist  as  that  individual  apart  from  the  body,  because 
it  is  just  that  embodiment  which  constitutes  the  in- 
dividuality. But  it  is  quite  possible  to  imagine,  if 
we  find  it  otherwise  credible,  that  the  miracle  of  a 
resurrection  of  the  body  may  be  a  fact.     Clearly  it 


272  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

would  be  vain  to  seek  in  philosophy  the  confirmation 
of  such  a  belief,  but  also  it  would  be  beyond  the 
sphere  of  philosophy  to  negate  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  nothing  in  philosophy  that  positively 
indicates  such  a  reality  as  an  individual  soul  inde- 
pendent of  the  body,  which  enters  it  at  birth  and 
survives  the  body's  dissolution,  or  which  comes  into 
existence  at  birth  and  retains  that  existence  after 
death.  The  impulse  of  life  that  philosophy  makes 
its  special  subject-matter  is  equally  manifested  in 
the  lowest  form  of  vegetable  and  animal  existence  as 
it  is  in  the  highest  forms  of  intellectual  and  instinc- 
tive activity. 

There  is,  however,  one  form  (perhaps  the  most 
prevalent  form)  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  which  this  philosophy  does  absolutely 
negate, — the  theory  of  Plato  that  the  soul  is  by  its 
nature  eternal  in  the  sense  that  it  is  timeless  and 
unchanging.  According  to  this  theory  the  soul  is  of 
like  nature  with  God,  from  whom  it  emanates  and  to 
whom  it  returns.  Like  God,  it  is  eternal  and  im- 
mortal in  the  sense  that  it  persists  unchanged.  Our 
philosophy  agrees  that  the  soul  is  of  like  nature  with 
God  only  if  we  understand  God's  nature  to  be  the 
unceasing,  ever-changing  freedom  of  creative  life. 
But  there  is  one  distinct  ground  of  personal  hope 
that  this  philosophy  of  change  alone  gives.  We  have 
seen  that  in  the  reality  of  a  pure  duration  the  past 
is  preserved — preserved  in  its  entirety.  Now  if  this 
preservation  of  the  past  is  a  necessary  attribute  of 


IMMORTALITY  273 

pure  duration,  then  may  it  not  be  that  some  means 
exists,  some  may  think  must  exist,  by  which  hfe  pre- 
serves those  individual  histories  that  seem  to  break 
their  continuity  at  death?  If  it  is  not  so  there  must 
be  unaccountable  waste  in  the  universe,  for  almost 
every  living  form  carries  on  an  activity  beyond  the 
maturing  of  the  germ  and  its  transmission  to  a  new 
generation.  It  would  be  in  entire  accordance  with 
what  we  know  if  it  should  prove  to  be  so,  but  we  may 
never  know.  One  thing  is  clear,  the  life-impulse 
bends  us  to  the  practical  task  of  attention  to  life, 
and  wide  though  our  outlook  is  in  comparison  with 
other  forms  of  activity,  we  are  yet  confined  to  an 
infinitely  narrow  view  of  the  reality  of  which  we  are 
a  part. 

I  have  given  this  quotation  rather  at  length, 
but  purposely  so.  Carr  is  an  out  and  out 
apostle  of  the  philosophy  of  change  and  I 
wished  to  indicate  here  the  direction  Bergson's 
ideas  are  taking  among  at  least  some  of  his 
followers,  especially  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  immortality.  Some  may  think  the  result  is 
disappointing.  To  me  it  is  sobering,  but  not 
disappointing.  We  must  not  expect  too  much 
of  philosophy.  I  f  we  look  to  it  to  present  us  with 
a  lively  faith  in  the  future  life,  we  shall  indeed 
be  disappointed.    But  does  that  render  useless 


S74*  BERGSON  AND  RELIGION 

its  efforts  in  this  direction?  I  do  not  think  so. 
Carr  is  evidently  a  little  more  "  tough-minded  " 
than  Bergson  but,  nevertheless,  even  he  goes 
beyond  purely  negative  results.  All  that  we 
have  a  right  to  expect  from  philosophy  is  that 
we  shall  gather  momentum  as  we  proceed 
along  the  track  of  reason  so  that  when  we 
reach  the  end  of  that  track — and  end  it  must, 
sooner  or  later — we  may  rise  surely  and  tri- 
umphantly on  the  wings  of  faith  into  those 
regions  whither  reason  can  never  penetrate  but 
whence  comes,  through  faith,  a  much  needed 
inspiration  for  life.  In  other  words,  the  future 
life  is  a  thing  to  be  believed  in  rather  than  a 
thing  to  be  demonstrated.  This  does  not  mean 
a  blind,  unreasoning,  or  unreasonable  faith, 
but  it  does  mean  faith. 

Now  our  conclusion  with  regard  to  Bergson 
is  that  he  leaves  us  free  to  believe;  nay  more, 
he  furnishes  us  with  a  basis  which  encourages 
us  to  believe.  The  general  tendency  of  his 
thinking  is  spiritual  and  progressive  and  would 
seem  to  be  more  compatible  with  a  Christian 
conception  of  life — whether  here  or  beyond — 
than  with  any  other.    Charles  holds  that  there 


IMMORTALITY  275 

are  only  two  theories  of  the  future  life  which 
are  consistent  with  the  Christian  conception  of 
God,  namely,  conditional  immortality  and  uni- 
versalism.  Bergsonism  is  compatihle  with 
either  view,  "  I  have  come  that  ye  might  have 
life,  and  that  ye  might  have  it  more  ahun- 
dantly."  So  Christ  taught  of  himself  and  so 
Bergson  allows  us,  and  even  encourages  us,  to 
think  of  him,  and  that  too  whether  we  think  of 
the  more  abundant  life  as  here  and  now,  or 
beyond  the  gates  of  death. 


INDEX 


Abbott,  Lyman  132. 
Absolute,   43,   47,   57,    71,    80, 

84,    130,    195,    204. 
Absolute,   the   32,   41,   44,   90, 

95,  99,  100,  107,  113,  114, 

117,  151. 
Absolutism,  37,  45. 
Absolutism,    Bergson's   attack 

on  45  f. 
Absolutistic,  45,  46,  94,  180. 
Absolutists,  45,  52. 
Adaptation     to    environment, 

101. 
Agnostic,    16,   41,    42,   45,    63, 

79,  106. 
Agnosticism,   16,   19,  33,  41-3, 

57,  61,  63,  65,  76,  79,  80, 

115,  237,  238. 
Agnosticism,       Bergson's 

thought  and  44,  76  f. 
America,  9. 

Ancestor   worship,   240. 
Animism,  37,   144,   161. 
Animistic,  14s5. 
Anti-Christ,  92. 
Anti-ethical       tendencies       of 

Bergson,   177,   178,   181  f., 

184. 
Anti-scicntific     tendencies    of 

Bergson,    33,    34,    41,    81, 

169,   178. 
Aquinas,  Thomas  13,  14. 
Aquinas,     Bergson,     Newman 

and  5. 
Arguments    for    immortalitj-, 

242  f .,   252  f. 
Aristotelian,   13,   14,  33,  72. 
Aristotelianism,  14,  15,  69. 
Aristotle,  13. 
Armenian,  246. 


277 


Associatlonist,   204. 
Assumptions  of  deterministic 

science,    189  f. 
Atheist,   106. 
Augustinian,  14. 
Author,  Bergson's  illustration 

from  work  of  an  169. 
Automatisms,  194,  233,  263. 

Baldwin,  J.  Mark  60,  110. 

Balthaser,   Nicholas   109. 

Belief   in   freedom,   186. 

Behgson: 

Creative    Evolution,   30,   38, 

46,  66,  67,  74,  75,  95,  97  f., 

109,   111,   128  f.,   145,   155, 

156,  227,  261  f. 

Emphasis  on  history,   179  f. 

Episteraology,     60  f',     70  f., 

81,  84,  85,  95. 
His  thought  in  relation  to 
Christian  theism,  13-t  f., 
creeds,  84  f.,  development 
of  religion,  139  f.,  ethics, 
166,  181  f.,  finality  of 
Christianity,  114  f.,  i42  f., 
immortality,  237  f.,  in- 
carnation, 113  f.,  theism, 
105  f.,  164  f. 
Idea  of  causality,  198  f., 
creative  evolution,  66  f., 
90  f.,  97  f.,  determinism, 
198  f.,  duration,  50,  66, 
95  f.,  100,  113,  194,  196, 
197,  200  f.,  270,  272  f., 
freedom,  185  f.,  193  f., 
God,  105  f.,  108  f.,  in- 
stinct, 70  f.,  73  f.,  intel- 
lect, 32  f.,  70  f.,  73  f., 
167  f.,  intuition,  71  f.,  75, 


278 


INDEX 


Bergson,  Continued: 

148  f.,  167  f.,  primacy  of 
spirit,  148  f.,  science, 
33  f.,  time,  45,  99,   100. 

Influence  of  9. 

Introduction  to  Metaphys- 
ics, 30,  38,  64,  73,  86. 

Laughter,  essay  on  30,  213. 

Lecture  tour  in  the  United 
States,  179. 

Materialism,  attack  on  52  f. 

Materialistic,  152  f. 

Matter  and  Memory,  30,  55, 
109,  145,  152,  162,  253, 
255  f. 

Mysticism,  dangers  of  177  f. 

Newman  and  Aquinas,  5. 

Objects  of  his  polemic,  31  f. 

On    religion,   8. 

Orthodoxy,  attack  on  45. 

Pantheistic  or  theistic? 
107  f. 

Pluralistic  or  monistic? 
106  f. 

President  of  Society  for 
Psychical    Research,    269. 

Reaction  against  determin- 
ism, 150  f. 

Relation  to  pragmatism, 
31  f.,  to  the  present  sit- 
uation in  France,  Pref. 
viii. 

Religious  values  of  his  idea 
of  evolution,  105  f.,  free- 
dom, 206  f.,  intuition, 
81  f.,  173  f.,  primacy  of 
spirit,    164  f. 

Religious  values  of  his  pro- 
tests, 27  f.,  of  his  theory 
of  knowledge,  76  f.,  89. 
Significance     for     Christian 

thought,  5 
Subjectivism,   179  f. 
Theory    of    life,    65  f.,    of 
matter,  159  f.,  of  memory, 
161,   of  the   "  pure   mem- 
ory,"   53,    146,    162,    163, 


167,  of  "  pure  percep- 
tion," 53,  54,  64,  152,  255, 
258,  259. 
Time  and  Free  Will,  3,  30, 
50,  53,  94,  97,  109,  193  f., 
223,    261. 

Bibliography,  Pref.  x,  5,  6,  64. 

Biological,  *37,  46,  105,  150, 
155,  238. 

Biologists,  150. 

Biology,  35,  131,  151. 

"  Board  of  Guardians,"  51. 

Body,  the  110,  144,  145,  156, 
161,  163,  229,  249,  253, 
255,  257,  259,  269  f. 

Bornhausen,  Karl,  6,  153  f., 
167. 

Boutroux,  Emile  192. 

Brain  and  mind,  158,  190  f., 
252  f. 

Buddhist  view  of  immortality, 
240  f. 

Bursting  shell  figure,  67,  68. 

Cabanis,   238. 

Caird,    Edward   11. 

Calvinism,  193,  214. 

Capitalism,  215. 

Carr,    H.    Wildon   64,   76,   78, 

95,     170,     171,     190,     193, 

270  f. 
Carr  on  immortality,  270  f. 
Categorical   imperative,   181  f. 
Catholic,   15,   174. 
Causality,   198  f. 
Cause,  98. 

Chamberlain,  S.  H.,  168. 
Change,    130,    131,     168,    190, 

216,  270  f 
Charge  of  materialism  against 

Bergson,   152  f. 
Charles,  R.  H.,  247,  274,  275. 
Charpin,  Frederic  153 
Chemical,  156. 
Chemistry,  38,  39. 
Chinese  view  of  immortality, 

240. 


INDEX 


279 


Christ,  5,  29,  134,  136,  193,  215, 

275. 
Christian,    13,    14,    16,   26,   29, 

44,  113f.,  123  f.,  131,  134, 

136  f.,   143,   147,    165,   184, 

220,  227,  230,  231,  246  f., 

252,  274,  275. 
Christian    thought,    Bergson's 

sigMificance  for  5. 
Christianitv,    11,    16,    24,    26, 

29,   44,"  87,    114,    116,    131, 

136,    139,    142,     184,    216, 

228  f.,  235,  248,  275. 
Christianity   and    immortality, 

248  f.,   252,   274  f. 
Church,  the  13  f.,  87,  88,  134, 

180. 
Cicero,  212. 

Cinematograph,    72,   84,    159. 
Coignct,   C.    6. 
Comic  in  animals,  the  212. 
Communion     with    God,    177, 

206,  210  f. 
Comparative  religion,  139  f. 
Comte,  A.  92. 
Concepts,   73,   87,    170. 
Conditional    immortalitj',   275. 
Conscience,  83,   183. 
Conscious,    160,   162,   163,   181, 

182,  200  f.,  234,  256,  262, 

267. 
Consciousness,     54,     55,     103, 

104,    106,    108,     109,    111, 

152,    158,     159,    162,    170, 

171,  191,  201,  234,     253  f., 

262,  263,  266  f. 
Conservation    of  energj',    149, 

202,  203. 
Contingent,  201,  202. 
Conversion,   religious  222  f. 
Cooperation    with    God,    206, 

214  f. 
Corbit-re,  Charles  6,  106. 
Corrance,   H.   C.    108,   130. 
Cosmic  soul,  163,  164. 
Cosmos,    110. 
Creation,  49,  99,  100,  109,  118, 


133,    145,    152,    158,    194, 

252,  266. 
Creative,    110,    208,    213,    225, 

227,    277,    230,    232,    233, 

272. 
Creative  Evolution,  Berg.son's 

30,  38,  46,  66,  67,  74,   75, 

95,  97  f.,   109,   111,   128  f., 

145,  155,   156,  227,  261  f. 
Creative    evolution,    Bergson's 

idea  of  90  f. 
Creator,    107  f.,    146,   176. 
Creeds,  51,  84,  87,  88,  134. 
Creeds,  Bergson's  thought  and 

84  f. 

Dante,  246. 

Death,    187,  229,  265  f. 

Deist,  110. 

Democritus,    55. 

Determinism,    31,    34,   37,    57, 

94,    149  f.,    188  f.,   198. 
Determinism,    Bergson's    idea 

of  198  f. 
Deterministic,  36,  37,  93,  141, 

149,     150,    161,    188,     192, 

193,  198. 
Determinists,    189,    199. 
Development       of       religion, 

Bergson's      thought     and 

139  f. 
Dignity  of   religion,  83  f. 
"  Ding-an-Sich,"  the  77. 
Dogma,  84  f. 

Dogmatic,  41,  57,  89,  101,  114. 
Dogmatism,  31,  34,  40,  41,  46, 

47,    122. 
Dogmatists,  46,  52,  88,  89. 
Doubt  regarding  immortality, 

237  f.",    219  f.,    270  f. 
Douglas,   5. 
Dualism,  36,  108,  159. 
Duration,    50,    66,    95  f.,    100, 

113,   194,    196,   197,  200  f., 

270  f. 
Dynamics,    198. 
Dynamism,   201, 


280 


INDEX 


Ecclesiastes,  25,  248 
Ecclesiastical  presumption,  51, 

122. 
Ecstasy,    174,    181. 
Edghill,  E.  A.  16,  17. 
"Elan  vital,"  66,  67,  95,  159. 
Eleatics,   the   50. 
Empiricism,  39. 
End,  61,  129,  130,  133. 
England,  9. 
English,  24. 

Environment,  98,  101,  117,  187. 
Epiphenomenalism,  53,   253. 
Epistemology,  Bergson's  60  f. 
Eschatologv,  135,  240,  247. 
Eternal  life,  133. 
Ethical,  20,  145,  146,  164,  166, 

167,    181,    184,    213,    214, 

228,  232,  235. 
Ethical     value     of     Bergson's 

doctrine  of  the  soul,  166. 
Ethics,   6,   7,  35,   36,   62,   165, 

181  f.,   234. 
Ethics,   Bergsonian   181  f. 
Ethnic   faiths,   142. 
Eucken,   R.   5. 
Evil,  problem  of  120  f. 
Evolution,  45,  46,  49,  57,  66  f., 

78,    90  f.,    149,    157,    161, 

203,    213,    231,    235,    238, 

243,    251,    261  f. 
Evolution      and      mechanism, 

91  f. 
Evolution,   Bergson's   idea   of 

66  f.,  97  f., 
Evolutionary      systems,      his- 
toric 90  f. 
Extensity,  50, 


Facts  against  belief  in  free- 
dom, 187  f. 

Faith,  81,  82,  87  f.,  115,  120  f., 
143,  147,  154,  176,  180, 
192,  225,  239,  244  f.,  260, 
266,  273,  274. 

Faith  and  intuition,  173  f. 


Faith  and  reason,  20  f. 

Fatalism,  121,  133,  230. 

Fatalistic,  214. 

"  Father,"  the  134  f.,  215. 

Fechner,   43,   44. 

Fichte,  245. 

Finalism,  47,  49,  99,  102,  111, 

116,  117,  127  f. 
Finalists,  48,  98,   112,  117. 
Finality,   115,   128,   129. 
Finality        of        Christianitj% 

Bergson's      thought      and 

the  114  f.,  142  f. 
Flux,   127,   128. 
Formalism,  167,  174,  176. 
France,  Pref.  viii,  9. 
Freedom,  49,  50,  56,  103,  104, 

110,    117,    130,    154,    157, 

166,    167,    183,    263,    264, 

272. 
Freedom       and       iconoclasm, 

217  f. 
Freedom  and  morality,  220  f. 
Freedom    of    the    individual, 

185  f. 
Free   will,   49,   150  f.,   261. 
French,  24. 

Galatians,  Book  of  193,  220. 

German,  24. 

"  German    Ideologists,"   245. 

Germany,  9,  244. 

Gerrard,  5. 

Gillouin,  Rene  34,  151. 

Gnosticism,  151. 

Gnostics,   173. 

God,  28,  29,  42,  46,  49,  51,  52, 
80  f.,  86  f.,  103,  105,  106, 
108  f.,  115  f.,  130,  132  f., 
145  f.,  148,  164,  176,  177, 
183,  187,  189,  206  f.,  245, 
248,  264,  268,  272,  275. 

God,  Bergson's  idea  of  105  f. 

God  growing,  49,  100,  116  f., 
119,  125  f. 

God,  omnipotence  of  116  f., 
124  f. 


INDEX 


281 


God,    omniscience    of    116  f., 

124  f. 
Goethe,  167. 
Gospel,  the  113. 
Greek,  29,  60. 

"  Habit  memory,"  162,  167, 
Haeckel,    90,    91,    92. 
Harnack,   17. 
Heathenism,   139. 
Heaven,  246. 
Hebraism,    139. 
Hebrew,  240. 
Hebrew-Christian,  143. 
Hebrew   Prophetism,  229. 
Hebrew  view  of  immortality, 

239  f . 
Hebrews,  239,  245. 
Hegel,   90. 
Hegelian,  140. 
Hegelian     view     of     religion, 

11  f. 
Hegelians,  11,  91. 
Heracleitan,   5. 
Hermann,  E.  5. 
Hermann,   W.    16,   17. 
Historical,    181,   248. 

History,    131,    149,    155,    179, 
180,   183,  245. 

History,    Bergson's    emphasis 
on   179  f. 

Hoffding,    211. 

Holt,  Henry  79,  179,  246. 

Human    longing    for    immor- 
tality, 241  f. 

Humanitarianism,   61. 

Hume,   76. 

Hymenoptera,   66,   170. 

Iconoclasm  and  freedom,  217. 
Idealism,   11,  32,  53,   93,   131, 

173. 
Idealist,  17. 
Idealistic,  32,   149,   167. 
Illusion,  42,  50,  185,  241,  252. 
Immanent,  106,   108,  109,  164. 
Immortality,    104,    155  f.,    163, 

227  f ., '  237  f . 


Immortality,       Bergson's 

thought   and  237  f. 
Immortality,    is    belief    in    it 

universal?  237  f. 
Incarnation,  113,  114. 
Incarnation,        Bergson's 

thought  and  113f. 
Indestructibility     of     matter, 

149. 
Indian,  113. 
Individuality,    230,    231,    234, 

245,  249,   250. 
Indi%'iduals,   68,   99,    104,    111, 
161  f.,  182,  183,  216,  229  f., 
235,     241,     247  f.,     259  f., 
265,    268,   271  f. 
Industrialism,  215. 
Inertia,   74. 
Infinite,  the  229. 
Influence  of  Bergson,  9. 
Instinct,     67,     69,     70,     72  f., 

170  f.,   2(il,  262,   268. 
Instinct,     Bergson's     idea    of 

70  f.,  73  f . 
Intellect,  32,  33,  39,  64,  66, 
67,  70  f.,  76,  78,  81,  82, 
84,  85,  130,  159,  169  f., 
176,  178,  190,  194,  197, 
209,  241,  242. 
Intellect,    Bergson's    idea    of 

32  f.,  70  f.,  73  f.,   167  f. 
Intellcctualism,  150,  180. 
Intelligence,     110,     HI,     116, 

262. 
Introduction    to    Metaphysics, 
Bergson's   30,   38,   64,   73, 
86. 
Intuition,    33,    37,    38,    71  f., 
104,   151,   153,   166  f.,  211, 
217. 
Intuition,    Bergson's    idea    of 

71  f.,  75,   148  f.,   167  f. 
Intuition        and        mysticism, 
173  f.,  and  religious  faith, 
81  f.,    173  f.,   and   science, 
177  f. 
Iron  filings  illustration,  98. 


282 


INDEX 


Islam,   193,   214,   229,   230. 
Italy,  9. 

Jacks,  L.  P.  43,  44,  172,  232. 

James,  William  31,  32,  93. 

Jehovah,   176,  240,  245. 

Jerusalem,   193. 

Jesus,  87,  134,  135,  144,  177. 

Jewish,    135,   241,   248. 

Job,   248. 

Joussain,  A.  6. 

Judaism,    125,    229,    240,   241, 

247. 
Judaizing,  29. 

Kaftan,  17. 

Kant,  6,  30,  110,  151,  162,  182, 

183,    244,   245. 
Kantian,    159. 
Keyserling,  Herman  graf  von 

251. 
Kingdom    of    God,    123,    135, 

136. 
Kinship  with  God,  206  f. 

Language,  73,  87,  156,  204. 

"  Last  Judgment,"  Michael- 
angelo's    246. 

Lmtghter,  Bergson's  essay  on 
30,  212. 

Lecture  tour  in  the  United 
States,   Bergson's   179. 

Legalism,  29,   180,  228,  229. 

Leibnitz,   40. 

Le  Roy,  E.  5,  26,  64,  71,  108. 

Levine,  Louis  7,  8,  109,  160, 
165,  174,  234,  267. 

Libertarian,    195,   204. 

Liberty,  106,  109. 

Life  Impulse  as  object  of 
worship,   154  f. 

Limitation   in   God,   102. 

Limits  of  scientific  determin- 
ism,   192. 

Lincoln,   19. 

Lindsay,   A.   D.   64,   168. 

Literary  composition,  illustra- 
tion  from  75. 


Locke,   60. 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver  106,  107. 

Logic,  31,   33,   72,   79,  85,  95, 

100,    173,   214. 
London,  269. 

Lord's  Prayer,  the  137,   138. 
Loveday,   T.    179. 
Lovejoy,  A.  O.  91. 
Luther,   29 

McDougall,  William  36,  144, 
161. 

Macintosh,  5,   174. 

Material,   148,    149,   268. 

Materialism,  31,  36,  52  f.,  61, 
65,   152  f.,   159,   162,  256. 

Materialism,  Bergson's  at- 
tack   on    52  f . 

Materialism,  how  to  refute  55. 

Materialist,   17,  53,  55. 

Materialistic,    152,   185. 

Matter,  38,  39,  47,  53  f.,  66, 
68,  74,  98,  99,  104,  107  f., 
144,  145,  151,  152,  157  f., 
167,  185,  201,  202,  209, 
228,  232,  233,  255  f.,  264, 
270. 

Matter,  Bergson's  theory  of 
159  f. 

Matter  and  Memory,  Berg- 
son's 30,  55,  109,  145, 
152,  162,  253,  255  f. 

Mechanical,  39,  91,  94,  127, 
145. 

Mechanism,  39,  47,  49,  91,  99, 
102,  117,  128,  129,  144, 
167,  201. 

Mechanism  and  finalism,  46  f. 

Mechanistic,  39,  46,  47,  128, 
161. 

Mechanists,  48. 

Mediators,  124. 

Memory,  77,  162,  163,  224, 
255  f. 

Memory,  Bergson's  theory  of 
161. 

Meredith,  J.  C.  71. 


INDEX 


283 


Mero-gnostic,  80. 
Messianic,  2-tO. 
Metapiior,  73,  85. 
Metaphorical     conception     of 

dogma,  85  f. 
Michaelangelo,  246. 
Mind,  53,  !08,  144,  152,  157  f., 

191,    197,    204,    238,    249, 

252,  2()l,  270. 
Miracle,   36. 
Missionaries,   139. 
Missionary  work,  140,  143. 
Modernists,  9,   13,   108. 
Modern   skepticism   regarding 

freedom,    185  f. 
Moleschott,   239. 
Monism,   106,   108. 
Monistic,   108. 
Moral,  105,  220,  221,  228,  229, 

232,  233. 
Moral     equivalent     for     war, 

232. 
Morality,  26,  62,  183,  216,  221, 

231,  232,  235. 
Mories,  A.  S.  5,  174. 
Motion,    145. 
Muck-raker,  28. 
Muirhcad,  J.  H.  64,  107,  108, 

111,    133,    173. 
Mystic,  5,  112,  174  f.,  216,  228. 
Mysticism,    5,    82,    103,     169, 

171,    173,    174,    180,    181, 

216,  228. 
Mysticism,   Dangers  of  Berg- 

sonian    177  f. 

Napoleon,  245. 

Natural  selection,  98. 

Nature    religions,   214. 

Necessity  of  dogma,  87  f. 

Neo-platonic,    5. 

"  New   Logic,"   the   72. 

Newman,     Hcrgson,    N    , 

and    Aquinas,   5. 
"  New  Realism,"  the  72,  94. 
"  New   Realists,"  the  94. 
Nineteenth    century    thought, 

148  f. 


Nirvana,  241, 
Norm,  114  f. 

Objects  of  Bergson's  po- 
lemic,   31  f. 

OlymiJJans,    29. 

Omni])otence,  49,  118  f.,  126, 
132,    135,    136. 

Omnipotent,  117,  120,  124, 
125. 

Omniscience,  49,  118,  119, 
122,    126,     132,     135,    136. 

Omniscient,    116,    124,    125. 

"  Once  Born "  type  of  re- 
ligion,  207,   209. 

"  Oj)eii  Door  Theory,"  tlie  94. 

Optimistic,  44. 

Organism,  117,  129,  249,  269, 
270. 

Oriental  and  occidental  re- 
ligion  comj)ared,    112  f. 

Ortiiodox  view  of  miracle  ex- 
plained, 36. 

Orthodoxy,  Bergson's  attack 
on    45. 

Osier,  William  237. 

Oughtness,  feeling  of  181   f. 

Pagan,  123. 
Paganism,    124. 
Palmer,  W.  Scott  164. 
Pantheism,   103,  106,  108,   112, 

176,  229. 
Pantheism,  value  of  112. 
Pantheist,  107,  108,  111. 
Pantheistic,   112. 
Parable   of  sheep   and   goats, 

216. 
Parallelism,  53,  253,  254. 
Paul,    29,    120,    193,    207,    216, 

220. 
Pauline,   225. 
Paulsen,   60. 
Perception,    54,    72,    162,    163, 

173. 
Personal,    109,    110,    160,    161, 

164,     185,    229,    241,    252, 

266,  271. 


284 


INDEX 


Personal  worth,  sense  of  229  f. 

Personality,  68,  109,  110,  132, 
133,  158  f.,  198,  204  f., 
210,  213,  217,  224,  230, 
245,   250,  267. 

Personality  of  God,  Bergson 
on  the  108  f. 

Pessimism,  44. 

Petitionary  prayer,  123  f. 

Phases  of  life  influencing  be- 
lief in  freedom,  192. 

Philosophy  and  belief  in  im- 
mortality, 274. 

Philosophy  and  religion,  rela- 
tion of  Pref.  v-vi,  10  f. 

Physical,  155,  157,  181,  189, 
191,  197  f.,  214,  215, 
238  f.,  249  f.,  259,  261. 

Physical  and  psychological 
determinism,  203  f. 

Physical  sciences,  35,  74. 

Physics,   38,   39. 

Physiological,    191,   203,   254. 

Physiological  psychologists, 
185. 

Physiology,   35. 

Place  of  protest  in  life,  27  f. 

Plan  of  book,  Pref.  vi-vii, 
23  f. 

Plato,  168,  272. 

Platonic,  131. 

Plotinus,  3,   173. 

Pluralism,    94,    106,    107,    108. 

Pluralist,  108. 

Pluralistic,   107. 

Pogson,  translator  of  Time 
and  Free  Will,  3,  194. 

Polemic,  33,  34,  45,  62,  63, 
112. 

Positivist,  106. 

Practical  nature  of  dogma, 
85  f. 

Pragmatism,  Bergson  and  31, 
32. 

Pragmatic,  31,  93,   150. 

Pragmatists,  31,  32,  78,  94, 
173. 


Prayer,    118,    123,    124,    137, 

138. 
"  Preacher,"  the  42. 
Predestinarian,  214, 
Predestination,   49. 
Present    situation    in    France, 

Bergson's       relation       to 

Pref.  viii  f. 
Priest,  George  M.  245. 
Primacy  of  Spirit,  148  f. 
Pringle-Patterson,  60,  62,   63. 
Progress,  human  218,  219. 
Prophets,  Hebrew  29,  116. 
Protest,  34,  40,  50,  57. 
Protestant,   12,  27  f. 
Protestant,  Bergson  the  27  f. 
Protestantism,  32. 
Protestants,  great  29  f. 
Providence,  46,  98,  99,  116  f. 
Psychic,     57,     148,     156,     157, 

160,  162,  164,  181,  182, 
191,  198  f.,  243,  254,  257, 
258. 

Psychical     Research,     Society 

for  269. 
Psychological,   46,   47,   56,   95, 

97,  100,  128,  130,  155,  174, 

202,   203,  258,  268. 
Psychologists,     56,     145,     150, 

185,  238. 
Psychology,   35,   37,   144,    151, 

161,  197,    198,  204,  256. 

"  Pure  Memory,"  the  53,  146, 

162,  163,   167. 

"Pure  Perception,"  53,  54, 
64,   152,  255,  258,  259. 

Purpose,   45,   52. 

Purpose  in  the  universe,  46  f., 
98f.,   116  f.,   128  f. 

Qualitative,  114,  197. 
Quality,  50,  96,  97. 
Quantitative,    114,   197. 
Quantity,   50. 

Rational,   110,  243. 
Rationalism,  31. 


INDEX 


286 


Rationalistic,  31,  46. 

Rationality,  242 

Reaction  against  determinism, 
Bergson's   150  f. 

Realism,  53,  173. 

Reality  as  "  Becoming,"  95  f. 

Reality,  how  do  we  know  60  f. 

Reason  and   faith,  20  f. 

Reasons  against  materialistic 
explanation  of  mind, 
190  f. 

Recent  tendencies  in  thought, 
93  f.,  148  f. 

Relativism,  C3,   174. 

Relativity  of  knowledge,  38, 
71,   77. 

Religion  and  belief  in  free- 
dom, 192  f.,  belief  in  im- 
mortality, 245  f.,  252, 
democracj-,  235  f.,  phi- 
losophy,  Pref.   V  f.,   10  f. 

Religion,   13ergson   on  8. 

Religion,  possibility  of  rise  of 
a   new   114  f. 

Religious  difficulties  raised 
by  Bergson's  idea  of  evo- 
lution,  106  f. 

Religious  values  of  Bergson's 
idea  of  evolution,  105  f., 
idea  of  freedom,  206  f., 
idea  of  intuition,  71  f., 
75,  148  f.,  167  f.,  idea  of 
the  primacy  of  spirit, 
164  f.,  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, 76  f.,  89,  protests, 
27  f. 

"Representative  Memory"  162, 
167. 

Resurrection  of  the  body,  271. 

Revelation,  110,  113,  115,  122, 
139,   142. 

Ritschl,  16,  17. 

Ritschlian,    18. 

Ritschlianism,    15  f. 

Ritschlians,  17. 

Ritual,  20. 

Roman  Catholic,  12  f. 


Roman  Catholics,  12,  13. 
Romanticism   and    religion,   6. 

Sabatier,   A.   87,   88. 

Salvation,  139,  142,  226  f. 

Scholastic,    113. 

Science,  6,  9,  19,  34,  37  f.,  46, 
47,  66,  71,  72,  74,  76,  82, 
101,  104,  150,  151,  161, 
168  f.,  188  f.,  193,  194, 
197,  203,  237,  253,  254. 

Science  and  agnosticism,  41  f., 
freedom,  188,  immortal- 
ity, 237  f.,  249  f.,  270  f., 
philosophy,  37  f.,  religion, 
40. 

Science,  Bergson's  idea  of 
33  f. 

Scientific,  31,  34,  35,  37,  40, 
41,  57,  133,  149,  1.50,  178, 
180,  181,  190  f.,  203,  254, 
271. 

Scientific  determinism,  Berg- 
son's  attack   on   34  f. 

Scientists,  34,  35,  91,  100,  188. 

Sheaf  figure,   Bergson's   140. 

Shell  figure,  Bergson's  140,  141. 

Sheol,   239  f.,  247. 

Simultaneity,  50. 

Skepticism,  14,  46,  63,  76,  79. 

Slosson,   E.   E.   173,  232. 

Social,  9,  21,  87,  88,  105,  156, 
165,  182,  196,  211,  212, 
215,  216,  234  f.,  247,  248. 

Sophists,   Greek   CO. 

Soul,  5,  37,  56,  57,  99,  104, 
144  f.,  161  f.,  173,  175, 
176,  182,  186,  204,  209, 
212,  213,  221,  225,  232, 
249,  253  f.,  270  f. 

Soul,  distinct  existence  of 
161  f. 

Soul,  evolution  and  the  144  f. 

Source  of  life  spiritual,  160. 

Space,  55,  97,   195,   196. 

Spaulding,  E.  G.  72. 

Species,  68. 


286 


INDEX 


Spencer,  90,  91,  92, 

Spencerian,  45,  77,  90,   140. 

Spinoza,  40. 

Spirit,  53,  55,  79,  99,  104,  109, 
188,  189,  207,  209,  215, 
233,  254  f. 

Spiritism,  161. 

Spiritual,  57,  103,  109,  110, 
112,  134,  148  f.,  207,  210, 
213,  219,  228,  229,  242, 
248,  265,  268. 

Spiritualism,  53,  55. 

Static  view  of  reality  com- 
bated, 95  f. 

Steenbergen,  A.  70,  233. 

Stoicism,   61. 

Subconscious  self,   150. 

Subjectivism,  63. 

Subjectivism  in  Bergson, 
179  f. 

Succession,  50,  96,  196,  197, 
199. 

Supernatural,  207. 

Symbolic,  38,   88. 

Symbolic  view  of  dogma,  84  f. 

Symbolism,  66,   100. 

Symbols,  38,  97,  168,  197,  198. 

Syndicalists,  9. 

Teleological,  127,  261,  263. 

Teleology,  45,  46,  102,  262, 
265. 

Tendency,  131. 

Tertullian,  246. 

"  Theanthropic  "  religion, 
206  f. 

Theism,  110,  111,  116,  130, 
134,   137,    138,    165. 

Theism,  Bergson  and  105  f., 
164  f. 

Theism,  Bergson  and  Chris- 
tian 1.34  f. 

Theistic,  110,  112,  138,  165. 

Theists,  107,  110,  138. 

"  Theocratic  "    religion,    206  f. 

Theological,   111,   133,   181. 

Theologians,  145,  246. 


Theories  of  knowledge,  his- 
toric 65. 

Theory  of  knowledge,  Berg- 
son's  59  f.,  65,  66,  70  f., 
81,  84,  88,  95, 

Theory  of  knowledge,  im- 
portance of  having  a  62  f. 

Theory  of  life,  Bergson's  65  f. 

Theory  of  life,  relation  to 
theory  of  knowledge,  65  f. 

Theory  of  matter,  Bergson's 
159,  160. 

Time  and  Free  Will,  Berg- 
son's 3,  30,  50,  53,  94, 
97,  109,  193  f.,  197  f., 
202  f.,  223,  261. 

Time,  Bergson's  idea  of  45, 
99,  100,  168,  195,  197,  198. 

Turk,   246. 

"  Twice  Born "  type  of  re- 
ligion, 209. 

Underbill,    5. 

Universalism,    275. 
"  Unknowable,"    the   45,   77. 
Utilitarian,  181. 
Utilitarianism,  61,  165. 

Validity  of  knowledge,  62  f,, 
76,  78,  82,  83. 

Validity  of  religious  knowl- 
edge, 82  f. 

Value  of  belief  in  immortal- 
ity, 244  f.,  of  epistemol- 
ogy,  63,  of  the  individual, 
229  f.,  250  f.,  261  f. 

Vital  Impetus,  the  52,  66  f., 
95,  98,  99,  105,  108,  111, 
116,  117,  129,  131,  133, 
136,  141,  142,  155  f.,  160, 
163,  166,  175,  179,  181  f., 
208,  213,  221,  222,  225  f., 
233  f.,    261. 

Vitalistic,  144,  150. 

Vitalistic  school,  the  93. 

Wordsworth  quoted,  80 
"World   Flight,"   228. 


BERGSON'S  CREATIVE  EVOLUTION 

Tr»nslated  from  the  French  by  "Dr.  Arthur  cMitchtll 

8th  printing,  $2.50  net,  by  mail  $2.67. 

"Bergson's  resources  in  the  way  of  erudition  are  remark- 
able, and  in  the  way  of  expression  they  are  simply  phe- 
nomenal. ...  If  anything  can  make  hard  things  easy  to 
follow  it  is  a  style  like  Bergson's.  It  is  a  miracle  and  he 
a  real  magician.  Open  Bergson  and  new  horizons  open 
on  every  page  you  read.  It  tells  of  reality  itself  instead 
of  reiterating  what  dusty-minded  professors  have  written 
about  what  other  previous  professors  have  thought.  Nothing 
in  Bergson  is  shopworn  or  at  second-hand." — William  James. 

"A  distinctive  and  trenchant  piece  of  dialectic.  .  .  .  Than 
its  entrance  upon  the  field  as  a  well-armed  and  militant 
philosophy  there  have  been  not  many  more  memorable  occur- 
ences in  the  history  of  ideas." — Nation. 

"To  bring  out  in  an  adequate  manner  the  effect  which 
Bergson's  philsophy  has  on  those  who  are  attracted  by  it 
let  us  try  to  imagine  what  it  would  have  been  like  to  have 
lived  when  Kant  produced  his  'Critique  of  Pure  Reason.' " — 
Hibbcrt  Journal. 

"Creative  Evolution  is  destined,  I  believe,  to  mark  an 
epoch  in  the  history  of  modern  thought.  The  work  has  its 
root  in  modern  physical  science,  but  it  blooms  and  bears 
fruit  in  the  spirit  to  a  degree  quite  unprecedented.  .  .  . 
Bergson  is  a  new  star  in  the  intellectual  firmament  of  our 
day.  He  is  a  philosopher  upon  whom  the  spirits  of  both 
literature  and  science  have  descended.  In  his  great  work 
he  touches  the  materialism  of  science  to  finer  issues.  Prob- 
ably no  other  writer  of  our  time  has  possessed  in  the  same 
measure  the  three  gifts,  the  literary,  the  scientific,  and  the 
philosophical.  Bergson  is  a  kind  of  chastened  and  spirit- 
ualized Herbert  Spencer." — John  Burroughs  in  the  Atlantic 
Monthly. 

HENRY     HOLT     AND     COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS  NEW  YORK 


DARWINISM   TO-DAY 

By  Prof.  Vernon  L.  Kellogg,  of  Leland  Stanford  University, 
Author  of  "American  Insects,"  etc.  395  pp.  and  index.  8vo. 
$2.00  net;    by  mail,  $2.15. 

A  simple  and  concise  discussion  for  the  educated  layman  of 
present-day  scientific  criticism  of  the  Darwinian  selection 
theories,  together  with  concise  accounts  of  the  other  more  im- 
portant proposed  auxiliary  and  alternative  theories  of  species- 
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sources  and  to  the  author's  own  observations  and  experiments. 

"Its  value  cannot  be  overestimated.  A  book  the  student  must  have  at 
hand  at  all  tLme.s,  and  it  takes  the  place  of  a  whole  library.  No  other 
writer  has  attempted  to  gather  together  the  scattered  literature  of  this 
vast  subject,  and  none  has  subjected  this  literature  to  such  uniformly 
trenchant  and  uniformly  kindly  criticism.  Pledged  to  no  theory  of  hia 
o/VTi,  and  an  investigator  of  tlie  first  rank,  and  master  of  a  clear  and  force- 
ful literary  style,  Professor  Kellogg  is  especially  well  fitted  to  do  justice 
to  the  many  phases  of  present-day  Darwinism." — David  Btarr  Jordan 
in  The  Dial. 

"May  be  unhesitatingly  recommended  to  the  student  of  biology  as  well 
as  to  the  non-professional  or  even  non-biological  reader  of  intelligence  .  .  . 
gives  a  full,  concise,  fair  and  very  readable  exposition  of  the  present  status 
of  evolution." — The  Independent. 

"Can  write  in  English  as  brightly  and  as  clearly  as  the  old-time  French- 
men ...  a  book  that  the  ordinary  reader  can  read  with  thorough  enjoy- 
ment and  understanding  and  that  the  specialist  can  turn  to  with  profit 
as  well  ...  in  his  text  he  explains  the  controversy  so  that  the  plain  man 
may  under  stand  it,  while  in  the  notes  he  adduces  the  evidence  that  the 
specialist  requires.  The  whole  matter  is  thoroughly  digested  and  put  in 
an  absolutely  intelligible  manner  ...  a  brilliant  book  that  deserves  gen- 
eral attention." — New  York  San. 

"The  balance-sheet  of  Darwinism  is  struck  in  this  work  .  .  .  the  attack 
and  the  defense  of  Darwinism,  well  summarized  .  .  .  the  value  of  this 
book  lies  in  its  summing  up  of  the  Darwinian  doctrines  as  they  have  been 
modified  or  verified  down  to  date." — Literary  Digest. 


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